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Big science infrastructures are confronting increasing demands for public accountability, not 
only within scientific discovery but also their capacity to generate secondary economic value. 
To build and operate their sophisticated infrastructures, big science often generates frontier 
technologies by designing and building technical solutions to complex and unprecedented 
engineering problems. In parallel, the previous decade has seen the disruption of rapid 
technological changes impacting the way science is done and shared, which has led to the 
coining of the concept of Open Science (OS). Governments are quickly moving towards the 
OS paradigm and asking big science centres to "open up” the scientific process. Yet these 
two forces run in opposition as the commercialisation of scientific outputs usually requires 
significant financial investments and companies are willing to bear this cost only if they can 
protect the innovation from imitation or unfair competition. This PhD dissertation aims at 
understanding how new applications of ICT are affecting primary research outcomes and the 
resultant technology transfer in the context of big science and OS.  It attempts to uncover the 
tensions in these two normative forces and identify the mechanisms that are employed to 
overcome them. The dissertation is comprised of four separate studies: 1) A mixed-method 
study combining two large-scale global online surveys of research scientists (2016, 2018), 
with two case studies in high energy physics and molecular biology scientific communities 
that assess explanatory factors behind scientific data sharing practices; 2) A case study of 
Open Targets, an information infrastructure based upon data commons, where the European 
Molecular Biology Laboratory-EBI and pharmaceutical companies collaborate and share 
scientific data and technological tools to accelerate drug discovery; 3) A study of a unique 
dataset of 170 projects funded under ATTRACT—a novel policy instrument of the European 
Commission led by European big science infrastructures—which aims to understand the 
nature of the serendipitous process behind transitioning big science technologies to 
previously unanticipated commercial applications; and 4) A case study of White Rabbit 
technology, a sophisticated open-source hardware developed at the European Organization 
for Nuclear Research (CERN) in collaboration with an extensive ecosystem of companies. 
Keywords: big science, open science, open-source hardware, data commons, information 
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1.1 Introduction to the topic of the PhD thesis 
Big science, defined as large-scale and capital-intensive scientific collaborative efforts 
(Weinberg 1961), has provided societies with frontier technologies that have impacted 
businesses, markets, and people's lives. One major characteristic of these infrastructures is 
that they cannot use off-the-shelf technologies to conduct their experiments and 
measurements. Instead, they require unique solutions to unprecedented engineering problems 
that severely challenge technology suppliers and thereby serve as drivers of innovation. 
Famous examples of technologies impacting business are the World Wide Web (specifically 
HTTP, URL, HTML), the capacitive touch screen conceived at first for mastering the 
controls of the Super Proton Synchrotron at the European Organization for Nuclear Research 
(CERN), and also the detection, imaging, and computational technologies developed for 
advanced scientific measurement and analysis which have demonstrated tremendous potential 
for many industries such as advanced manufacturing, medical diagnostics and imaging, 
biotechnology, and microelectronics (Bressan 2014a, 2014b).   
The tremendous potential of big science centres to innovate has equally not gone unnoticed 
by policymakers who, after the "carte blanche" attitudes of early big-science endeavours 
(Autio, Bianchi-Streit et al. 2003) and the softening of their geopolitical ethos (Hellström and 
Jacob 2012; Weinberg 1961, 1963, 1964), have increasingly demanded a broader higher 
return on investment via commercialisation of their technologies and research outputs 
(normative vector 1: technology transfer) (Autio 2014; Autio et al. 2004; Autio, Hameri et al. 
2003; Castelnovo et al. 2018; Hallonsten 2014; Heidler and Hallonsten 2015). Although there 
is extensive literature describing big science’s technological contribution to business and 
society, most of those studies have treated these organisations as a “black box”, just as 
“sources of spin-offs, licenses and new knowledge” (Autio et al. 2004 p. 107). Little is 
known about how big science infrastructures can actively cultivate the transfer of their 
technologies to unanticipated and “outside” applications to fulfill the public policy plea 
(Autio 2014; Autio et al. 2004). 
In parallel, the previous decade has seen the disruption of rapid technological changes, 
primarily in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), impacting the way 
science is done and shared. Several terms have appeared to mark the impact of ICT in 
science: e-science (Crowston et al. 2008, 2009; David and Spence 2003; Stockinger 2005), 
the fourth paradigm in scientific discovery (Atkins et al. 2003; Hey 2009), and cyberscience 
or science 2.0 (Borgman 2010; Edwards 2019). The scientific process has long been one of 
the leading application areas of ICT and the rapid technological evolution in the last decade 
has been transforming science with the emergence of new research methods that capitalise on 
advanced computational resources, distributed infrastructures that support long-term sharing 
and reusing of data collections and scientific instruments. Data intensity, powered by 
computational hardware, software and research processes, is allowing scientists to carry out 
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experiments at unprecedented levels in terms of scale and volume (Borgman 2010; 
Dougherty and Dunne 2011; Hey 2009). Social computing is also enabling new behaviours in 
communication and collaboration among scientists, where researchers are using multiple 
tools to share elements of their research: from literature reviews (e.g. Zotero1), to data (e.g. 
Figshare2) or their electronic lab notebooks (e.g. Scinote3) (OECD 2015) 
Within such a framework, opening up and sharing data, code, scientific experimental devices, 
and any primary research output has become increasingly important. This phenomenon has 
led to the coining of the concept of Open Science (OS), which describes an approach to 
research based on greater access to any primary outputs of research with minimal restriction 
while fostering broader collaboration and transparency through all the stages of the scientific 
process (David 2003; OECD 2015). In this context, opening up and sharing data through data 
infrastructures, code (open-source software), engineering tools (open-source hardware), notes 
(electronic lab notebooks) and any possible primary research output have become 
increasingly crucial in particular in big science settings which have the policy mandate to 
widely disseminate all possible scientific outputs generated (Atkins 2003; Borgman 2015; 
European Commission 2014, 2019; OECD 2015).  Governments are quickly moving towards 
the OS paradigm and asking public research institutions and big science centres to "open up" 
the scientific process—often making these practices requisite for continued funding (vector 2: 
open science) (European Commission 2014).  
Yet these two forces run in opposition: Big science centres must negotiate a tension between 
their goal of generating revenue and economic stimulus via transferring their technologies to 
the market (vector 1: technology transfer), with the additional plea by policymakers of 
increasing openness in the way science is performed and diffused (vector 2: open science). 
The commercialisation of scientific outputs usually requires significant financial investments 
and companies are willing to bear this cost only if they can protect the innovation from 
imitation or unfair competition (Caulfield et al. 2012; David 2003; Dosi et al. 2006; 
Perkmann and Schildt 2015).  
Hence, the overarching goal of this PhD dissertation is: 
(1) To understand the tension between the two normative forces that big science 
infrastructures face (i.e. technology transfer and open science (OS)) by uncovering the 
mechanisms that are employed to overcome the challenges that lie at the root of such tension.  
To understand this tension requires understanding the macro phenomenon of each of the 
vectors (i.e. open science and technology transfer) as external forces that at times can work 
contradictorily. Hence, we seek:  
 
                                               
1 About Zotero: https://www.zotero.org/ 
2 About Figshare: https://figshare.com/ 




(1.1.) To understand the dynamics behind the aim of opening up primary research outputs 
(i.e. open science vector).  
(1.2.) To understand the dynamics of steering big science activities towards transferring their 
technological solutions to previously unanticipated commercial applications (i.e. technology 
transfer vector).  
Understanding the dynamics of the exogenous influence of the openness vector (1.1) and the 
technology transfer vector (1.2.) will inform our goal (1) to understand the tension between 
the two that at times can work contradictorily, and to elucidate the specific mechanisms that 
organisations use to reconcile the tensions caused by the two vectors.   
1.2 Structure 
This PhD thesis adopts the form of four studies, all written for publication. Each of these four 
studies responds to a step in the research strategy to accomplish the aforementioned 
overarching research goal of understanding the dynamics and tension within and across open 
science and technology transfer vectors and uncovering the mechanisms that are employed to 
overcome them. 
• Chapter 2 presents the overarching framework in which the four studies are 
developed and introduces the research gaps and research questions that each study 
addresses. It provides an overview of the four complementary studies.  
• Chapter 3 is the first of the four studies, which aims at understanding the first 
vector: open science, responding to the first sub-goal (1.1.) of our PhD 
investigation. In particular the study will shed light on the dynamics behind 
opening up scientific data and the explanatory factors behind the gradual and 
disparate adoption of data sharing practices across scientists. With this purpose, 
the study engages in a mixed-method design combining survey data collected in 
2016 (n=1,162) and 2018 (n=1,029) and qualitative data from two case studies 
sequentially sampled of two information infrastructures within two scientific 
communities (i.e. high-energy physics and molecular biology).  The study draws 
upon the notion of “epistemic cultures” originated from the sociology of science 
and a collective action theory perspective to understand the incentives and 
deterrents that scientists confront when considering contributions to the collective 
goods of data sharing (i.e. data commons). 
• Chapter 4 is the second empirical study, which consists of a micro-study of a 
single case that gives us insight into the different mechanisms that help reconcile 
the main tensions between the first exogenous influence presented (i.e. open 
science) and technology transfer. The study analyses the governance processes in 
the development of an information infrastructure based upon data commons in the 
big science field of molecular biology. The study examines the exemplary case of 
 
 5 
Open Targets (OT), a large-scale information infrastructure created by leading 
organisations in bioinformatics, genomics, and pharmaceuticals that include for-
profit companies, non-profit foundations, and public research organisations. 
Under collective action theoretical lenses, the study theorises about the 
governance conditions of modularity and brokerage that enable a fluid process of 
transitioning between open and opaque spaces of work in the development of the 
information infrastructure. This fluid dynamic helped navigate many of the trade-
offs between private and collective interests in the development of shared resource 
pools composed of heterogeneous members with different objectives. 
• Chapter 5 is the third study, which aims at understanding the second vector: 
technology transfer, responding to the second sub-goal (1.2.) of our PhD 
investigation. The study seeks to understand the nature of the serendipitous 
process behind transferring big science technologies to alternative and previously 
unanticipated commercial applications by looking at the modes towards its 
realisation. Leveraging a unique dataset of 170 projects funded under 
ATTRACT,4 a novel policy instrument of the European Commission aiming to 
harness the detection and imaging technologies of the leading European research 
infrastructures towards entrepreneurship, the study uncovers four serendipity 
modes showing the potential of directed interventions enabling organisations to 
find unexpected commercial applications of big science research. 
• Chapter 6 is the fourth study which consists of a micro-study of a single case that 
gives us insight into the different operational levers that help reconcile the main 
tensions between the two exogenous influence presented (i.e. open science and 
technology transfer). In particular, the study will assess the development of White 
Rabbit (WR), an OSH initiated at CERN and deployed as a powerful precision 
and synchronisation technology in many industrial settings where time accuracy is 
critical. Through the investigation of WR, the study contributes to recent 
conceptualisations of digital objects by uncovering the differences from hybrids to 
purely non-material digital objects and elucidates what happens when we 
transpose the open-source model of development to a hybrid object. As a lens to 
understand how different attributes of objects require different development 
models, we adopt relevant constructs from Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) 
and examine its utility as a predictive theory of open source hardware 
development. 
                                               
4 The members of ATTRACT are as follows: the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), 
European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), European Southern Observatory (ESO), European 
Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF), European X-Ray Free-Electron Laser Facility (European XFEL), and 
the Institut Laue-Langevin (ILL), Aalto University, Esade Business School, and the European Industrial 




• Chapter 7 integrates the main conclusions, theoretical and practical contributions, 
limitations, and suggestions for future research from the four articles. 
 





























 Overarching Framework 
This chapter discusses the phenomenon under investigation, related constructs and literatures, 
presents the research question, offers an overview of the four empirical studies that constitute 





2.1 Big science 
First coined by physicist Alvin Weinberg (1961), big science is a term used to refer to 
research organisation with high capital intensity, long-lasting facilities or networks, operating 
in monopoly or oligopoly conditions, and affected by externalities that produce social 
benefits via the generation of new knowledge, either pure or applied (Bozeman 2000). While 
big science was initially devoted to nuclear physics and astronomy, it has spread to other 
disciplines such as molecular biology, where scientists are tapping into data resources and 
computational infrastructures.  
Under the label of big science infrastructures, there is (alphabetically): CERN, European 
Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF), 
European Southern Observatory (ESO), Institut Laue Langevin (ILL), Joint European Torus 
(JET), International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and the now-completed 
Human Genome Project. 
2.2 The role of ICT in big science 
Science, and in particular big science (Au 2014; Borgman 2015; Hey 2009), has been one of 
the leading application domains of ICT. Multiple constructs have emerged to describe how 
ICT has transformed scientific research (e.g. eScience, eResearch, cyberscience or science 
2.0) and the supporting systems that emerged to assist such transformation (e.g. 
cyberinfrastructures). Big science research could not be understood today without high-
performance computing supporting the analyses of large volumes of data or without the 
diverse internet-enabled applications affording scientists access to a variety of resources 
including other scientists’ workflows. Supercolliders, telescopes and a diverse set of large 
instruments are operated by large distributed research teams employing a wide range of ICT 
applications.  
The fundamental nature of the data produced in such big science infrastructures has also 
changed: More than 200 petabytes of data are now permanently archived in CERN’s tape 
libraries, which come from the particles collided in the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) 
detectors that generate about one petabyte of collision data per second (Gaillard 2017); more 
than 120 petabytes are archived in EMBL-EBI, which have experienced a deluge of 
biological data after the completion of the human genome in 2003 (Cook et al. 2018); and 
large volumes of data coming from remote sensing in satellites have revolutionised 
environmental sciences.  
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Within such a context, while seeking to accomplish their primary goal of conducting 
groundbreaking scientific research, big science centres face two exogenous demands that 
affect how they do it. First, they are requested to generate secondary socio-economic benefits 
and returns on investment by transferring the technologies developed for their scientific 
experimentation to other industrial settings. Second, they need to maximise the dissemination 
of their primary research outputs by disclosing with minimal restrictions their data, code, and 
the design of their engineering tools (OSH) so that others can re-use them.  
2.3 Two normative vectors 
2.3.1 First normative vector: Open Science 
Whereas the origins of OS are rooted in the norms of science articulated by sociologist 
Robert Merton (1973) who stressed the co-operative character of inquiry, the current 
developments of ICT transforming scientific practices have led to an emergent approach to 
research that reduces the barriers to sharing any form of research output, methods or tools at 
any stage of the research process (Friesike et al. 2015). The expression is used as an umbrella 
term that encapsulates open access to publications, open research data, open-source software, 
open-source scientific hardware, open distributed collaboration, open peer review, and 
citizen science.  
OS was one of the clear political priorities of Commissioner Moedas. In 2014, the European 
Commission launched a public consultation about OS, which, in 2015, resulted in a policy 
agenda to foster it in Europe. This policy engagement led to the launch of the Open Science 
Cloud, a federated data infrastructure with cloud-based services to offer the scientific 
community an open environment for storing, sharing, and re-using scientific data, and the 
implementation of several actions contained in the Amsterdam Call for Action on OS. Also, 
in the United States, the Federal Crowdsourcing and Citizen Science Act were signed into 
law in January 2018. The requirements from funding agencies have incorporated the mandate 
of opening up research data and making it publicly available: US National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) in 2003 for grants over $500,000 (NIH 2003), the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) in 2010 (Borgman 2012), and the European Commission for Horizon 2020 program in 
2014 (European Commission 2014).  
Governments are quickly moving towards the OS paradigm and asking public research 
institutions and big science centres to "open up" their processes with particular attention to 
their data, meaning to make it freely available for other scientists to reuse.  However, only 
recently has the literature started capturing the factors inhibiting scientific data sharing, 
suggesting that it imposes increased costs on scientists and their institutions without 




Tenopir et al. 2015; Wallis et al. 2013). Considering the tensions between policymakers and 
funding agencies’ efforts to foster data sharing and the apparent barriers to its wide adoption, 
we lack an understanding of the multifaceted and complex dynamics behind the normative 
force of sharing research data and the explanatory factors behind the drivers for and 
barriers to sharing research data. 
2.3.1 Second normative vector: Technology Transfer 
Since the 1970s, public research institutions have faced demands for greater accountability of 
public spending, which have only grown in the current climate of budgetary austerity. In 
particular, big science accounts for a large proportion of publicly-funded research. With the 
conclusion of the Cold War, the direct link between big science, nuclear physics, and 
government expenditures on defence programs decreased. As a result, big science 
infrastructures faced more vigorous appeals to demonstrate their social value, not only in 
scientific discovery but also for the economy and society in general (Autio 2014; Autio et al. 
2004; Schmied 1982).  
Often associated with numerous technological innovations gestated during WWII, such as 
radar and wireless communication, big science infrastructures generate frontier technologies 
by severely challenging technology suppliers with sophisticated engineering problems that 
require never-seen technologies. By conducting experiments and measurements with 
unprecedented technological specifications, big science cannot use off-the-shelf technologies, 
thereby serving as an incredible driver of innovation, while significantly advancing the 
technical and organisational capacities of technology suppliers. Besides the immediate 
applications within experimentation and instrumentation, many of these technologies find 
alternative applications that were not part of their original scope within the scientific facility. 
Famous examples of research technologies gestated in big science centres impacting business 
are the World Wide Web (specifically HTTP, URL, HTML) at CERN, and also the detection, 
imaging, and computational technologies developed for advanced scientific measurement and 
analysis in the framework of such infrastructures which have demonstrated tremendous 
potential for many other industries such as advanced manufacturing, medical devices and 
imaging, biotechnology, and microelectronics.  
The tremendous potential of big science centres to innovate has equally not gone unnoticed 
by policymakers who, after the "carte blanche" attitudes of early big-science endeavours 
(Autio, Bianchi-Streit et al. 2003), have increasingly demanded a broader higher return on 
investment via commercialisation of their technologies and research outputs (Guston 2000). 
However, the difficulties of transitioning these technologies and technical knowledge from 
the big science setting to “outside” their organisational setting, i.e. technology transfer 
(Bozeman 2000), are substantial. The primary goal of such big science infrastructures is to 
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drive cutting-edge scientific research. Neither their cultures nor their governance is optimised 
for technology commercialisation. As such, different efforts have been put in place to 
provide the demand-side pull on these frontier technologies. For instance, most big science 
infrastructures set up specific structures, such as technology transfer offices (TTOs) (Siegel 
et al. 2003), as well as internal protocols and policies that seek to foster business 
collaboration. For example, the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) created 
EMBL Enterprise Management Technology Transfer (EMBLEM), an affiliate and the 
commercial arm of the EMBL in 1999; CERN set up the Knowledge Transfer Group in 1997, 
which provides active service to CERN by managing and advising on all activities related to 
technology transfer. Moreover, since 2012, the organisation has set up business incubation 
centres (BICs) throughout its Member States (nine at present) to support entrepreneurs in 
taking CERN technologies and know-how to market. 
While big science is famous for its capacity to bring new technologies to society in 
applications previously unanticipated, yet there is a limited amount of rigorous empirical 
research on the nature of the serendipity behind such process, which refers to a broad, 
multifaceted phenomenon related to the unanticipated discovery of something beneficial. Big 
science infrastructures are often treated as “black boxes” from which studies only grasp the 
outputs of the serendipity process by counting licenses or spin-offs (Autio 2014; Autio et al. 
2004), but we lack knowledge on how such infrastructures can proactively realise such 
serendipity process (Autio 2014; Autio et al. 2004; Autio, Hameri et al. 2003; Castelnovo et 
al. 2018; Hallonsten 2014; Heidler and Hallonsten 2015).  
Extant literature on serendipity has mostly been based on small-sample or anecdotal 
examples of scientific discoveries, and has mainly focused on the individual scientists' 
experiences as opposed to a more systemic level of analysis (Autio 2014). Hence, questions 
remain around how to move towards the technology transfer vector and how to shift 
serendipity towards proactively finding market applications for big science. There is a need 
for studies that put forward empirical examinations of serendipity to understand the dynamics 
that lie at the root of policy demands for leveraging big science technologies into market 
applications.  
2.4 Managing the tension between technology transfer and open science 
While OS promises to enhance the efficiency and quality of research by lowering data 
collection costs and fostering collaboration throughout the research process, it is unclear in 
the literature how a deliberate decision to share the scientific process openly with no 




outputs (Caulfield et al. 2012; David 2003, 2004; Dosi et al. 2006; Perkmann and Schildt 
2015).  
One of the most famous and unprecedented examples reflecting such friction between 
openness and economic returns via commercialisation of technologies was the World Wide 
Web when Tim Berners- Lee on April 30, 1993, convinced managers at CERN to place it in 
the public domain and make the IP freely available to everyone. By accepting this, CERN 
effectively agreed not to draw revenues or economic value from it. The tension emerges in 
other examples, for instance in the Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS), which came on-stream 
in 1976. It was the first accelerator to have a computerised control system. At that time, 
mastering the controls of the big new accelerator required technological ingenuity that led to 
the invention of the world's first capacitive touch screen. To develop the technology at that 
time, CERN worked with one of its suppliers. The development of the technology involved 
new techniques for metallisation on various substrates, which was the object of patent rights. 
However, when Bent Stumpe, CERN's scientist, was asked to sign a nondisclosure 
agreement, he refused, arguing that all inventions at CERN should be open. The supplier at 
this time was interested but unable to invest in the project unless the organisation could 
commit itself not to disclose the technology to third parties. As a consequence, CERN's 
involvement with the further development of touch screens ended and these technologies 
were put on hold and reinvented and brought to market in many applications by other players 
years later around the world (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2010).  
Finally, the case of the Human Genome Project also provides an example from the life 
science field, when a global publicly-funded consortium, challenged by a parallel 
commercial effort, decided to open up all draft sequences of genes and made them available 
to everybody (Shreeve 2005). Had commercial pressure dominated, this could have led to a 
global “genome gold-rush” (Boulton et al. 2012).  
These examples reflect the inherent tension regarding effects that greater openness in the 
scientific process powered by ICT may pose to the financial protection and exploitation of 
the technologies resulting from scientific activity (Dosi et al. 2006; Perkmann et al. 2013; 
Perkmann and Schildt 2015; West 2008). The commercialisation of scientific outputs usually 
requires significant investment, and companies are only willing to bear this cost if they can 
protect such outputs from imitation or unfair competition (Ågerfalk et al. 2015; Ågerfalk and 





2.5 Research question 
Hence, the overarching research question guiding my dissertation is:  
 
How are new applications of ICT affecting research processes and the resultant technology 
transfer in the context of big science and open science?   
  
To answer our research question we will interrogate the two forces in isolation: open science 
(study 1) and technology transfer (study 3) and will explore through two single-case studies 
the different operational levers that help reconcile the main tensions between these two 
exogenous forces.  In particular, we selected two of the constructs under the OS umbrella for 
their empirical prominence, significant impact on how businesses collaborate with big 
science and their theoretical relevance for the IS discipline:  
a) Data commons (also called “open data in research” or “data collaboratives"’). Data 
commons co-locate data, storage, and computing infrastructures with commonly used 
services and tools for analysing and sharing data to create an interoperable resource for the 
research community (Grossman et al., 2016).  
b) Open source hardware (OSH) refers to tangible artifacts—machines, devices, or other 
physical things—whose design is made publicly available in such a way that anyone can 
study, modify, distribute, make, and sell the design or hardware based on that design (Open 
Source Hardware Association 2012).  
2.6 Overview of four complementary studies 
As briefly introduced in section 1.2, to respond to the aforementioned overarching research 














Figure 1. Overview of the four complementary studies 
 
 
While the first and third studies offer us a contextual overview of the dynamics in the two 
vectoral forces of open science (study 1) and technology transfer (study 3), the studies on 
Open Targets (OT) (study 2) and White Rabbit (WR) (study 4) provide us with the required 
depth to understand the specific mechanisms that organisations use to reconcile the tensions 
caused by these two trajectories. Both studies, WR and OT, offer a complementary 
perspective on describing the tensions of these two exogenous forces by examining two 
different OS dimensions: OSH in WR, and data commons in OT. The two case studies come 
from two leading big science infrastructures in two different fields: high-energy physics 
(CERN) and molecular biology (OT), and offer us some variance when investigating the 
mechanisms that emerge to overcome the tensions. That is, in the case of WR it is hardware 
with embedded operating, middleware, or application-level software applied as a 
synchronisation device in multiple industrial settings (OSH), while for OT it is data and 
technological tools to accelerate R&D development processes in drug discovery (data 
commons). Both studies share the unit of analysis by looking at the ecosystem of 
organisations that contributed to the development of WR, namely firms’ network and 
research organisations and their interactions when developing WR; and the organisations that 
develop OT information infrastructure, that is, big science infrastructure, pharmaceutical and 





















































While these two investigations are paramount in our inquiry, the two larger studies 
addressing sub-goals 1.1. and 1.2 provide us with the contextual overview to understand the 
dynamics in each normative vector, that is, the difficulties behind opening up scientific data 
by exploring the factors behind the gradual and disparate adoption of data sharing practices 
across scientists (i.e. first study: open science vector); and the nature of the serendipitous 
process behind transferring big science technologies to alternative and previously 
unanticipated commercial applications (i.e. third study: technology transfer vector).  
The units of analysis of the four studies are also complementary: the first study investigates 
the researcher perspective (individual level of analysis); the second and fourth study 
investigate the ecosystem of organisations participating in Open Targets and White Rabbit, 
and the third study is at a project level of analysis investigating the serendipitous mode in 
ATTRACT projects. This complementarity provides us with a holistic examination of the 
friction generated by the two exogenous forces.  
In terms of research design (see Table 2), the four studies display heterogeneity in methods. 
The first study employs a mixed-method approach where the survey data of two global online 
surveys in 2016- 2018 are compared and combined with qualitative data of two case studies. 
The second and fourth studies consist of single-case qualitative studies based on primary and 
secondary data. The third study codifies 170 project proposals (3,000 words on average) to 
identify patterns across proposals and cluster them by identifying four main serendipity 
modes. The variety in methods responds to the needs of each specific study question, while it 
helps to provide a global view of the phenomenon under study, that is, the dynamics within 






Table 1: Overview of the four empirical studies 
Study # 1: The stickiness 
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2.7 The theoretical basis of the four empirical studies 
The disparity of the technological objects at the core of each work (open-source hardware, 
data commons), the different perspectives employed (from micro-foundations to the 
ecosystem level) and the heterogeneity in the specific interrogations of the four studies led to 
the adoption of different theoretical foundations to more appropriately and effectively guide 
each study towards progress in the common overarching research objective of the dissertation 
(see Figure 2 below).  
Figure 2. Overview of theoretical foundations employed across studies 
 
As a result, the first study of the dissertation combines a cultural perspective from the 
sociology of science that draws on the notion of “epistemic cultures” (Knorr Cetina 1999) 
and a collective action theory perspective (Hardin 1968, 1982; Olson 2009; Ostrom 1990) 
that seeks to understand the complex, intricate system of incentives and disincentives that 
scientists confront when considering whether to contribute to the collective goods of data 
sharing. 
The second study relies on the literature on information infrastructures (Constantinides 2012; 
Constantinides and Barrett 2015; Hanseth and Monteiro 1997) and adopts a collective action 
theory approach (Hardin 1968, 1982; Olson 2009; Ostrom 1990) to identify the many trade-
offs between private and collective interests in the development of shared resource pools 
composed of heterogeneous members with different objectives.  
The third study is based on prior literature on serendipity (Fink et al. 2017; Garud et al. 2018; 
















Finally, the fourth study builds upon the literature on digital objects and artifacts (Faulkner 
and Runde 2019; Kallinikos et al. 2013; Orlikowski and Iacono 2001; Yoo 2010) and open-
source (Benkler 2002; Dahlander and Magnusson 2008; Feller and Fitzgerald 2002; 
Fitzgerald 2006; Fitzgerald and Feller 2002; Howison and Crowston 2014; O’Mahony and 
Ferraro 2007) while adopting transaction costs economics theoretical lenses (Williamson 
1975, 1985, 1996). These theoretical underpinnings help us to effectively isolate how OSH 
differs from what we know about open-source software and better inform the challenges 




Table 2. Overview of the research design of the four empirical studies 
Study # 1:  The stickiness of scientific 
data 
2: Opaque spaces of the commons: 
Governing information 
infrastructures in Life Sciences 
3: Systematising 
serendipity for big science 
infrastructures 
4:  From bits to atoms: 
White Rabbit at CERN 
Research 
Question 
Do researchers share their data? 
How do they share their data? 
Which mechanisms emerge to 
enable researchers to share their 
data? 
How do organisations develop 
commons-based information 
infrastructures that govern access to 
collective resources while 
simultaneously protecting members’ 
private interests? 
What are the formative 
conditions of serendipity 
transforming big science 
research towards 
commercial applications? 
How do the attributes of a 
hybrid object and its 
components affect the open-





Collective action theory 
Information Infrastructures 
Collective Action theory 







Comparative Longitudinal Cross-sectional Longitudinal 
Data Survey data 2016 (n=1,162) 
Survey data 2018 (n=1,029) 
2 cases: High energy physics 
(Reana) and molecular biology 
(Open Targets) 
1 case: Open Targets 170 project proposals (3,000 
words each)  
1 case: White Rabbit 
Analyses Mixed-method study: 
Comparing data practices across 
time (2016- 2018) and scientific 
communities (High energy 
physics and molecular biology) 
Qualitative study: Analysis of 
primary and secondary data to 
identify governance mechanisms and 
conditions that align organisations’ 
individual and collective interests 
Qualitative study: 
Clustering and coding 
serendipity modes 
Qualitative study: Analysis 
of primary and secondary 
data to relate object 





2.8 Research process and scholarly contributions  
The four articles of this dissertation are in different stages of publication. The first article, co-
authored with Jonathan Wareham, is based on the research done in the framework of the 
Open Science Monitor commissioned by the Directorate General of Research and Innovation 
of the European Commission and published by the European Commission: 
Pujol Priego L, Wareham J. "REANA: Reproducible Research Data Analysis 
Platform: Open Science Monitor Case Study". European Commission Directorate-
General for Research and Innovation, B-1049 Brussels. 2019. 
http://publications.europa.eu/publication/manifestation_identifier/PUB_KI0219176E
NN. Accessed March 20, 2019. 
Pujol Priego L, Wareham J. “Zenodo”. European Commission Directorate-General 
for Research and Innovation, B-1049 Brussels. 2019. 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b5187345-f3b1-11e9-8c1f-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-118580915. Accessed March 20, 
2019 
Pujol Priego L, Wareham J. “Open Targets: Open Science Monitor Case Study”. 
European Commission Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, B-1049 
Brussels. 2018 
http://publications.europa.eu/publication/manifestation_identifier/PUB_KI0518020E
NN. Accessed March 20, 2019. 
Pujol Priego L, Wareham J. “Pistoia Alliance: Open Science Monitor Case Study”. 
European Commission Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, B-1049 
Brussels; 2018. 
http://publications.europa.eu/publication/manifestation_identifier/PUB_KI0618230E
NN. Accessed March 20, 2019. 
Pujol Priego L and Wareham J. “Yoda: Open Science Monitor Case Study.” 
European Commission Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, B-1049 
Brussels. 2018. 
http://publications.europa.eu/publication/manifestation_identifier/PUB_KI0518019E
NN. Accessed March 20, 2019 





The second article, also co-authored with Jonathan Wareham, was presented in:  
Pujol Priego, L. and Wareham, J. D. (2019) "Open Targets: Pre-competitive 
Collaborative Research in Life Sciences." Academy of Management Proceedings. 
Vol. 2019. No. 1. Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510: Academy of Management, 2019. 
The manuscript is currently in preparation for submission to a leading IS journal.  
The third article written with Jonathan Wareham, A. Romasanta, T. Wareham Mathiassen, 
M. Nordberg and P. Garcia Tello was revised and resubmitted (under the second round of 
review) to Technovation in March 2020.  
The fourth article is co-authored with Jonathan Wareham and was presented in:  
Pujol Priego, L. and Wareham, J. D. (2018) “Time as a service: White Rabbit at 
CERN” International Conference on Information Systems Proceedings. Vol. 2018. 
San Francisco: Association for Information Systems. 
It has been submitted in February 2020 to MIS Quarterly (under review)  
Finally, this research has also informed the following studies: 
Brunswicker, S., Pujol Priego, L. and Almirall, E. (2019). Transparency in 
policymaking: A complexity view. Government Information Quarterly. Volume 36, 
Issue 3, July 2019, pp. 571-591 
Pujol Priego L. and J. Wareham “Emergent open strategies to accelerate innovation: 
Lessons from the Pharmaceutical industry” Harvard Deusto Business Review, No 
289, 05/2019, p. 70-81 
Susanne Beck, Carsten Bergenholtzj, Marcel Bogers, Tiare-Maria Brasseura, Marie 
Louise Conradsen, Diletta Di Marcou, Daniel Dörler, Agnes Efferta, Benedikt 
Fecher, Despoina Filiou, Thomas Gillierh, Christoph Grimpeb, Marc Gruberk, 
Carolin Haeusslerl, Florian Heigl, Karin Hoislp, Katie Hyslopa, Olga Kokshaginat, 
Marcel LaFlammea, Cornelia Lawson, Wolfgang Lukas, Markus Nordberg, Maria 
Theresa Nornj, Marion Poetz, Gernot Pruschak, Laia Pujol Priego, Agnieszka 
Radziwon, Janet Rafners, Alexander, Rusero, Henry Sauermann, Julia Suess-Reyesa, 
Sonali K. Shahk, Jacob F. Shersons, Christopher L. Tucci, Philipp Tuertscher, Jane 
Bjørn Vedel, Roberto Verganti, Jonathan Wareham, Sunny Mosangzi Xu. 2019 
"Open Innovation in Science" Industry and Innovation (lead article in the special 




Book Chapter: Osimo, D., Pujol Priego, L., and Vuorikari, R. (2017). Alternative 
Research Funding Mechanisms: Make Funding Fit for Science 2.0. Research 2.0 and 
the Impact of Digital Technologies on Scholarly Inquiry (pp. 53-67). IGI Global. 
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 The Stickiness of Scientific Data: Epistemic 
Cultures and a Collective Action Dialogue 
The article that constitutes this chapter aims at understanding the first vector: open science, 
which responds to the first sub-goal (1.1.) of our PhD investigation. The study empirically 
investigates the dynamics behind sharing scientific data while interrogating the explanatory 








Researchers are generating unprecedented volumes of data. As the expectations of big 
scientific data grow, the expectations on the potential of sharing it and allowing others to 
mine, aggregate, and recombine it with other data for novel findings grow as well. As such, 
government funding entities, particularly in Western Europe and the US, have placed open 
data at the crux of scientific policy. While sharing scientific data has been positively 
promoted for some time now, only recently have several challenges become apparent, 
suggesting that data sharing imposes increased costs on scientists and their institutions 
without commensurate professional benefits. Considering the tensions between policymakers 
and funding agencies’ efforts to foster data sharing and the apparent barriers to its wide 
adoption, we lack 1) a recent overview of data being shared across scientists (if and what); 2) 
how researchers share their data (how), and 3) what mechanisms enable research data sharing 
(why). Our study engages in a mixed-method design by combining survey data collected in 
2016 (n=1,162) and 2018 (n=1,029) to explore data sharing behaviours of scientists across 
disciplines and countries; and qualitative data from two case studies sequentially sampled 
within two scientific communities of the disciplines surveyed (i.e. physics and life science): 
high-energy physics (HEP) and molecular biology (MB). As a lens to understand the factors 
behind data sharing practices, we draw upon the notion of epistemic cultures, originated from 
the sociology of science, and the collective action theory perspective to shed light on the 
incentives and deterrents that scientists confront when considering contributions to the 
collective goods of data sharing. 
 
Keywords: open science, scientific data sharing, data commons, epistemic cultures, 
collective action theory.  
3.2 Introduction 
In September 2011 OPERA (Oscillation Project with Emulsion-tRacking Apparatus) 
researchers fired a 730 km beam of muon neutrinos from CERN (European Organization for 
Nuclear Research) to the Gran Sasso National Laboratory in central Italy at what appeared to 
be faster than the speed of light. Puzzled by these results, they decided to upload all the data 
with unprecedented granularity at arXiv.org. The scientific team included all the necessary 
procedural descriptions so that other scientists could search for an explanation for this 
surprising violation of physical law. More than 200 papers emerged and were shared at 
arXiv.org trying to explain the effect. With ruthless external scrutiny, the mystery was 
resolved within a year: the OPERA team announced the identification of two potential 
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sources of timing error that corrupted measurements (Royal Society 2012). Many similar 
examples abound on the scientific and social value of data sharing; but if researchers were 
asked today whether they release their data, what would they answer? 
Researchers are generating unprecedented volumes of data (Hey 2009). Although some 
disciplines have a long tradition of working with big data, particularly the big science 
research infrastructures (Weinberg 1961) for physics and astronomy (Atkins et al. 2003; 
Borgman 2015, 2015; Carillo and Papagni 2014), other disciplines have only recently begun 
to adopt the practice (EIROforum IT working group 2013). Examples of recent adopters of 
big data include computational social science (Lazer 2009), digital humanities (Kaplan 
2015), sensor devices (Wallis et al. 2013), social media data (Plantin et al. 2018) citizen 
science research projects (Hochachka et al. 2012), and political science and public policy 
(Lee et al. 2016). 
Perspectives have evolved, increasing the scale, role, and status of data in recent years. 
Scientific data is now its own scholarly object with dedicated journals such as Nature-
Scientific Data. The increasing use of data-intensive methods has been labelled the “fourth 
paradigm” in science (Atkins et al. 2003; Hey 2009) that augments “the existing paradigms 
of experimental theoretical and computational science” (Edwards et al. 2011 p. 670). As the 
expectations of big scientific data grow, the expectations on the potential of sharing it and 
allowing others to mine, aggregate, and recombine it with other data for novel findings grow 
as well: “If the rewards of the data deluge are to be reaped, then researchers who produce 
those data must share them, and do so in such a way that the data are interpretable and 
reusable by others” (Borgman 2012 p. 1059). Data sharing describes the act of releasing data 
in a form that can be used by others (Pasquetto et al. 2017). If research data needs to be 
shared, it is expected to be FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable and Reusable)5 so that 
it can be easily and effectively discovered and reused. Recent studies have estimated that the 
annual financial cost of not sharing FAIR data to be at least €10.2bn for the European 
economy; an additional estimate of the impact of FAIR on potential economic growth is 
€16bn annually (European Commission 2019b). 
The growing importance of sharing (FAIR) data comes as part of a more general “open” 
movement embracing greater transparency in science (Edwards 2019). Starting with open 
access publishing, it expanded towards open scientific data, open standards, open 
repositories, open bibliography, open lab-notebooks, open-source software and hardware, 
with an endless list of  'open'- qualifiers to all activities in the scientific realm (Friesike et al. 
2015). The urgency of sharing FAIR data is not only grounded in the reproducibility crisis 
                                               
5. The term FAIR was launched in the Lorentz workshop celebrated in 2014. The resulting FAIR principles 




(Baker 2015) or concerns about fraudulent scientific practices (Kupferschmidt 2018) but also 
a recognition of the novel technological and scientific innovations resulting from data sharing 
(Borgman 2010).  
As such, government funding entities, particularly in Western Europe and the US, have 
placed open data at the crux of scientific policy. Carlos Moedas, the former EU 
Commissioner for Research, Science and Innovation, made open research data one of the 
EU’s priorities in 2015. Several expert working groups were put in place (e.g. High-level 
expert group on FAIR data; the Open Science Policy Platform; Expert group on altimetrics) 
to provide advice about how to foster and promote research data sharing in Europe.  In 2016, 
the European Commission launched the Open Science Cloud initiative, a federated data 
infrastructure with cloud-based services to offer the scientific community an open 
environment for storing, sharing, and reusing scientific data. This policy evolution has been 
accompanied by requirements from funding agencies that scientific data be publicly 
available: US National Institutes of Health (NIH) in 2003 for grants over $500,000 (NIH 
2003), the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 2010 (Borgman 2012), and the European 
Commission for Horizon 2020 program in 2014 (European Commission 2014).  
Accompanying policy, new private and public entities have emerged to facilitate the 
aggregation and publication of research data. Examples include the Research Data Alliance, 
the National Data Service, as well as for-profit publishers who attempt to build on existing 
structures (e.g. Mendeley Data) (Borgman 2015). Platforms such as Dataverse (King 2007), 
FigShare (Thelwall and Kousha 2016), Dryad (White et al. 2008), Zenodo (Peters et al. 
2017), DataHub (Bhardwaj et al. 2014), and EUDat (Lecarpentier et al. 2013) have also 
emerged, offering scholars new venues to archive and share their data (Cragin et al. 2010).   
While sharing scientific data has been positively promoted for some time now, only recently 
have several challenges become apparent. In general terms, researchers have identified 
factors inhibiting data sharing, suggesting that it imposes increased costs on scientists and 
their institutions without commensurate professional benefits (Borgman 2015; Edwards 
2019; Edwards et al. 2011; Tenopir et al. 2015; Wallis et al. 2013). Considering the tensions 
between policymakers and funding agencies’ efforts to foster data sharing and the apparent 
barriers to its wide adoption, we lack 1) a recent overview of data being shared across 
scientists (if and what); 2) how researchers share their data (how), and 3) what mechanisms 
enable research data sharing (why).  
Hence, the research questions that this study seeks to answer are: 
RQ1a: Do researchers share their data?  
RQ1b: How do they share their data?  
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RQ2: What mechanisms enable researchers to share their data? 
Our study engages in a mixed-method design to answer the research questions (Venkatesh et 
al. 2013) (Figure 1). First, to answer RQ1a and RQ1b, we employ survey data collected in 
2016 (n=1,162) and 2018 (n=1,029) to explore data sharing behaviours of scientists across 
disciplines and countries. To explain the results from the survey and answer our RQ2 (why), 
we employ qualitative data from two case studies sequentially sampled within two of the 
disciplines surveyed (i.e. physics and life science). We chose these disciplines because they 
displayed the highest rates of data sharing and reuse in our survey findings, yet have 
significantly different scientific cultures, offering some variance needed to investigate the 
factors and boundary conditions behind data sharing practices. Specifically, we selected the 
communities of high-energy physics (HEP) and molecular biology (MB). Two information 
infrastructures (i.e. Reana (HEP) and Open Targets (MB)) were established to facilitate 
scientific data sharing within these communities. Our study complements the survey findings 
through an analysis of the architecture, practices, and governance of each infrastructure. 
As a lens to understand the factors behind the data sharing practices, we draw upon both 
cultural and rational perspectives. The notion of ‘epistemic cultures’ originated from the 
sociology of science but has been subsequently applied in IS and organisational studies to 
understand information and knowledge sharing across communities (e.g. Kellogg et al. 2006; 
Mørk et al. 2008).  This perspective helps us explain the diversity and discontinuity across 
scientific communities and their heterogeneous data sharing practices. We augment a cultural 
perspective with a rational perspective to understand the incentives and disincentives that 
scientists confront when considering contributions to the collective goods of data sharing. 
Towards this, we employ collective action theory (Hess and Ostrom 2003; Olson 2009; 
Ostrom 1990), also used by IS scholars to explain how agents share heterogeneous 
information when developing common information infrastructures (Constantanides 2012; 
Constantinides and Barrett 2015; Vassilakopoulou et al. 2016). Collective action theory 
provides a useful framework to explain why researchers would contribute their data to 
collective resources by identifying incentives that are articulated for scientists to share. We 
believe that these complementary perspectives are useful in elucidating scientists’ data 









Figure 1. A mixed-method approach to answer RQ1a,b, and RQ2 
 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We first provide the research context by 
reviewing the background concepts from the IS and STS pieces of literature to delineate what 
data is and identify the reasons for sharing, or not sharing, scientific data. In a second step, 
we review the theoretical foundations of our research study and sequentially describe our 
methods and results. We follow Venkatesh et al.'s (2013) guidelines on how to present results 
of mixed-method studies: we first present the method and results from the survey data, and 
thereafter, the method and results from the case studies. We synthesise the findings and 
discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the study, its limitations, and future 
directions. 
3.3 Research Context 
An examination of research data sharing practices requires a brief review of the ontology of 
data as portrayed in the academic literature and the role of data in scientific knowledge 
production. 
3.3.1 Conceptual considerations: what (or when) data is 
“Data are representations of observations, objects, or other entities used as evidence of 
phenomena for research or scholarship” (Borgman 2015 p. 18). A more operational definition 
from OAIS (Open Archival Information System) defines data as “a reinterpretable 
representation of information in a formalised manner suitable for communication, 
interpretation, or processing.” Examples of data include: “sequence of bits, a table of 
numbers, the characters on a page, the recording of sounds made by a person speaking, or a 
moon rock specimen” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems 2012 p. 10). 
The first important observation when examining these definitions is that data is created by 
people or machines. Entities may have a material existence or maybe a digital one (e.g. 
signals from sensors), which requires “acknowledge[ing] relationships between data, 
computers, models, and software” (Uhlir and Cohen 2011, as reported in Borgman, 2012a, p. 
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1061).  These entities become data when scientists use them as evidence to understand a 
phenomenon better.  In a seminal work, Susan Leigh Star describes how we may unveil the 
processes by which a scientific fact “emerges which is simultaneously stripped of its 
complexities and isolated from its relationship to a larger work/historical context” (Star 1983, 
pp. 224–225; Kallinikos and Tempini 2014). Thus, data typically involves a process 
(Kallinikos and Constantinou 2015) in which a scientist considers the observation or any 
other entity as evidence for a phenomenon and “collects, acquires, represents, analyses, and 
interprets those entities as data” (Borgman 2015 p. 62). Recognizing that data is a process 
implies that the research context is determinative to what becomes data and how it is 
processed (Kallinikos and Constantinou 2015). As such, it becomes paramount that all 
relevant contextual information is gathered in the description of the data, giving metadata a 
critical role in data sharing practices; metadata increases the utility of data across disciplines, 
time, geography or application domains (Edwards et al. 2011). For data to be reusable for 
those who did not create it, metadata needs to describe how it was generated, measured, and 
recorded. For instance, in biobanks, data creators need to publish highly-detailed descriptions 
of data collection parameters and procedures, including what was excluded or considered 
irrelevant (Demir and Murtagh 2013).  
The conditions, instruments or mechanisms by which data is generated and recorded also 
informs the different types of research data (Kallinikos and Constantinou 2015). The US 
National Science Board distinguishes between: a) observational data, which results from 
identifying and recording facts or occurrences of a phenomenon; b) computational data, 
which results from implementing computer models or simulations; and c) experimental data, 
which is the product of implementing procedures in controlled conditions to test hypotheses 
or discover new laws (National Science Board 2005). Finally, a record is a fourth category 
that encompasses “everything else” not present in the former three. It is essential to 
acknowledge that this categorisation is permeable to some extent: observational data can be 
used in computational models or results from experiments may be used to refine the 
collection of observations.  
The genesis of data may also affect an operational decision about whether to preserve the 
data and for how long (National Science Board 2005). For instance, it is considered essential 
to preserve observational data because it is the most difficult to replicate. Computational data 
requires extensive documentation on hardware, software, input data, and the workflow 
followed. Finally, the replicability of experimental data highly depends on the conditions of 
the experiment (Raphael et al. 2020). Nevertheless, who makes such decisions? Who has the 




3.3.2 Incentives and deterrents for data sharing in science 
Where authors are initially the copyright holders of their academic publications, the 
jurisdiction of data is more ambiguous: uncertainty around ownership, control, and access 
over the data generates tensions. “Even when individuals and groups assign authority for 
data, the rights and responsibilities may remain unclear” (Borgman 2015 p. 43). What 
happens in practice is that raw data usually becomes the “intellectual and physical property 
of their creator” (Bowker 1999 p. 646). Policymakers, funders, and academic institutions are 
working towards an increased awareness that while publications and the knowledge produced 
from the research data pertains to the authors, the underlying data needs to be considered a 
public good (European Commission 2014; OECD 2015) so that its potential value can be 
unleashed (Järvenpää and Markus 2018; Vassilakopoulou et al. 2016). 
Merton (1973) captured the norms of science in the imperatives of disinterestedness, 
communalism, universalism and organised scepticism. These principles highlight the 
cooperative spirit of scientific inquiry and emphasise that knowledge growth stems from 
collaboration where transparency and making scientific processes and outputs public are 
fundamental. Nevertheless, the transparency applied for research outputs such as publications 
does not play the same way for data: while scientists disseminate their publications, this 
differs when it comes to data (Tenopir et al. 2015).  
While the practical concerns of making raw data transparent have been removed by lowering 
the cost of storing digital data and computing progress, other reasons behind non-sharing 
come into play (Table 1). First, there is a lack of incentives and rewards in the scholarly 
system which is heavily biased towards traditional journal and conference dissemination 
(Borgman 2015; Plantin et al. 2018); promotion and tenure decisions rarely take into account 
“subsidiary” products such as data or software contributions (Harley et al. 2010; Howison et 
al. 2015). Relatedly, some journals (e.g. The Journal of Neuroscience (Maunsell 2010)) 
recently announced that they would no longer publish supplementary data as reviewers are 
not able to spend the time required to scrutinise the material. Basically, for scholars driven by 
credit, sharing data offers little benefit, particularly in light of intentions to try to publish 
future articles out of the same data or aggregating it with complementary datasets (Harley et 
al. 2010; Meijer et al. 2017). Other factors include misuse, misinterpretation or liability 
concerns (Meijer et al. 2017; Tenopir et al. 2015; Wallis et al. 2013), in particular the fear 
that their work practices will come under scrutiny (Harley et al. 2010). A lack of skills, 
expertise, and tools to make their data available also hinders the practice (Borgman 2015). 
Finally, the real difficulty and costs associated with getting researchers to record detailed 
metadata are determinative (Edwards et al. 2011).  Scientists' main interest is in using the 
data and they have little incentive to incur the additional overhead of a collective of unknown 
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and future researchers “to whom they are not accountable and from whom they receive little 
if any benefit” (Edwards et al. 2011 p. 673; Gitter 2010). The production of metadata and the 
contextual descriptions of datasets require a critical amount of time to repair mistakes and 
misunderstandings, and researchers prefer to spend more time on new endeavours. Some 
have attempted to calculate the costs of metadata production, which could span an estimated 
two to three weeks from an average of a two-year research grant application (OpenAire 
2019). In a dedicated study to examine high-energy physics practices, the vast majority of 
respondents (94.3%) thought that “the additional effort needed for preparing data for 
preservation in a re-usable form is substantial (more than 1% of the overall effort invested in 
producing and analysing the data) whereas 43.0% think that the supplementary effort is more 
than 10%” (Holzner et al. 2009 p.6). Table 1 summarises these arguments. 
Table 1. Reasons why data sharing is disincentivised in science 
Reasons for not 
sharing 
Description Source 
Lack of credit There is a lack of consistency in the 
way data is cited. 
(Borgman 2015; Meijer et al. 
2017; Parsons et al. 2010; 
Piwowar and Vision 2013) 
Lack of incentives 
and rewards 
The scholarly system is heavily 
biased towards publications and 
secondary products such as data or 
code are rendered far less credit.  
(Harley et al. 2010; Howison 





liability concerns  
Uncertainty over who is going to 
reuse the data and for what purposes 
and lack of understanding of the data 
and thus misuse.  
(Meijer et al. 2017; Tenopir et 
al. 2015; Wallis et al. 2013) 
Lack of skills  Lack of expertise and knowledge of 
tools to make their data available. 
(Borgman 2015; European 
Commission 2019b; Meijer et 
al. 2017; OECD 2015) 
Costs to input 
metadata 
The effort and time-consuming 
activity of providing contextual 
information and detailed descriptions 
of the data. 
(Edwards 2010; Holzner et al. 
2009; OpenAire 2019) 
Nevertheless, despite such barriers, there is a consensus that sharing scientific data is 




behind such consensus include (Table 2): to improve reproducibility; to accelerate scientific 
processes and research velocity; to increase scientific quality; to prevent scientific fraud; and 
to increase scientific productivity by reducing redundancy and innovation gains (e.g. 






Table 2. Reasons for data sharing in science 
Reasons sharing Description Source 
Reproducibility Sharing research data raises transparency and multiplies opportunities for the 
replicability of research findings. Making it easier to peer review data 
strengthens transparency and the potential of publishing negative results and 
enables accurate verifications of research findings. 
(Baker 2015; Fecher et al. 
2015; Lyon 2016; OECD 
2015; Pujol Priego and 




The availability of the Gene Expression Omnibus (GEO) database at the US 
National Center for Biotechnology Information led to more than 1,150 
published articles by third-party contributors by the end of 2010. 
(Borgman 2015; Pasquetto et 
al. 2017; Piwowar et al. 2011) 
Increase scientific 
quality 
Sharing research data is related to the strength of the evidence supporting the 
results and the quality of the statistical results reporting.  
(Wicherts et al. 2011) 
Fraud prevention Sharing research data contributes to the identification of scientific fraud and 
enables transparency and greater scrutiny of research.  
(Kupferschmidt 2018)  
Increase scientific 
efficiency  
It increases the scientific efficiency of the research system by reducing 
duplication of costs and other costs stemming from data storage and transfer. 
More knowledge can be produced from the same data and thus increase 
returns on publicly-funded research.  
(Lyon 2016; OECD 2015; 
Whyte and Pryor 2011) 
 
 
Innovation gains Data sharing fosters the reuse of data for R&D and innovation processes (e.g. 
in drug discovery processes). For instance, the use of data from PubMed 
Central at the US National Institutes of Health's repository has 17% unique 
daily users from companies versus 25% from universities.  






3.4 Theoretical underpinnings 
Understanding the drivers for and barriers to sharing research data is both multifaceted and 
complex. We believe that they are shaped by the specific research community’s values and 
norms (cultural perspective) as well as the professional incentives that reconcile both 
individual and collective interests (rational perspective). Consequently, our study builds upon 
the notion of “epistemic culture” (Knorr Cetina 1999) and collective action theory (Hess and 
Ostrom 2003; Olson 2009; Ostrom 1990) to build a complementary perspective on the 
phenomenon.  
3.4.1  Epistemic cultures 
Anthropologist Knorr Cetina (1999) coined the notion of epistemic cultures to describe 
“those amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms—bonded through affinity, necessity and 
historical coincidence—which, in a given field, make up how we know what we know” 
(Knorr Cetina 1999 p. 1). The notion of epistemic culture claims that the nature of scientific 
activities, types of reasoning, and practices of establishing evidence are variable across 
scientific fields. It is considered a cultural approach that disputes the ‘unity of science’ 
associated with the Vienna Circle (Knorr Cetina 1999 p. 3) and “reveals the fragmentation of 
contemporary science” (Mørk et al. 2008 p. 15). The main idea that Knorr Cetina argues is 
that different scientific fields exhibit different epistemic cultures.  
The idea of different scholarly cultures can be drawn back to the (Fleck 1979 [1935]) idea of 
“styles of thought” shared by “thought collectives” (Knorr Cetina 1999) and also relates to a 
concept of “thought worlds” (Dougherty 1992) or the idea of “communities of knowing” 
(Boland and Tenkasi 1995). Haas (1992) also uses the notion of “epistemic communities” 
defining groups of people engaged in knowledge production. The general and universal idea 
across such notions is that knowledge is situated and local (Borgman 2012). "There is no 
'view from nowhere'—knowledge is always situated in a place, time, conditions, practices, 
and understandings. There is no single knowledge but multiple bits of knowledge" (Cetina 
2007; Gläser et al. 2015).  
What makes Knorr Cetina's ideas attractive is that her definition of “culture” is rooted in 
practice, that is, when defining epistemic cultures, she designates the prevailing dynamics 
and aggregate patterns in scientists' practices. The “epistemic machinery” defines the shared 
tools, techniques, particular ontologies of instruments, conventional methods, and the 
architectures of shared empirical approaches that the epistemic subjects use to produce and 
distribute knowledge between them. She grounds the concept in the making of science, in 
practice and acts of making knowledge and the patterns in such practices. She constructs the 
concept of epistemic cultures, describing their interiorised process and arguing that scientists 
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(or epistemic subjects) and the organisations and collectives that are part of the epistemic 
culture (e.g. labs and experiments) are shaped by conventional practices and these shared 
pieces of machinery of knowing, which also affects the nature of competition in the field 
(Knorr Cetina 2007).  
Employing Knorr Cetina’s lenses, we would expect that data sharing practices may be 
community-bound as a result of the epistemic culture of the community. Differences in data 
sharing practices across scientific communities would depend on whether the scientific 
community is more “communitarian” or “individualistic”, using her terminology, resulting 
from how contributions are ascribed to individual scientists in the community and their 
norms and practices. A collective or communitarian epistemic culture compared to the 
individualised nature of another one may display predispositions to share and fewer concerns 
about individual incentives and rewards 
The cultural explanation is useful when trying to account for the heterogeneity of data 
sharing practices across “field-specific research culture” (Gläser et al. 2015 p. 329). This is 
logical if we consider the long training cycles with which new members are trained, the 
specificities in the technological tools, the commonly accepted methods, particular financing 
sources, norms in collaboration dynamics, and how responsibility and authorship are 
assigned.  
3.4.2 Collective action theory: managing the commons 
An alternative for explaining differences in data practices is to examine the mechanisms put 
in place by which self-interested researchers would contribute to a data commons. Commons 
designates a “resource shared by a group of people that is subject to social dilemmas” (Hess 
and Ostrom 2003). We bring an economic-rational perspective to the foreground of the data 
sharing conversation by revisiting classic collective action theory to uncover the intricate 
system of incentives and rewards behind the considerable amount of work needed to make 
data available to others and eventually FAIR. 
Collective action theory has been widely used in sociology and economics to understand 
individuals' motivation to engage in collective action (Fulk et al. 2004; Monge et al. 1998). 
Research into collective action problems was originated with Olson's work in the classic 
Logic of Collective Action, which later Hardin (1968) developed with his thesis on the 
“tragedy of the commons” that argues how uncontrolled individual self-interested pursuits 
may corrupt the commons (Greco and Floridi 2004). In other words, the tragedy of the 
commons is an instantiation of the prisoner’s dilemma (with n-people) where the rational 
pursuit of each self-interest results in suboptimal management of the commons (Greco and 




As Hardin (1982) describes, the community benefits if the individual perceives gains from 
their contribution to the commons. However, if no scientists perceive gains from contributing 
to the commons, the shared pool of resources is 'latent' and will not succeed by itself without 
external intervention. The social dilemma in contributing to the data commons arises when 
the incentive structure favours the free-riding of scientists on other contributions. Optimally, 
there should be a positive relationship between individual gains and individuals' 
contributions to the commons and the value of the commons and the collective resources that 
have been contributed. By increasing the number of contributors to the commons, the 
individual commitment to contribute is reinforced. In other words, there is individual-
collective interdependence. 
What makes collective action useful in understanding the scientific data sharing phenomenon 
is that the fundamental dynamic behind the commons is the prediction of individual gains by 
adjusting the values and costs associated with resource contribution (Fulk et al. 2004; Ostrom 
1990; Vitali et al. 2018; Weill and Ross 2004). 
3.5 Methods and Results 
For the analysis and presentation of our data, we have followed the approach suggested by 
Venkatesh et al. (2013) to extract the most potential value from mixed-method research. As a 
result, we first present the method and results of the analysis of the survey data, we follow 
that with the case studies and thereafter synthesise the findings of both. The synthesis of the 
results in the discussion is a “bridging” process (Creswell 2018) where we seek to leverage 
the complementarities between the findings to enrich our empirical and theoretical 
understanding of scientific data practices.    
3.5.1  Survey 2016 and 2018 
3.5.1.1 Method and data 
We developed a large-scale global online survey collected in 2016 and 2018 in collaboration 
with Elsevier, and the academic collaboration of scholars to provide an Open Science 
Monitor for the European Commission. The survey data allow us to answer RQ1a—whether 
researchers share data—and RQ2a—how they do it. 
The survey of 2016 was sent in June-July 2016 by Elsevier to researchers worldwide in all 
scientific disciplines. 1,162 researchers responded, which represented a 2.3% response rate. 
Responses were weighted by the research team to be representative of the researcher 
population (UNESCO counts of researchers, 2013). The margin of error for 1,162 responses 
was estimated ± 2.87% at 95% confidence levels (see prior analysis of the survey and full 
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dataset in (Meijer et al. 2017). The full and raw data results from survey 2016 were available 
at DOI:10.17632/bwrnfb4bvh.1.  
The survey of 2018 was sent in October-November 2018 to 40,991 individuals randomly 
selected from the Scopus author database while being weighted to be representative of the 
researcher population (UNESCO counts of researchers), to which 1,029 researchers 
responded (2.5% response rate). Appendix B provides the demographics of the survey 
respondents. Appendix C presents the full survey questionnaire.  
The significant differences between the 2016 and 2018 survey questionnaires are four 
additional questions that were added in 2018 to assess the consequences of data sharing for 
scientists in their future collaborations with for-profit entities and other scientists. Finally, 
other minor modifications were introduced in the questionnaire to improve clarity. 
We employ the survey data with a descriptive objective to analyse frequencies, averages, and 
patterns across researchers to obtain an overview of scientists’ willingness to share data if 
they have done it, and through which means. The survey allows extracting such attitudes and 
practices by age, country, and discipline, while providing initial trends comparing results 
from 2016 and 2018. 
3.5.1.2 Findings of the survey 
 
Data sharing practices are steady  
Comparing survey results between 2016 and 2018 reveals that despite widespread support 
from policymakers and pressure from funding agencies, the number of academic researchers 
that declare making their data available remains stable, with no growth shown over the past 
two years (66%) (Figure 2). Although researchers acknowledge the benefits of data sharing, 
their practices are still limited, with one-third of researchers saying they do not share their 
data at all. While researchers acknowledge the benefits of sharing unpublished research data 
(74%), fewer are willing to share data (66%) or have previously shared their data (64%) 










Figure 2.  Researchers´ attitudes on data sharing 
 
Data sharing varies across disciplines 
Data sharing practices are dependent on the field. The survey results show that data sharing 
activities are highly concentrated in math (79%), computer science (70%) physics and 
astronomy (69%) and life science (65%) (Figure 3). When we compare physics and 
astronomy to life science, we see that while 65% of scientists in physics and astronomy say 
that access to others’ data would benefit their research, a larger number coming to 73% is 
willing to allow others to access their data. On the contrary, in life science, while 74% say 
they benefit from others’ data, the number of scientists willing to allow others to access their 
data is lower (65%) (Figure 2). The same pattern displayed in life science disciplines of 
higher perceived benefit compared to the willingness to share is shown in the rest of 







Note: Corresponding question: Please think about the research data that typically is 
not published (e.g. not summary charts, tables or images), and indicate how much you 




Figure 3. Attitudes to data sharing by discipline 
 
Discriminatory sharing 
The survey data show that most of the data sharing is carried out between collaborators on 
the same projects (80%), suggesting that researchers adopt a discriminatory approach, 
sharing data with selected partners on a case by case basis (Figure 4). Most scientists still 
rely on ad hoc and communicative exchanges to share their data instead of formal data 
repositories (14%), as “purpose-built, stored and ready for use” data (Edwards et al. 2011) 
(Figure 4). Although efforts have been made to improve metadata products, the results 
suggest that we will still see “informal, ad hoc, incomplete and contested processes of 
communicating about data” (Edwards et al. 2011), as only 14% of researchers share it 
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Figure 4. Data sharing behaviour of researchers 
Note: Corresponding question: Have you done any of the following with any or all of 
the research data that you used or created as part of your last research project?  
Shared directly with… 
 
 
Figure 5. Preferred ways for data sharing 
Note: Corresponding question: Have you published the research data that you used or 
created as part of your last research project in any of the following ways? (See Q1f 
and Q1c1 in Appendix B) 
 
 
Data sharing: an interactive process  
Over one-third of researchers were contacted by another university/institute after sharing 
their data. 10% were contacted by a company, and over one-third of researchers believe that 
sharing data promoted new collaborations with researchers in their discipline. By being 
contacted by other researchers, whether in public or for-profit organisations, we infer that 











... researchers on same research project in collaboration 
... researchers NOT working on same research project 
but know personally  
... researchers NOT working on same research project 
and DON'T know personally 
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metadata or the description and contextual information of the data is not enough in some 
cases or requires clarification with the scientist who generated the data (Figure 5).  
Figure 6. Follow up to data sharing 
Corresponding question: Thinking about the most recent research project on which you 
shared data, did individuals outside of the research team contact you concerning the 
data that you shared? I was contacted by researchers from: 
 
 
In sum, what becomes clear from the survey results is that data sharing is a practice that 
varies significantly across disciplines (and we speculate subfields). Each discipline delineates 
collectively the tools that fulfill specific requirements for their community. Why are there 
such disparities across scientific disciplines? Which mechanisms are behind the high data 
sharing rates of physics or life sciences? And what can we learn from these fields with high 
scientific data sharing rates? 
3.5.2  Case study 
3.5.2.1 Method and Data 
We follow this with a qualitative study of two cases sampled from two of the disciplines 
displaying high rates of data sharing, molecular biology and high energy physics, to find 
plausible explanations of factors enabling scientists' data sharing behaviours to enrich and 
extend the quantitative results from the survey (Creswell 2018). As such, the primary 
purpose for employing a sequential mixed approach in our study was to acquire 
complementary explanatory insights about scientific data sharing practices in the two 
empirical settings while providing opportunities for opening avenues for future research 




The two case studies are thematically sampled (Creswell 2018) as representative of two 
different epistemic cultures to account for the cultural dimensions which ground and augment 
other formal mechanisms that influence how and why researchers share their data. To capture 
data practices behaviours of HEP and MB, we investigate their practices grounded in two 
information infrastructures. Open Targets is a microbiology consortium created in 2015 by 
for-profit, non-profit and research entities led by the European Molecular Biology 
Laboratory-European Bioinformatics Institute (EMBL- EBI). Reana is led by the European 
Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), established in 2018 as an infrastructure that 
embeds a set of platforms and services developed by the HEP community to share their data 
and code and foster reproducibility of scientific results.  
Information infrastructures have been defined as "a digital library system based on 
commonly shared standards and containing information of both local and/or widespread 
interest" (Kahn and Cerf 1988 pp. 3) … “to augment our ability to search for, correlate, 
analyse and synthesise available information,” (Kahn and Cerf 1988 p. 11.) Adding a social 
dimension, Constantinides (2012 p. 21) defines them as “efforts to integrate other computer-
based and social systems, and to regulate and monitor processes that were previously 
performed in various, isolated settings.”  Our decision to focus on information infrastructures 
(as opposed to less-institutionalised data sharing practices) is based on the fact that the 
highest data sharing levels are in communities that actively use information infrastructures. 
As such, we believe that insight into the determinants of the most successful practices can be 
obtained by studying these infrastructures. 
Both infrastructures are based upon data commons, i.e. data commons co-locate data, 
storage, and computing infrastructures with commonly used services and tools for analysing 
and sharing data to create interoperable resources for a different base of users (Grossman et 
al. 2016).  
The study of both cases relies on diverse primary and secondary data sources, described in 
Table 3. Numerous discussions with managers from Open Targets and Reana were an 
integral part of the Open Science Monitor and shared by the European Commission services 
in separate reports (Pujol Priego and Wareham 2018, 2019).  
As part of participation in the two additional EU H2020 funded projects, the authors 
benefited from extensive conversations with policymakers, research infrastructure managers, 
data architects, and programmers to discuss data sharing practices and future open research 
data (CS3MESH4EOSC part of the European Open Science Cloud, and ATTRACT funded 




Table 3. Details on Data Collection 
 MB - Open Targets HEP-Reana and related platforms 
Primary 
data sources 
13 interviews with scientists and 
managerial team of Open Targets 
4 interviews with scientists and managerial 
team of Reana and related platforms.  
4 interviews with CERN programmers and 
data architects.  
Observations Study visit to Genome Campus 
for Open Targets Open Days – 
workshop, working groups and 
social event (June 2019) 
Study visits to CERN (2018, 2019, 2020).  
Partner in H2020-funded CS3MESH4EOSC, 
a constituent project of the European Open 
Science Cloud  
https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/863353 
and ATTRACT https://attract-eu.com/   
Interviews and discussions with open data-
related services at CERN (Zenodo, Open Data 




1 tutorial on OT infrastructure 
3 outreach posts 
19 release notes 
6 posts 
7 websites 
Experiments data policy and guidelines: 
CMS data policy 
ALICE data policy 
ATLAS data policy 
LHCb data policy 
OPERA data policy 
CERN open data terms of use 
22 guidelines in CERN open data portal 
CERN Analysis Preservation Portal 
Documentation from data preservation HEP 
projects  
Joint declaration and task force 
documentation on HEP data preservation 
Reana workshop presentations June 2018 
12 runnable examples of Reana 
6 publications 
6 release notes 
User guide 
Administrator guide Developer guide 





Empirical context 1: Molecular biology and Open Targets 
The sequencing of the human genome (Human Genome Project, HGP) is recognised as “the 
largest undertaking in the history of biological science” (Chaguturu et al. 2014 p. 35). Not 
only did it transform biology into a data-driven science as a result of the deluge of new data 
and computational techniques, but it also opened the debate about research data sharing when 
Celera, a private undertaking, initially announced their intention to patent "fully-
characterised important structures" amounting to 100–300 targets (Leonelli 2012). In March 
2000, President Clinton announced that the data on the genome sequence should be made 
freely available to the entire research community. Some argue that in the post-HGP era, the 
human genome brought to biology a blueprint on research data sharing that other research 
communities need to follow. HGP propelled discourse on open research data to the forefront 
of molecular biology research (Leonelli, 2012) and spawned a new generation of information 
infrastructures to generate, integrate, and curate the growing data pools with other sources 
and commonly used tools and analytical methods for the research community (Grossman et 
al. 2016; Vamathevan et al. 2019). As a result, the discipline has been very active in 
developing data commons (Pujol Priego and Wareham 2018).  
Open Targets (OT) was created in 2015 by the EMBL-EBI, Europe’s flagship laboratory for 
life science, with the Wellcome Sanger Institute, and pharmaceutical companies (Biogen, 
Celgene, GSK, Sanofi, Takeda) to accelerate knowledge about the links between genetic 
targets and disease development. The architecture, data policies, and procedures from 
researchers participating in OT provide insights about the mechanisms that effectively foster 
data sharing across the MB research community.  
Empirical context 2: High-Energy Physics and Reana 
Big scientific research infrastructures within High-Energy Physics such as CERN have a long 
tradition of embracing open data. Large volumes of data generated via expensive, unique, 
and extensive experiments make data preservation and reuse important. Reana is a reusable 
and reproducible research data analysis infrastructure created at CERN in 2018 to facilitate 
data and code reuse. The infrastructure sits on already existing platforms and services 
provided by CERN to the HEP community such as Zenodo, a free and open data repository, 
and the CERN open data portal, which are precedents to Reana infrastructure. The 
infrastructure generalises computational practices used by the HEP community and facilitates 
the adoption of workflow systems to run and reuse data analysis on remote compute clouds 
(Simko et al. 2018). CERN generated Reana to allow the different HEP experiments to 
adhere to FAIR principles and facilitate data sharing and reuse in the community. Reana 
allows the reuse and reinterpretation of the data shared by helping HEP scientists to structure 
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their input data, their analysis code, containerised environments, and computational 
workflows to run the analysis on remote clouds (Pujol Priego and Wareham 2019). What 
makes Reana attractive is that the infrastructure helps to generalise computational practices 
employed by HEP scientists, thereby systematizing reproducibility. The infrastructure 
supports a plurality of “container technologies (Docker), workflow engines (CWL, Yadage), 
shared storage systems (Ceph, EOS) and compute cloud infrastructures (Ku- 
Kubernetes/OpenStack, HTCondor)” used by the HEP scientific community (Simko et al. 
2018, p. 1).  
The analysis of HEP and MB scientists around Open Targets and Reana infrastructures gives 
us an insight into how such culturally different communities are capable of actively sharing 
and reusing data. 
3.5.2.2 Findings of the case studies 
Preliminary observations about HEP and MB communities suggest two different epistemic 
cultures consistent with Knorr Cetina's work: HEP is more communitarian with MB more 
individualistic, using Knorr Cetina's terms. When looking at how HEP data flows are 
organised, we first realise the importance of the entity of “the experiment”. In HEP, few 
extensive, capital-intensive experiments have been designed and constructed over 20 odd 
years. For example, CERN currently hosts seven large experiments on the Large Hadron 
Collider, four of which are elaborate international collaborations (ATLAS, CMS, ALICE, 
LHCb).  
By contrast, MB is organised around the “laboratory” or single institution, and consistent 
with what Knorr Cetina describes, molecular biologists are shaped by the conviction that they 
need to compete “for the priority of important findings” (Knorr Cetina, 1999), generating 
competition within and across labs.  
When comparing how HEP and MB ascribe contribution to an individual scientist, we soon 
realise that in HEP there can be a vast number of authors as the construction and operation 
the experiments depends on many people, the record being over 5,000 authors on one article 
(Aad et al. 2015). In MB, although there are also challenges in ascribing results to individual 
scientists, the experiments are typically far less capital-intensive and permit differentiation in 
contributions within smaller teams. Finally, it is worth noting that some MB research is 
closer to commercial organisations (life sciences and pharma), where HEP is traditionally 
considered basic research with a more extended pathway towards any commercial outcome.  
Accordingly, we would expect a more competitive culture with less data sharing in MB than 
HEP. However, despite such differences in their epistemic cultures, both exhibit high levels 





OT was set up in 2015 under the umbrella of the EMBL-EBI and Sanger Institute within the 
collaboration of large pharmaceutical companies. By applying lean user experience (UX) 
design methods, OT infrastructure was developed to search, assess, and integrate a vast 
quantity of genetic and biological data to support target-centric and disease-centric inquiries. 
At present, OT contains more than 27,717 targets, 7,999,050 associations, 13,445 diseases, 
and 20 data sources (Open Targets, 2020).  
OT displays a modular infrastructure containing different layers, access rights, and data 
standards that employ different mechanisms for researchers to be able to simultaneously 
share their data and comply with the norm in the post-HGP community era, while 
simultaneously allowing them to grasp the competitive benefits of being the generators of the 
data. The stratified architecture grants different access rights to the data, where data 
generators are granted access to a hidden layer augmented by a public layer accessible (with 
different rights) to any researcher willing to reuse the data.  
The modular architecture with different access rights combines time dilation between the 
generation of the data and the publication of the data in the infrastructure that spans on 
average two years and could be considered as a considerably long “embargo period”.  
Finally, the information infrastructure acts as a “boundary organisation” (O’Mahony and 
Bechky 2008), that is, “structures capable of effectively mediating between disparate 
constituencies and establishing common ground among the differing interests in play” 
(Perkmann and Schildt 2015 p. 1134).  
The two mechanisms are combined with normative governance rules provided by the 
infrastructure on data access and reuse, where the ownership and responsibilities over the 
data are explicit. These two mechanisms fit in a “logic of exchange” that seeks to maximise 
benefits for the researchers (that is, the potential of the data for being reused and the 
competitive advantage of data generators) while minimizing the costs of sharing data. This 
optimisation is completed by providing the protocols and data standards required to minimise 
the efforts of data reuse and increasing the value of the data aggregated while reducing the 
uncertainty over who controls and owns the data. The fact that for-profit companies form a 
significant part of the OT consortium suggests that the mechanisms are effective in balancing 
incentives to scientists to contribute while mitigating the risks of a competitive loss to other 






CERN built Reana as an infrastructure for the HEP research community to foster the reuse of 
the data generated via the large HEP experiments, which built upon data access and 
preservation policies agreed within the main experiments. While the data policies may differ 
slightly across experiments, they all stratify the data generated by the HEP community in 
four main layers: a) data directly related to publications, which include the complete 
documentation for published results; b) simplified data formats devoted to training exercises 
within the physics community; c) reconstructed data, simulations, and software analysis to 
facilitate research analysis; and finally, d) the raw level data and associated software, which 
permits access to the full potential of the experimental data reuse (Pujol Priego and Wareham 
2019). Data sharing is concentrated for data layers (b) and (c) described above. Raw data (d) 
is not made available to other researchers to reuse for declared pragmatic reasons. For 
instance, one of the core CERN experiments, CMS (Compact Muon Solenoid) produces on 
average 1 petabyte (100 gigabytes) of “raw” data per second, and similar data volumes 
characterise other experiments. As the LHC data policy explains: “It is practically impossible 
to make the full raw data-set from scientific endeavours of the scale of high-energy physics 
easily usable in a meaningful way outside of the collaboration. […]It should be noted that, 
for these reasons, direct access to the raw data is not even permitted to individuals within the 
collaboration, and that instead the production of reconstructed data is performed centrally.”  
Experiments also foresee a time dilation between the generation of the experimental data and 
the moment to share it with the external research community. These periods, also referred to 
as embargo periods, allow the data generators within the experiment to publish.  
As explained in the LHC experiment data policy: "In general data will be retained for the 
sole use of the collaboration for a period commensurate with the substantial investment in 
the effort needed to record, reconstruct and analyse those data. After this period, some 
portion of the data will then be made available externally, with this proportion rising with 
time. The CB will keep such periods and proportions under review and may reconsider 
whether they should be varied in the light of experience. In the first instance, access will be 
granted to portions of the DST data five years after data is taken. The portion of the data 
which LHCb would normally make available is 50% after five years, rising to 100% after ten 
years." 
One of the significant concerns within the HEP community related to data sharing is not 
credit but more importantly that the reuse may lead to an inflation of incorrect results. 
Consistent with what researchers claim in a dedicated study on data preservation in HEP 
(Holzner et al. 2009), “45.0% of the respondents are  ‘very concerned’ or ‘gravely 




Interestingly, experimentalists are by far more concerned (51.3%) than theorists (29.0%)” (p. 
7).  
Different research teams employ a variety of tools supporting their computational workflows. 
By analyzing the different scientific pipelines, Reana has abstracted the steps that scientists 
follow and provides a "simple 'shell script' use case where commands are run sequentially, 
and each step produces outputs for the next step" (Simko et al. 2018 p. 2). As a result, Reana 
allows structuring research data analysis in a reusable way making it possible to instantiate 
computational workflows remotely in the cloud with the support of a set of workflows 
specifications, storage systems, and container technologies. 
"Our own experience from opening up vast volumes of data is that openness cannot simply be 
tacked on as an afterthought at the end of the scientific endeavour. Besides, openness alone 
does not guarantee reproducibility or reusability, so it should not be pursued as a goal in 
itself. Focusing on data is also not enough: it needs to be accompanied by software, 
workflow, and explanations, all of which need to be captured throughout the usual iterative 
and closed research lifecycle, ready for a timely open release with the results" (Chen et al. 
2019). 
The main idea behind Reana's infrastructure is to preserve software and data workflows so 
that they can enhance collaborative scientific work and as a way of grasping the knowledge 
behind a given analysis during the review process (Dphep Study Group 2009). Such data 
sharing process and preservation techniques are embedded in the Reana framework and can 
be translated into new analysis methods for future HEP research. Reana was set up to seek 
the reuse of experimental data first by the large community of collaborators themselves and 
then extend it. 
The Reana cases describe the challenges for the HEP community to share and reuse their data 
which implies a shift from in-depth documenting and archiving of analysis towards 
preservation based on simulation and software containers. For instance, the CMS experiment 
preserves “the reconstructed data and simulations by keeping available a copy of the data 
reconstructed with the best available knowledge of the detector performance and conditions 
for each period of data-taking a virtualised computing environment, compatible with the 
software version with which the original data can be analysed, is provided and maintained” 
(Dphep Study Group 2009 p. 7).  
Reana acts as a boundary organisation or “interface” to the experiment knowhow so that 
other researchers outside the experiment can reuse it. Data policies in HEP are decentralised 
at the experiment level, instead of at the infrastructure level, and Reana builds on top of the 
data rights and responsibilities agreed within every single experiment. 
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In Reana, we also find meaningful roles for the mechanisms of modularity (i.e. levels of data 
with different data access) and time dilation. While normative governance defining data 
access rights and responsibilities exists, it is not provided at the infrastructure-level but rather 
at the experiment-level, making the infrastructure respect distinct data policies. Table 4 in the 
Appendix provides a detailed description of the progression of our empirical analysis towards 
the theoretical constructs of the two mechanisms, modularity and time dilation, as well as the 




Table 4. Theoretical progression of our analysis  
Illustrative examples of empirical observations from data sources How they are similar How they differ 
MB- Open Targets HEP- Reana Identification of same 
theoretical construct 
Theoretical observation 
“When data is ready, we integrate it into the 
platform; we need to wait until it is ready and 
publicise and then we enter it in the platform at 
that point and release it” OT4.  
"The platform team (in charge of releasing the 
data) get to see the type of data very early in the 
process. They have sample data, and they 
discuss the format. We also have a UX 
specialist, to understand what the deliverable is 
and how we manifest it in the platform so that 
people can use it to make a decision. This is the 
foundation for data specification. How are we 
going to receive it? What does it look like, how 
will it be processed? The discussions are very 
early on, and we try to get mock-ups very early 
on, to gather feedback from the consortium 
partners but also other users, and then we kind 
of refine them that as we go along (…) It is a 
moving target, as some of the projects do not 
know what the data will look like, so we have 
monthly meetings." OT4 
“New data will enter the portal once the 
embargo periods for them are over.” (CERN 
Open Data Portal) 
 
“The first data release of 2010 data took 
place in 2014, as a stress-test exercise of the 
entire preservation, re-use, and access chain. 
This release was followed by a full analysis 
of the procedure, which was endorsed by the 
Collaboration Board in 2015, and regular 
data releases, accompanied by appropriate 
simulated data, each approved by the 
Collaboration Board, are now taking place" 




The embargo period of HEP is around 5 to 
10 years, depending on the experiments.  
 
In OT, the time dilation between the 
generation of the data and release in OT is 
18 months to two years.  
 
After the embargo period in HEP, only a 
% of the data is agreed to be released.  
 





“So, we have a platform that is public and open 
to everybody. Then, for the experimental 
projects, the partners share the data while they 
are creating it in Google buckets”.6 
"We have an intranet for the consortium 
partners. It is an information exchange between 
"Open access to its data by people outside 
the collaboration can be considered at four 
levels of increasing complexity." 
Modularity 
(Mechanism 2) 
HEP establishes four layers of data: raw 
data is not released, while more elaborated 
versions of data are opened (level 2 in 
open data portal and reused in Reana; 
level 1 from publications through HEP 
library systems). 
                                               





partners (…) The intranet has a link with the 
platform, and it is used for the general 
governance of the projects. As we go through 
the project call processes, there are page 
proposals to share the details. It is like a one-
stop-shop for the whole portfolio of projects." 
OT4. 
 
Raw data from target associations with 
metadata is released in OT. However, the 
aggregations with data related to the next 
steps of the drug discovery process (e.g. 
proprietary compound libraries) remain 
closed. 
“There is a need to coordinate the integration of 
data into OT, both from the projects that 
generate data but also with the data providers 
such as Chembl and Uniprot and all the data 
that goes into the platform to keep it up to date. 
We also work with the developer team that 
creates some of the features that users will use 









The infrastructure:  
Dissipates 
uncertainties over data 
ownership, control, 
access rights and rights 
to reuse. Defines and 
agrees on a clear data 
policy amongst OT 
participants.   
- The boundary organisation and what 
makes the interface that mediates the data 
flows between researchers and establishes 
the rules, responsibilities, and drivers in 
data policies varies in the two cases. 
 
- The prominent role of the experiment in 
HEP, which decides rights and 
responsibilities across data. These rules 
prevail across infrastructures, including 
Reana. The competition over the data is 
not between scientists but between 
experiments. 
- In MB, the different experimental 
projects need to comply with the data 
governance and rules of the OT 
infrastructures, which establish the 
protocols to avoid unintended spill overs 





“The data preservation process should 
follow well-defined policies, defined as soon 
as possible during the lifetime of the 
collaborations, and possibly embedded in a 
global HEP data preservation initiative.” 
“For the widest possible re-use of the data, 
while protecting the Collaboration's liability 
and reputation, data will be released under 
the emerging standard Creative Commons 
CC0 waiver.”7  
The experiment: 
Dissipates 
uncertainties over data 
ownership, control, 
access rights and rights 
to reuse. Defines and 
agrees on a clear data 
policy that prevails 
across infrastructures.   
 
                                               





3.6.1 Implications for theory 
Data sharing is desired by the research community at large. 74% of researchers say that 
having access to other data would benefit them. Nevertheless, the number of researchers 
in our survey who have shared their data remains stable from 2016 to 2018, despite all 
policy activities, funders' efforts, and investments put in place to foster research data 
sharing. Admittedly, two years may not be indicative of longer trends, but the lack of 
any meaningful difference suggests that the uptake of data sharing practices is slow. 
Our analysis further suggests that there is no homogenous explanation. Slow adoption 
of data sharing comes from an intertwined web of varied cultures and rational pursuits. 
Where HEP and MB have significantly different epistemic cultures, research 
infrastructures, and scientific practices, both communities have established information 
infrastructures with mechanisms designed to mitigate the domain-specific costs and 
facilitate data sharing and reuse. 
In this respect, the cultural explanation usually employed to justify data sharing 
differences across academic communities is only partially adequate. Both HEP and MB 
have professional norms characterised by some level of self-interested “exchange logic” 
which can deter scientists from absorbing the additional costs of data sharing with no 
apparent benefits.  
Our case studies have examined two different information infrastructures that have 
enacted mechanisms to align scientists’ professional incentives with data sharing 
practices across more individualist and communitarian scientific communities. That MB 
and HEP have two substantially different epistemic cultures is understandable given the 
vastly different research infrastructures and scientific practices: the enormous scale of 
many HEP experiments requires substantial organisations where individual 
contributions are difficult to account for. MB, by contrast, is conducted in smaller teams 
with less capitally-intensive research infrastructures, clearly influencing the allocation 
of academic merit and professional status.  
Our analysis of Open Targets and Reana offers insight into how these differences can be 
accommodated in two different information infrastructures. Both Open Targets and 
Reana employ modularity, time dilation, and explicit governance to align the private 
interests of the scientists with the collective interests of their communities. In this 
respect, there is a consensus that scientific data should be a public good. Scientists, 
however, need some assurance of the recognition of their scientific endeavours. 
Towards this, scientific communities can consider adjusting how they allocate 
professional merit to recognise the cultivation and publication of datasets as a legitimate 
professional contribution. However, the mere publication of datasets is insufficient to 
address the challenges of reproducibility and scientific efficiency. Appropriate 
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governance and policies enacted in the information infrastructures can address the needs 
of metadata as well as the risks of data misuse and liability specific to the scientific 
community. 
In Table 5, we summarise the results and suggest some normative implications that we 





Table 5. Summary of findings and normative implications 
Research 
Questions 
Findings Normative Implications 
RQ1a: Do 
researchers share 
their data?  
66% of researchers say they make their data available. The % 
remains stable, with no growth shown over the past two years.  
 
Funding and policymaker requirements for data sharing have little effect 
in the short-term. 
Alternative approaches (e.g. scientific-community based mechanisms) 
may be more effective in promoting data sharing practices. 
RQ1b: How do 
they share their 
data?  
Data sharing varies significantly across disciplines. 
Most of the data sharing is carried out between collaborators on 
the same projects (80%), suggesting that researchers adopt a 
discriminatory approach by sharing data with selected partners. 
Only 14% of researchers share theirs through data repositories. 
Metadata is an interactive process: over one-third of researchers 
were contacted by another university/institute after sharing their 
data, and 10% were contacted by a company. 
Disparities in data sharing practices suggest that there is no one-size-fits-
all in data sharing policies. 
Knowing with whom you share the data (or delegated mechanisms of 
trust) is relevant for researchers to share. General repositories may not be 
the means to enforce data sharing amongst research communities. 
Releasing data is the beginning but not the end; it leads to interactive 
exchanges with data re-users. This implies more unexpected effort but 
also potential new collaborations. 
RQ2: What 
mechanisms have 
emerged to enable 
researchers to share 
their data?  
Both communitarian and individualistic scientific communities 
(different epistemic cultures) employ three mechanisms (with 




-Boundary organisation to establish transparent data 
governance and mediate the identification of the “bona fide” 
researcher. 
Sharing data is not a dichotomous decision, but rather it needs to establish 
a degree towards what data you share (modularity), and when you share it 
(time dilation - embargos).  
 
Scientific communities can consider adjusting professional norms to 
recognise data sharing as a legitimate contribution.  
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3.6.2 Implications for policy and practice 
This study contributes to the current research policy debate that is examining the potential 
policy interventions to increase data sharing across scientists. Survey data combined with the 
insights from the two case studies suggest that one size does not fit all, in particular for such 
a complex phenomenon as an intricate system of incentives and rewards, combined with 
historical and cultural accounts that shape the diverse research practices.  
The insights from the two case studies also guide other disciplines displaying less data 
sharing practices in the survey such as ours. In particular, our research communities could 
leverage the potential of research data sharing to increase the transparency and 
reproducibility of our research practices. Towards this, the establishment of information 
infrastructures in the social, economic, and managerial sciences can adopt mechanisms such 
as modularity and time dilation, with the appropriate mechanisms concerning metadata, 
reuse, and liability that are critical to ensure that data sharing objectives are achieved.  
3.7 Conclusion 
"The Republic of Science is a Society of Explorers. Such a society strives towards an 
unknown future, which it believes to be accessible and worth achieving. In the case of 
scientists, the explorers strive towards a hidden reality, for the sake of intellectual 
satisfaction. And as they satisfy themselves, they enlighten all men and are thus helping 
society to fulfill its obligation towards intellectual self-improvement" (Polanyi 1962 p. 19). 
Data sharing is a practice that is intended for the collective benefit of the “society of 
explorers”. In this respect, scientific communities are far from being united, but display 
heterogeneous practices and norms in the way science is produced and how merit and status 
are allocated. The need for greater transparency and reproducibility, combined with advances 
in ICT, render data sharing a clear choice for scientific policymakers and funders. Yet 
reasons for its gradual and disparate adoption are less obvious. A delicate system of 
mechanisms needs to be established to align individual and collective incentives. Moreover, 
these will differ across scientific communities. The use of modularity, time dilation, and 
appropriate policies are pivotal in the information infrastructures created by the scientific 
disciplines currently at the forefront of scientific data sharing. Other academic communities 
that seek to follow these examples can apply these mechanisms in a manner accordant with 
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 Opaque Spaces of the Commons: Governing 
Information Infrastructures in Life Sciences 
The article that constitutes this chapter consists in a micro-study of a single case that gives us 
insight into the different mechanisms that help reconcile the main tensions between the two 
exogenous forces: open science and technology transfer. It empirically investigates Open 
targets an information infrastructures based upon data commons developed by EMBL-EBI 








The sequencing of the human genome is recognized as a major landmark in biomedical 
research that has facilitated the emerging disciplines of genomics, proteomics, and systems 
biology. However, the capabilities and economic resources needed to leverage these vast data 
sources towards a greater understanding of disease mechanisms often exceed the scope of a 
single organization. In response to this challenge, biopharmaceutical companies have created 
commons-based information infrastructures. We present the exemplary case of Open Targets 
(OT), a large-scale information infrastructure created by leading organizations in 
bioinformatics, genomics, and pharmaceuticals that includes for-profit companies, non-profit 
foundations, and public research organizations. We describe and theorize about the 
governance conditions of modularity and brokerage that enable the processes of folding and 
unfolding into concealed or open spaces of work. This fluid dynamic simultaneously enables 
the benefits of shared investments and protects the private economic interests of its members. 
It offers a successful model for information infrastructure governance that navigates many of 
the trade-offs between private and collective interests in common resource pools composed 
of heterogeneous members with divergent objectives. 
Keywords: Information infrastructure; collective action; governance; drug discovery 
4.2 Introduction 
The sequencing of the human genome (Human Genome Project, HGP) is recognized as “the 
largest undertaking in the history of biological science”(Chaguturu et al. 2014, p.35), which 
brought 1) a deluge of new biological data to be incorporated and assimilated in drug 
discovery processes; 2) new computational challenges of transforming DNA sequence 
information into disease-associated protein functions leading to the generation of digital 
technologies such as bioinformatics, metabolomics or genomics; and more broadly, 3) the 
discipline of systems biology, which promotes the understanding of how networks in the 
biological system interact (Au, 2014). Enabled by new computational technologies, the HGP 
opened the door to abundant data and, consequently, fundamental changes in how scientists 
understand diseases and biological mechanisms. 
Sixteen years since its completion, it is acknowledged that the full potential of the HGP has 
not been realized for a number of reasons. One explanation is that the technological 
challenges of exploiting the HGP exceed the capabilities traditionally available to an 
individual company (Altshuler et al. 2010). In parallel, the cost of drug discovery has been 
growing (Lee 2015): the total R&D spent worldwide by pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
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firms increased from USD 108 billion (2006) to USD 141 billion (2015) (Evaluate Pharma 
2017), while the cost of developing a single medicine is estimated at 2.6 billion, more than 
double the figure of only a decade ago (Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development 
2015). 
As a result, pharmaceutical companies have carefully opened up their boundaries in the early 
phases of drug discovery by creating pooled, commons-based information infrastructures 
shared across multiple, often competing, organizations. The primary focus of such 
information infrastructures has been to generate, integrate, and curate large data pools with 
commonly used tools and analytical methods for the research community (Grossman et al. 
2016, Vamathevan et al. 2019). The main impetus is to avoid redundant investments in early-
stage research efforts and to accelerate drug discovery. 
Information infrastructures have been defined as “multi-layered entities comprised of 
technological components, people and institutional arrangements” (Constantanides 2012 p. 
25) (Hanseth and Monteiro 1997). A more technology-focused definition is “a digital library 
system based on commonly shared standards and containing information of both local and/or 
widespread interest” (Kahn and Cerf 1988 pp. 3) … “to augment our ability to search for, 
correlate, analyze and synthesize available information,” (Kahn and Cerf 1988 p.11.) Adding 
a social dimension, Constantanides (2012 p.21) defines information infrastructures as “efforts 
to integrate other computer-based and social systems, and to regulate and monitor processes 
that were previously performed in various, isolated settings.”  The logic behind these 
conceptualizations is now evident, as pharmaceutical companies have developed information 
infrastructures that integrate shared data, technologies, methods, and the rapidly increasing 
financial expense of integrating human genome information into drug discovery processes. 
The goal is to pool resources to achieve the needed depth and scale to validate potential 
therapeutic targets for various diseases in the first two of seven phases in drug discovery, 
typically occupying three of the twelve total years required on average. In drug discovery, the 
term “targets” typically refers to proteins that have three-dimensional structures to which 
specific molecules can bind to provoke some physiological effect. 
The development of these information infrastructures has been based upon the concept of the 
commons, which refers to a set of resources that are collectively owned and shared among a 
community (Ostrom 1990). Commons contain public and private property over which 
different agents have certain rights. By creating such information infrastructures, 
organizations commit to revealing resources (data, methods, technologies) and forgo IP 
related to drug targets (Mishra et al. 2016). More concretely, companies agree to postpone 




patent objects, and the data, technologies, and knowledge related to targets are to be shared 
openly in an information infrastructure. 
Such time dilation at the moment of patenting offers a novel practice of sharing in the early 
phase of drug discovery that poses both benefits and challenges: while limited sharing can 
lead to redundant investments and delays in scientific discovery, excessive sharing can lead 
to unintended spillovers that damage the firm’s competitive position. In other words, the 
development of the infrastructure (i.e., the conceptualization and implementation) must 
adequately negotiate a conundrum: it must be sufficiently open that organizations benefit 
from sharing but adequately restrictive at certain points to protect private economic interests 
in the competitive race towards therapeutic drug development. Ultimately, participants in 
these information infrastructures face a collective action problem: how do pharmaceutical 
companies develop an infrastructure that grants access to the data, methods, and technology, 
which we refer to as collective resources, critical to upstream drug development while 
preserving downstream commercial opportunities? Balancing these economic and scientific 
incentives remains a challenge in an IP-intensive industry, which has historically been 
characterized by high levels of secrecy, even between clinical teams within a company 
(Allarakhia 2014, Mittleman et al. 2013). To address this challenge, the development of the 
information infrastructure requires well-considered governance that enables the sharing of 
pooled resources, which we term openness, while offering the protections, or closure, needed 
to realize an economic return on firms’ investments in later phases. 
The term “collective action” refers to joint action by a number of agents to achieve and 
distribute some gain through coordination or cooperation (Hardin, 1982). Research into 
collective action problems was initiated with Mancur Olson’s (1965) now classic Logic of 
Collective Action and later popularized with Gareth Hardin’s (1968) thesis on the “tragedy of 
the commons.” Collective action research has been adopted by information infrastructure 
scholars to understand the challenges of information infrastructure development that align 
individual and collective interests from the different organizations involved. Tightly coupled 
with this literature is the concept of governance, which refers to the rules that underlie the 
social activities that are integral to order relationships, responsibilities, and expectations of 
contributors (Ostrom 1990, Mindel et al. 2018, Weill and Ross 2004). The debate on 
commons governance distinguishes between bottom-up, decentralized or polycentric 
approaches and top-down or centralized structures in assigning rights, responsibilities, and 
privileges in various types of collective resource systems (Constantinides and Barrett 2015, 
Mindel et al. 2018). The historical discourse has been polarized in two rival schools of 
thought: one represented by Garret Hardin and the second by Elinor Ostrom. Hardin’s 
‘tragedy of the commons’ describes the cautionary tale of how collective resources will 
eventually decline if governed in a decentralized manner characterized by a high level of 
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openness. By contrast, the 2009 Nobel Prize winner in Economics Elinor Ostrom documents 
in her book Governing the Commons (1990) how communities manage collective resources 
without top-down regulations. 
When adopting the commons discourse to understand information infrastructures, the 
proponents of the top-down approach argue that infrastructure development needs to have 
clear governance defining who makes what decisions e.g., (Weill and Ross 2004). A 
contrasting scholarship argues that information infrastructures cannot be governed in a top-
down, centrally controlled manner due to the complex dynamics required to cultivate a 
constantly growing base of users with diverse needs (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010, Sahay and 
Aanestad 2009). This literature suggests that information infrastructures need to be governed 
through their design, suggesting a set of design principles and rules that acknowledge 
“pivotal relationships between technical and social elements, and their dynamic interactions” 
(Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010 p.15); that is, through careful design choices, information 
infrastructures can be self-organized. 
In this paper, while we acknowledge the relevance of bottom-up governance approaches to 
information infrastructures, we argue that they also need to be effectively governed with 
certain restrictions to award the appropriate economic protections for companies to realize a 
return on their substantial investments. 
Thus, the key research question that we seek to answer is as follows: how do organizations 
develop commons-based information infrastructures that govern access to collective 
resources while simultaneously protecting the members’ private interests? 
Following calls in the recent literature (Mindel et al. 2018) and requests to “cover the 
interplay with institutions, goods, and the social practice” (Von Krogh et al. 2012, p. 670), 
our objective is to advance beyond the usual rivalry between bottom-up and top-down 
governance and the binary distinction between public and private goods in information 
infrastructure research. We seek to understand and develop theory about alternative 
governance forms that allow dynamic navigation through the needs of sharing collective 
resources (openness) with the appropriate levers of restriction and confidentiality (closure) to 
enable the pursuit of competitive interests. 
Among other successful results, OT researchers have effectively contributed to accelerating 
the development of targeted cancer treatments by discovering “thousands of genes essential 
for cancer’s survival and ranked which ones show the most promise as drug targets for 
developing new treatments” by employing a novel computational framework that integrates 





Combining insights from the extant literature and findings from our in-depth study, we 
develop a generalizable model of information infrastructure governance based on the 
commons that enables both the protection of competitive knowledge and a degree of 
openness to make the collaboration effective. Our study seeks to better understand the 
collective action challenge of granting participating organizations access to collective 
resources while reconciling both collective and self-interests. While our empirical context is 
an information infrastructure in the life sciences, we believe that our findings can inform 
information infrastructure development in a wider range of domains. Our theoretical 
development integrates ideas from three main areas: 1) information infrastructure governance 
scholarship, e.g., (Constantanides 2012, Constantinides and Barrett 2015, Hanseth 2001, 
Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010, Hanseth and Monteiro 1997); 2) collective action theory, e.g., 
(Hardin 1968, Hess and Ostrom 2003, Ostrom 1990); and 3) the literature describing the 
implications of the sequencing of the human genome and recent computational research 
methods to the collaborative dynamics of the pharmaceutical industry, e.g., (Allarakhia 2014, 
Au 2014, Choudhury et al. 2014, Collins 2003, Hood and Rowen 2013, Vamathevan et al. 
2019). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop our 
theoretical underpinnings regarding information infrastructure development and collective 
action theory. This is followed by a discussion of the research context and methods employed 
for conducting the empirical study. We then draw on our theoretical approach in presenting 
the results of our analysis on OT. Finally, we develop contributions to collective action 
challenges and information infrastructure development and suggest avenues for future 
research. 
4.3 A Paradigm Shift in Science and Technology for Drug Discovery 
Drug discovery is defined as “the process of creating chemical or biological molecules that 
have the potential to be developed as therapeutic agents, typically because they generate a 
desired biological effect in an appropriate testing or assay system against a particular 
molecular (drug) target” (Weigelt, 2009, p. 941). The basic approach in drug discovery 
consists of developing drugs that will alter the disease state by modulating (i.e., as an agonist 
or antagonist) the activity of a molecular target (Vamathevan et al. 2019). 
Despite some idiosyncrasies that may change from company to company, the standard drug 
discovery and development process can be divided into the following interdependent 
processes (Chaguturu et al. 2014): 1) target identification, which focuses on discovering the 
molecular targets (normally proteins) that play a fundamental role in disease; this phase is 
devoted to uncovering causal associations between a target and disease, which requires 
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demonstrating that the modulation of a target has an effect on (i.e., modulates) a disease 
state; 2) target validation, which is the confirmation of the molecular target being associated 
with the disease identified by employing physiologically relevant ex vivo and in vivo 
models; 3) lead or hit identification, which consists of identifying multiple pharmacological 
molecules active against potential targets; 4) the lead optimization process consists of 
optimizing the "function of how tightly the molecules interact with the target in order to 
improve selectivity and the degree to which a dose of a drug produces the desired effect 
against a specific target"(Chaguturu et al. 2014, p.34) while evaluating the safety of leading 
molecules; 5) preclinical trials to identify the best candidate molecules to test; and 6) clinical 
trials (phases I, II, and III) test potency, metabolism, toxicity and other variables critical to 
regulatory approval. 
In essence, once a target has been confirmed to be associated with a disease, companies need 
to identify for further development the pharmacological molecules that can affect the target. 
At this point, the lead leaves the discovery phase and enters preclinical development 
(Zanders 2011). The transition from the discovery phase (related to targets) to preclinical 
development (lead development) is a major one: scientists leave ‘blue sky’ research and enter 
into a heavily regulated process of developing and marketing a medication to be sold to a 
global market. The steps to be taken from the discovery phase onwards have a diverse set of 
legal and financial implications for the company at hand. While the work on the discovery 
phase, which involves in targets until the lead molecule is chosen to proceed to development, 
is experimental, the following steps devoted to development require the manufacture and 
formulation of the compounds, which comprise highly regulated procedures with very well-
defined processes that need to be consistently performed. Fundamentally, such consecutive 
phases need to prove that the drug candidate can effectively bind and modulate the target in a 
safe manner. Towards this end, company teams need to examine the pharmacodynamics (i.e., 
the effect of the drug on the body), pharmacokinetics (i.e., the effect of the body on the drug), 
and safety pharmacology or toxicology, in other words, any undesirable effects (Zanders 
2011). 
Historically, academia conducted basic research in biology, deciphering new disease targets 
and relevant pathways with potential therapeutic value, while biopharmaceutical companies 
pursued closed research in search of therapeutic targets. Since the completion of the HGP, 
genomics technologies in drug discovery have shifted the problem from the “identification 
and creation of novel small-molecule drugs against known targets (chemistry) to the 
biological characterization and functional validation of large numbers of unknown drug 
targets (biology) at the molecular, cellular and system levels” (Hopkins et al. 2007, p. 371). 
The effort consists of decoding the disease-associated mechanisms that are generated by 




While the genome is a significant determinant of how diseases originate and evolve, 
environmental factors often play an essential role, and in many cases, these two factors are 
intertwined (i.e., a particular genotype may change the risk of an environmentally induced 
disease) (Katsila et al. 2016). 
As a result, firms have shifted their focus towards the early stages of the drug discovery 
process, reducing investments in later stages to improve the success rate of drugs entering the 
development pipeline. The significant economic cost of this novel research form requires 
collaborative investments to generate large shared data resources. In essence, we have 
witnessed a paradigm shift since the completion of human genome sequencing and the 
consequent technological advances, the features of which we summarize in Table 1. 
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Table 1.  A Paradigm Shift in Drug Discovery (inspired by Au, 2014) 
 Before    After  Source 
Time (average) 8 – 10 years 10 - 15 years (e.g., Au 2014; Lee, 2015; 
Schuhmacher et al. 2016) 
Cost (average) $800 million $1.65 billion (e.g., Tufts Center for the Study 
of Drug Development, 2015) 
Intellectual property Patent protection Shorter patent protection and numerous drugs going 
off a patent-patent cliff 
(e.g., (Markus et al. 2006) Lee, 




“Trial and Error” – start with 1000 
compounds and narrow it down 
More targeted pathways that demand a better 
understanding of biology 
(e.g., Lesser and Hefner 2017) 
Focus Focus on later stages of drug development  Increased focus on the basic science of drug discovery (e.g., Lesser and Hefner, 2017)  
Technologies 
implemented for drug 
discovery 
The standard strategy was to internalize 
public-domain data and to build (or 
license) internal platforms to manage and 
integrate them with internal data 
Innovative computational biology approaches require 
the development of new technologies that extract value 
from increasingly comprehensive public-domain data 
sources. A shift from ‘proprietary data' to ‘proprietary 
understanding of data’ 
(e.g., Au 2014; Barnes et al. 2009;  
Loging et al. 2007; Schrattenholz 
and Soskic 2008) 
Publication of clinical 
trial data 
Restricted access due to IP protection 
reasons. Patient data confidential unless 
subpoenaed by a court order 
Companies opening up clinical trial data for research 
to increase a better understanding of disease 
progression  
(e.g., Au 2014; Pogorelc 2014) 
The scope of industrial-
academic collaborations 
Focus on specific targets. Partnership 
agreements are typically small in scope 
The broader focus of the collaboration expanding 
across one or more indications, therapeutic areas, or 
operational capabilities 
(e.g., Bianchi et al., 2011; 
Chaguturu et al. 2014; Hunter and 




Typically involving two parties and using 
a structure (a “sponsor” and “partner” 
model) that distributes control, risks, and 
rewards  
Typically involving three or more parties including 
biopharmaceutical companies, academia, non-profit 
contributing resources. Shared control and decision-
making, thus increasing potential risks and rewards 




4.4 Theoretical underpinnings 
4.4.1 A Collective Action Approach to Information Infrastructures 
Information infrastructures such as data and code repositories for scientific or health 
information have long been differentiated from transactional information systems (e.g., ERP) 
for being integrators of widely distributed and previously siloed information spaces 
(Constantanides 2012, Constantinides and Barrett 2015, Hanseth and Monteiro 1997). The 
key attributes of an information infrastructure described by such a body of literature are 
described in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Summary of Key Aspects of an Information Infrastructure (II) 
II attributes  Definition Sources 
Shared and open An information infrastructure is shared by and open 
to a large user base and technological components. 
e.g., (Byrd and Turner 




An information infrastructure is modular in that it 
has the ability to add, modify and remove 
technological components with little effect on its 
features and process of other components. The 
modular attribute of an infrastructure leads to the 
subprinciples of decomposition, recombination and 
reusability of its components.  
e.g. (Byrd and Turner 2001, 
Chung et al. 2003, Duncan 
1995) 
 
Built on installed 
base 
An information infrastructure is not developed from 
scratch but on the existing installed base, which 
constantly evolves in different layers.  
e.g., (Grisot et al. 2014, 
Hanseth 2001, Weill and 
Broadbent 1998) 
 
Enabling An information infrastructure has a supporting or 
enabling function. It is not designed to automate 
something that already exists or to support one way 
of working or a specific application but to support 
the emergence of new activities.  
e.g., (Hanseth 2001) 
Embodied in 
standards 
An information infrastructure and its components 
are embodied in different standards (e.g., coding 
schemes, terminologies) that need to be agreed 
upon to facilitate the interoperability and 
e.g., (Ciborra and Andreu 
2001, Hanseth et al. 2006, 




connection between the different components and 
their further reusability. “Standards are a necessary 
constituting element” of the collection of 
information infrastructure connections (Hanseth 
2001, pp.57). Standards allow a shared pattern of 
use among a diverse range of user organizations.  
 
Heterogeneous An information infrastructure is a heterogeneous 
collage of people, systems and processes.  
e.g., (Ciborra and Andreu 
2001, Hanseth et al. 2006, 
Hanseth and Monteiro 
1997)  
 
The process of integrating information spaces is characterized by being complex due to a 
number of challenges that it needs to face (Constantinides and Barrett 2015). Challenges 
include combining heterogeneous interests and resources from the different organizations and 
(Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010, Hanseth and Monteiro 1997) agreeing on a set of standards 
(Bowker 1999, Hanseth 2001, Hanseth and Monteiro 1997, Star and Ruhleder 1996), which 
“are a necessary constituting element” (Hanseth 2001, p.57) “to the collection of information 
infrastructure connections” (Constantanides 2012 p.26). An additional challenge is defining 
an appropriate governance that facilitates the integration and sustainability of the information 
infrastructure (Constantinides and Barrett 2015). Decisions are made across a wide range of 
aspects, including infrastructure architecture and its components, procurement and operation, 
type of information, standards, access and user rights, applications, processes, and resource 
investment e.g., (Weill and Ross 2004). 
Some researchers have argued that information infrastructures need to be governed in a 
centrally controlled manner to solve conflicts of interests, e.g., (Markus et al. 2006, Vincent 
and Camp 2004), while other scholars have argued that centralized control is insufficient to 
address the dynamics of a perpetually changing base of heterogeneous users (Hanseth and 
Lyytinen 2010, Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013, Sahay and Aanestad 2009, Yoo et al. 2012). 
A top-down versus bottom-up approach for governing information infrastructures translates 
the centuries long debate among economists, sociologists, ecologists, and political scientists 
regarding how to govern different types of collective resource systems called commons 
(Mindel et al. 2018). Both streams of literature are preoccupied with how large-scale 
resource pools can be made openly accessible to a large population of users while 
maintaining an equilibrium between, often competing, private and public interests. The 




agents to contribute to the common resource pool and jeopardize its overall sustainability 
(Rolland & Monteiro, 2002). 
The historical discourse has been polarized into two rival schools of thought: one represented 
by Garret Hardin and the second by Elinor Ostrom. In 1968, Hardin popularized the ‘tragedy 
of the commons,’ which became a leading paradigm in political science as an argument 
explaining what will happen to openly accessible resources if strong top-down institutions do 
not set limits on individual freedoms (Hardin 1968), showing how uncontrolled individual 
self-interested pursuits may sabotage the common good (Greco and Floridi 2004). The 
tragedy of the commons is an instantiation of the prisoner’s dilemma, specifically, an n-
person prisoner’s dilemma where the rational pursuit of each agent's individual self-interest 
leads to suboptimal management of common recourses (Greco and Floridi 2004, Fletcher and 
Zwick 2000, Ostrom 1986). According to Hardin’s logic, decentralized online information 
systems would not succeed due to their high openness levels (Mindel et al. 2018). There are 
abundant studies providing empirical support for Hardin’s argument, e.g., (Ma and Agarwal 
2007, Moon and Sproull 2008, Ransbotham and Kane 2011, Stewart and Gosain 2006). 
As an alternative, Ostrom (1990) argued that the logic behind the tragedy of the commons is 
simplistic and problematic. In the 1980s, Ostrom and her school of thought collected and 
analyzed more than 5,000 empirical field studies from around the world to scrutinize and 
identify the structural characteristics of open resource systems: the attributes and practices of 
their users and rules and the reported outcomes. This research identified many well-
functioning open resource systems that work in the absence of strong, centralized authority 
(Nagendra and Ostrom 2012, Ostrom 1990). She observed that the ‘most resilient governance 
arrangements were those that dynamically managed boundary setting and mutual 
accountability through a high degree of inclusivity in decision-making’ (Mindel et al. 2018). 
The main idea was that by increasing the number of decision-makers (polycentricity), an 
individual’s commitment to the open resource system is reinforced, mitigating the need for 
central governance. The concept of polycentricity was first developed by (Polanyi 1951) to 
describe the free independent exercise by scientists unconstrained by the intervention of a 
central management authority (Aligica and Tarko 2012). Ten years later, polycentricity was 
adapted by Ostrom (et al. 1961) as an alternative to centralization. The resulting framework 
became the foundation for common-pool resource governance research, also known as 
collective-action research. 
The literature, to date, has paid little theoretical attention to whether centralized and 
polycentric governance of an information infrastructure are discrete, static alternatives or, 
rather, a fluid and manageable characteristic that could be dynamically governed through 
certain architectural characteristics of the infrastructure. Just how such movement between 
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openness and closure is made possible in an information infrastructure (what this balancing 
involves, who manages it, how it happens and how it actually impacts the collective action 
problem while addressing both collective and private self-interests) is an under-researched 
area that we endeavor to explore and theorize about. Such an exploration requires an 
understanding of the type of collective resources under focus. 
4.4.2 Commons Goods in Information Infrastructures 
Samuelson (Samuelson 1954 pp. 387-389) classified goods as either private or public, 
placing great emphasis on exclusion. Goods for which the use by other individuals was 
excluded were labeled private, in contrast to goods for which all individuals were included 
(i.e., public goods). Another dimension was introduced into the schema by adding 
subtractability (also referred to as rivalry), where the use of a good by one person subtracts 
from the availability of the good to others. Across this two-dimensional classification of 
goods, research has been developed to identify the varying degree of exclusion and 
subtractability. Embracing these two dimensions (exclusion & subtractability), collective 
action research transcended the dual classification of public versus private goods (Monge et 
al. 1998), which led to the approach to goods as commons, which exhibit properties of both 
private and public goods (Ostrom 1990). 
Despite their parallel characteristics, Hardin’s and Ostrom’s ‘commons’ (called common 
pool resources by Ostrom) have important differences with the goods involved in discussions 
of information infrastructures. Hardin and Ostrom theorize about physical resource systems 
with tangible natural or man-made resources. The application of collective action research to 
theorize about information infrastructures conceptualizes a ‘good’ as the functionalities that 
the information system affords and the collective interests and resources of the users. 
Compared to the classical theorization around natural collective action goods (e.g., forests, 
fisheries, pastures), in information infrastructures, goods are “sociotechnically 
interdependent on the heterogeneity of interests and resources of a distributed user base” 
(Constantinides and Barrett 2015 pp.44, Markus et al. 2006). As a result, information 
infrastructure research maintains that due to the distributed and interdependent nature of such 
goods, ‘the level of the good at any given time will depend on the average rate of collective 
resources contributed’ (Monge et al. 1998 p.417) 
While the physical nature of the resources in Ostrom’s and Hardin’s theories makes the 
resource unit subtractable, in information infrastructures, the resources are in a digitalized 
form, so one person’s use of information does not directly imply subtraction from another 
person’s ability to use it; resources do not face the social dilemma of overconsumption 
(Constantinides and Barrett 2015, Mindel et al. 2018). The characteristics of exclusion and 




technologically contingent”(Vassilakopoulou et al. 2016 pp.4.) Thus, information 
infrastructures are always subject to negotiations regarding the extent to which they remain 
open and shared by a wide and growing base of users (Hanseth 2001, Star and Ruhleder 
1996), how they regulate their use through IP regimes e.g., (Benkler 2006), standards 
(Monteiro 1998), and the governance structures to manage their use e.g., (Weill and 
Broadbent 1998, Weill and Ross 2004). 
4.4.3 Folding and Unfolding Processes in Information Infrastructures 
In addition to information infrastructure scholarship and collective action theory, we now 
introduce two constructs to complete our conceptual foundations. In our theorizing, we 
borrow from Shaikh and Vaast (2016) the concepts of folding and unfolding. Shaikh and 
Vaast (Shaikh and Vaast 2016)  employ these terms to describe how open-source developers 
create opaque spaces of work (the fold) and transition dynamically back to open spaces. 
Folding refers to the process by which developers create such private workspaces (the fold), 
and unfolding is the process by which the output of the fold (e.g., code, bug fixes) is released 
back into the open. Folding and unfolding processes balance the need in open-source 
software development for complete openness in the development process and sharing the 
source code with the need for moments to work in opacity. It is “a folding from what happens 
outside” (Shaikh and Vaast 2016 p.827) into a more restricted or hidden space that creates a 
territory for reflective organizing. 
Originally inspired by Deleuze’s and Kavanagh and Araujo’s ideas (Deleuze and Strauss 
1991, Kavanagh and Araujo 1995), the creation of the fold or hidden territories is temporary 
and return that which is inside back to the outside or a wider environment after a period of 
time. Folds are enabled by digital technologies and represent a virtual space for restricted 
exchanges and possess a fluid nature ‘where change is the norm’ (Shaikh and Vaast 2016 
p.827). Unfolding is the natural occurrence after the fold when releasing the output (e.g., 
code) of the discussion. 
We will adapt the concept of folding and unfolding in our theorizing to illustrate how 
information infrastructures dynamically manage pharmaceutical companies’ need for 
openness and closure. 
4.5 Research context and methods 
We conducted a longitudinal, in-depth case study of OT with the goal of providing 
theoretical insights into how to govern data commons, allowing firms to reveal their data and 
resources while competing in later stages (Yin, 1984). Case-based exploratory methods are 
suitable for investigating poorly understood phenomena (Eisenhardt 1989). 
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OT offered a powerful opportunity for theory generation. Based on a set of preliminary 
interviews with managers at a variety of pharmaceutical companies (n=5) and life science 
laboratories (n=3), we selected OT following three main criteria: its fit, distinctiveness, and 
revelatory nature (Eisenhardt 1989; Siggelkow 2007; Yin 2003). First, OT is an information 
infrastructure that has achieved extraordinary success in organizing the disclosure of data, 
technology, and methods, leading to the identification of 2,540 potential new indications for 
791 current drug targets. Second, the case is distinctive in the sense that the OT includes 
Europe´s leading pharma and life science organizations and flagship scientific research 
infrastructures. Finally, we view OT as highly revelatory of a successful example of 
information infrastructure governance that enables data and knowledge sharing (Altshuler et 
al., 2010) to accelerate target identification and validation while protecting organizations’ 
assets in the later stages of the drug development process. In this section, we describe the 
research context and our data collection and analysis. 
4.5.1 Research Context 
OT is constituted by a group of organizations: EBI-EMBL—Europe’s flagship laboratory for 
life science—the Wellcome Sanger Institute, GSK, Biogen, Takeda, Celgene, and Sanofi. 
The organizations collaborate to generate target-centered data on human physiology and 
systems biology in pursuit of cutting-edge experimentation, which they openly share and 
integrate with publicly available data in the OT infrastructure. 
The methods used by OT include a combination of large-scale genomic experiments with 
scientific statistical and computational techniques to identify and validate causality between 
targets, pathways, and diseases (Open Targets, 2018). OT employs advances in cutting-edge 
genetic methods to support researchers in the first step of exploring new drugs, concretely 
helping them to identify "where to start" (Open Targets, 2018). By applying lean user 
experience (UX) design methods, OT members developed an infrastructure that searches, 
assesses and integrates a vast quantity of pubic and proprietary genetic and biological data to 
support target-centric and disease-centric inquiries.  
According to the last update available (November 2019), OT contains more than 27,069 
targets, 6,336,307 associations, 13,579 diseases, and 20 data sources (Open Targets, 2018). 
OT collective work has resulted, among other highlighted results, in the identification of 
2,540 potential new indications for 791 current drug targets. A total of 1,366 of these 2,540 
indications are for Orphanet rare diseases where the target is a known drug target for a 
common disease (Khaldakar et al., 2017). OT has suggested potential drug-repositioning 
opportunities for 14 rare diseases, and according to Pharmaprojects8, which gathers 
                                               




worldwide drug development pipeline data, 6% of all new target-disease pairs uncovered in 
OT are in drug development, which is a conservative estimate given that only indications 
with exact matches were considered (Khaldakar et al., 2017). Drug repositioning is a strategy 
in drug development that seeks to expand the indication space for a successful drug or find a 
new indication for a drug that was not successful in clinical trials. While the traditional 
approach to drug development takes from 10 to 15 years, the repositioning strategy takes an 
average of 6.5 years (Khaladkar et al. 2017). 
4.5.2 Data Collection and Sources 
Our study relies on a diverse set of primary and secondary data to provide richness and 
enhance the validity of our findings (Alvesson 2009, Klein and Myers 1999). Primary data 
included 25 semi-structured interviews conducted in two phases from 2017 to 2019 and 
direct observations from one study visit at the Welcome Genome Campus for the OT open 
days (June 2019). Our objective was to interview a representative cross-section of OT, 
including academics, company members, the operational team and external users (non-
members) of the OT infrastructure. The interview process was concluded when no significant 
additional insights were obtained from the data, and theoretical saturation was achieved. 
Secondary sources were also an essential data source. As OT activity has been widely 
publicized in media outlets, it was possible to collect substantial and relevant information 
from published sources. We combined these data with the publications resulting from OT 
(i.e., 41 research publications), together with tutorials about how to use OT infrastructure, 
blog posts, release notes, webinars, workshop presentations, the question and answer (Q&A) 
section of the OT website, and OT information contained in the seven partners’ websites and 
annual reports. These secondary sources appear to be very useful, as they allowed us to 
perform crosschecks using multiple sources. The combination of our primary data with 
secondary data analysis allowed us to build our theoretical inferences from the case. 
Finally, we supplemented our data with peer-reviewed publications on the topic of target 
identification and validation in the drug discovery process. We drew upon these sources to 
better grasp the technical work involved in OT to identify the target-disease associations and 
understand the type of data and methods used to find the best evidence of an effective and 
safe target. These academic sources served the mutually relevant but separate purpose of 
acquainting us much more deeply with relevant bioinformatics and biomedical backgrounds. 
This gave us contextual knowledge to make better sense of our primary data, both the 
interviews and observations (Lok and de Rond 2012). Table 4 in Appendixes provides a 
detailed description of the data collection, sources and their use in the analysis. 
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4.5.3 Data Analysis 
We performed a two-stage inductive analysis. The first stage, conducted between September 
2017 and November 2018, was exploratory. We obtained primary data from 10 in-depth 
semi-structured interviews and informal conversations with research scientists and engineers 
from academic organizations and the managers of companies participating in information 
infrastructures in the life science sector. This phase was also devoted to reading abundant 
material available online about emerging information infrastructures after the HGP in the life 
science sector. 
After this first exploratory phase, in a second stage, we completed 15 interviews in a second 
round with a cross-section of representative organizations participating in OT. The major 
themes in our interview protocol are summarized in Appendix B. Interviews were, on 
average, 45–60 min long, and the questions focused on OT governance, technical 
characteristics of the infrastructure, the role of the OT operational team, and the competitive 
and cooperative dynamics sustaining the infrastructure. Interviews were anonymized, and we 
organized and analyzed data for salient themes. We compared transcripts to identify themes 
in initial interviews to then explore and contrast these themes in subsequent interviews. 
Themes were coded by one of he co-authors and they were iteratively discussed with the 
other co-author, especially when the categorization was unclear to reach an agreement. We 
performed the interviews and their analysis in several iterations, and thus those earlier 
transcripts informed and incorporated information emerging from later interviews. In our 
results (section 5), we present interview excerpts from the study, with alphanumeric key 
identifiers (corresponding to table 3) representing quoted interviewees. Table 4 in appendix 






Table 3. Details on Data Collection and Use in the Analysis 
Source of 
data 
Type of data Description Identifiers Use in the analysis 
Interviews First Round 
n=10 
Research scientists and 
engineers from academic 
organizations in 
information commons in 





To gather data and an 
overall understanding 




Managers of companies 
participating in information 
infrastructures in the 




Operational team members 





Research scientists and 
engineers from academic 
organizations partnered 





To gather data on 




processes.   Managers of companies in OT (n=3) 
MT1 
MT2 MT3 
Managers of companies not 
participating in OT but 





Managers of OT – 




Observations Visit to OT Observation to OT Open Days – 
workshop, working groups and social 
event (June 2019) 
To gain additional 
understandings of how 
the OT operational 
team facilitates the 
work of OT partners  
Secondary 
data 
Publications 41 publications To gather data and 
obtain an overall 
understanding of all 
OT infrastructure, 
components, usages, 
and governance and 
major outcomes of the 
collaboration. 
Tutorials 1 tutorial on OT infrastructure 
Blog 3 outreach posts 
Release 
notes 
19 release notes 







4.6.1 Open Targets Information Infrastructure 
OT was created in 2015 by a nucleus of academic institutions and pharmaceutical companies 
that sought to mitigate the attrition rates of firms’ pipelines and increase the probability of a 
successful drug going through the process. The organizations decided to achieve this via the 
development of an information infrastructure to 1) integrate comprehensive datasets from 
myriad public databases, such as UniProt, ChEMBL, NHGRI-EBI GWAS, EuropePMC, and 
Cancer Gene Census, and share computational techniques to calculate, rank and score gene-
disease associations and 2) generate new data, methods and tools via joint experimental 
research projects, the results of which would later be combined with large public datasets to 
support data-driven target prioritization. 
The integration of the datasets followed a federated approach to develop summary 
information about the data, which takes the form of evidence objects supplied by the source 
database or by the OT team from parsing other databases. The idea was not to store all 
relevant data because the databases are already uniquely tailored to many of the specialized 
data sources and often evolve quickly. The infrastructure interface works as an open access 
"Google" – a type of search engine that extensively searches, assesses and integrates the vast 
quantity of genetic and biological data available – supporting two main paths: target-centric 
and disease-centric inquiries. An OT user can search for a target and is presented with 
visualizations of the evidence for associations with specific diseases clustered into broad 
therapeutic areas, allowing in-depth investigations of the evidence and user-defined lists of 
associations. In the second path, the user enters the name of a disease and asks which targets 
can be associated with this disease. The output is a visualized summary of the genetic targets 
associated with that disease and the underlying evidence available (Koscielny et al. 2017). 
OT also integrates third-party visualizations, which include visualizations of biological 
pathways developed by Reactome, a graphical display of RNA baseline expression 
developed by Expression Atlas, a visualization of the different protein features developed by 
UniProt or a three-dimensional protein structure display for targets9. In Appendix we offer an 
example of a search result in the OT infrastructure. 
The analysis of our data reveals a governance form in OT that afforded two processes: 
folding and unfolding, which allowed organizations to dynamically navigate from open 
towards opaque and closed workspaces to protect companies’ economic interests. The 
conditions creating and dissipating the fold are as follows: 1) a modular infrastructure 
containing different layers, access rights, and data standards supporting the systems’ 
                                               




interoperability (so-called ‘technical attributes’ of the information infrastructure) and 2) a 
brokerage exercise by a trusted third party, the OT operational team, which behaves as an 
independent entity and as a liaison to the different companies to manage the boundaries 
between open, opaque and closed spaces of work (i.e., the ‘organizational attributes’ of the 
information infrastructure). We turn first to the description of the technical and 
organizational attributes (the conditions) to allow an appropriate description of the processes 
of folding and unfolding. 
4.6.2 The Technical Attributes of Open Targets: A Modular Infrastructure with 
Multiple Layers 
OT designed different layers in the information infrastructures: a public layer, where any user 
can add data and tools through a federated approach coordinated by an OT operational team; 
a consortium layer, where only a selected number of partners can join through a negotiation 
process; and finally, each partner can privately include their proprietary data by integrating 
OT with their internal information systems (the private layer). 
 
1) First, regarding the public layer, the information shared is accessible to any organization 
but belongs to the organization that contributed it to the public OT domain. The results are 
openly shared in the OT infrastructure and are aggregated and temporally delayed formats. 
“We are not keeping the data for ourselves. We generate the data on the Wellcome Trust 
campus, and the data is made available. It takes a little bit of time, it has to be in the right 
format, but all data is available, and we need to write a publication before disclosing the 
data, which takes time.” MT2 claims, “The platform has an average of 1,100 visitors per 
week.” As OT4 further explains, “We contribute not only with the data but also with the 
processes, documentation and the code that runs the platform.” 
 
2) Regarding the consortium layer, OT members have access to the data that generate 
through collaborative experimental projects, together with all contextual information relevant 
for extracting insights from large-scale experimentation. The information is accessible to any 
organization in the consortium and belongs to the organization contributing to the project and 
generating the data. As MOT1 describes, 
“Accessing the raw data is not that easy. It is not easy to interpret. The data is hard to deal 
with, and we need to be part of the consortium to be part of the experimental projects that 
generate the data, to have access to the metadata, and be close to the academic partners in 
the consortium to exploit the data.” As OT4 describes, “Everybody that joins OT 
understands the premise for being here. There is limited access without a doubt. Everybody 
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understands that until there is a formal publication after the project there is no disclosure.” 
OT4 
The process of becoming a member of OT is highly regulated to safeguard productive and 
sustained collaboration: a) all members have to reach consensus on accepting the candidate 
organization; b) only one organization per year is allowed to enter the consortium; c) 
significant in-cash and in-kind investment is required (a commitment that the organization’s 
teams will devote resources to consortium activity); and d) the decision entails a rigorous 
evaluation, spanning several months of negotiation, to determine whether the candidate 
organization is committed to sharing its resources and capabilities for a sustained period of 
time and to ensure strong alignment between the goals of the candidate and the consortium. 
As OT1 describes, 
“To become a member, you need to share the vision of the consortium [open disclosure] and 
agree on investing around two-digit million euros, and all partners have to accept your 
membership." As MT2 explains, "We have to be careful; this is why we have only one 
company join every year. It takes time to integrate a company into the consortium." 
The process of incorporating a new member can be proactive (i.e., reaching out to 
organizations that OT members want to bring into the consortium) or reactive (i.e., 
addressing the requests of organizations asking to join the consortium): 
“There are companies that contact us and express their interest in being part of the 
consortium, and there are other companies that we actively reach out to" (MT1). 
Agreeing with the OT ‘philosophy’ of sharing resources across partners and the results with 
the broader research community is not natural for pharmaceutical companies. As MOT2 
explains, 
“Our head of R&D thought that it was better to put the investment in working with others on 
targets than trying to be the only ones knowing about the targets (…) An important issue is 
that for this step of target identification, genetics and genomics data is extremely relevant, 
which is a seed that is changing extremely rapidly and is a seed where most of the data 
advances are provided by academic advances. The way to exploit this information and our 
expertise was working with leading academic centers and joining forces with other 
companies.” As he further explains, “Our head of R&D came from academia and decided 
that in the specific activities of early discovery and early biology, there is so much going on 
that he realized we would not be able to compete. Typically, to compete requires 
considerable investment, and we did not know if such investment was going to pay off. It is a 
long time and a very risky investment." 
 
3) The private layer to individual company members: in-house, firms can integrate OT with 




develop a potential drug for the identified target. Only company members can access the 
information, which is exclusive to the organization (i.e., a private good). 
"We have other features that are private, that we do not share with others. Those hidden 
features allow me, for instance, to work with my compound library on the platform, which I 
do not share with other OT partners” (MT2). “We also can ask for new features in the 
platform. We can also implement the platform in-house, within the company, integrate it with 
our systems, and you receive support from the other members of the consortium” (OT1). 
In addition to the demarcation of multiple layers based on access rights or visibility, the 
modularity of the infrastructure emphasizes a decomposition of loosely coupled knowledge 
domains in the drug discovery process (Henfridsson et al. 2014). This decomposition is based 
on 1) temporal latency and 2) domain separation of data and knowledge. 
First, temporal latencies refer to the periods between the generation of a particular datum 
and its mandated release to the public commons (Contreras 2010). Second, regarding 
knowledge domain separation, e.g., (Sakakibara 2002), firms agreed in knowledge domains 
across the drug discovery process where they would reveal their data, methods, and 
technologies while separating them from domains where they would compete. Generally, 
firms agreed where to draw the line between what is considered precompetitive and 
competitive knowledge (figure 1). 




In practical terms, firms decomposed the type of data and knowledge required in each phase 
of drug discovery into different components. They agreed to disclose data related to phases I 
and II of the drug discovery process (target identification and validation) while not revealing 
the knowledge and proprietary data that they use to identify the multiple molecules active 
against the potential targets or other information useful in later stages of the drug 
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development process (i.e., phase 3 onwards) (figure 1). Dr. Rolf Apweiler, former director of 
OT, explains this as follows: "the identification of a promising new target is precompetitive 
and should be shared, with the subsequent steps moving into the competitive arena” (figure 
1). This distinction is fluid: “The definitions of precompetitive data may change over time, 
and boundaries of the intellectual property are becoming increasingly fluid." (OT1) 
 
5.3. The Organizational Attributes in Open Targets: A Brokerage Exercise 
Integrating information spaces from the different organizations in OT required a brokerage 
exercise by a trusted third party. The organizations involved in OT agree on the selection of a 
team – the OT executive and operational team (henceforth, the operational team) – that 
includes individuals with highly sophisticated scientific and managerial expertise who 
operate as a separate entity. As OT3 describes, “we compare ourselves to a startup.” 
The OT team acts as a ‘broker’ across the different organizations, enabling the pooling of 
dispersed information across the organizations and supporting transitions among public, 
shared, and private workspaces. Non-disclosure agreements and complementary legal 
boundaries are implemented bilaterally between the OT team and each organization. The 
operational team also helps the different organizations agree on a set of standards and data 
protocols that enable not only interoperability between different layers but also boundaries 
between layers (public, consortium and private). As OT4 describes, “Any access to data from 
the experimental project is provisioned through a person on the OT operational team. We 
have a gatekeeper for that, so that any person from our team asking for data needs to go 
through this person.” 
The operational team also helps match individual research initiatives across companies in 
pursuit of a joint research agenda. Organizations agree on a set of projects that will generate 
experimental data, which will initially be owned by the organizations generating it but will 
be made available in the public layer of the OT infrastructure after two years. An example of 
a brokerage activity implemented by the OT operational team is described by MT1: “The 
process starts with a call for proposals that we distribute across all the companies, and the 
academic partners do the same as well, and we ask for an expression of interest, which 
consists of a one-page idea. We receive various ideas from our colleagues worldwide, we 
look at them [referring to the OT management team], and we see if the idea makes sense in 
what it tries to achieve. Then we do some matchmaking between companies, putting together 
similar ideas and proposals coming from X, Y and Z [a reference to specific OT companies], 
and we build teams combining the three firms. We merge the ideas that we agreed made 
sense into single projects. Based on the feedback that we provide, those teams come together 
after the matchmaking and write a full project proposal, which is around five pages. The 




each partner. Based on their ranking, we give a cut-off according to the budget available. 
Then, a certain number of projects go ahead and start. Typically, projects last 2-3 years" 
(see figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Shaping the Research Agenda, Match-making and Merging 
 
 
4.6.3 Folding and Unfolding Processes: Navigating Dynamically among the 
Private, Shared and Public Layers 
A detailed analysis of our data gave us insights into what happens at the boundaries of each 
layer (public, consortium, private) and how the different organizations move across layers in 
the modular infrastructure. We characterize this process of fluidly transitioning through 
layers as folding and unfolding, employing Shaikh and Vaast’s terminology (Shaikh and 
Vaast 2016). We use the term ‘folding’ to refer to the process by which organizations in OT 
create ‘private pockets of interactions’ inside their organizations (i.e., the movement of going 
private) and limit the openness of the information infrastructure. We employ the term 
‘unfolding’ to describe the process by which organizations in OT release private information 
from private interactions into the shared or public layer of the infrastructure (figure 3). In 
other words, we consider the ‘open’ characteristics traditionally discussed in the information 
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infrastructure literature (Constantanides 2012, Hanseth 2001) as a fluid and manageable 
attribute of an information infrastructure. 
1) Folding refers to the process by which OT organizations create private workspaces: either 
a) including the OT consortium (i.e., opaque), or b) totally closed within a single 
organization (i.e., dark). Folding towards the consortium occurs when organizations seek to 
generate experimental data and robust evidence about targets and disease associations in 
collaborative projects. The outcomes are released after an average of two years into the 
public domain. In the second case of folding towards a single organization, companies 
periodically return to their drug development departments to exploit target-disease 
associations for their own drug discovery pipeline, that is, identifying potential molecules in 
their private compound libraries that may more satisfactorily modulate such targets. 
2) Unfolding refers to the process by which OT organizations bring the output of the fold 
(e.g., experimental data, method, or technological tool generated in an OT project) back into 
the open. 
These two processes allow information infrastructures to balance the principle of openness 
with the organization's needs for opacity and closure following competitive and market logic. 
The process of folding towards the consortium layer gives organizations “access to data 
since minute one, while the public will only have it after a publication and appropriate 
curation, which takes on average of two years, and this makes a huge difference,” explains 
OT1. “This gives us an advantage compared to others outside OT," MT1 confirms. 
Additionally, MT1 cites the reason for folding into the shared consortium space: “Sharing 
scientific data in the public domain is a necessary but insufficient requirement for being able 
to reuse such data for drug development. You need, and this is what you pay for, close 
interaction with the scientists who generate data to understand what the data says, how it 
was generated, and how to interpret it.” 
Folding towards a completely closed space inside the company occurs when organizations 
need to integrate proprietary data and knowledge to reuse the information obtained from 
targets in the shared space in its pipeline. As OT1 explains, “We know about other companies 
that are using the platform, and it is beneficial to them. Absolutely, that is happening. What 
they cannot do if they are not part of the consortium is to direct, integrate proprietary 
domains or data going to the platform, prioritize regarding functionalities of the platform, or 










It has been suggested that the massive increases in genomic and proteomic data have had a 
profound impact on the structure of the pharma and life sciences industries (Chaguturu et al. 
2014, Zanders 2011). Specifically, the clear demarcations that once existed between a) drug 
discovery and drug development and b) precompetitive and competitive domains are now 
becoming more fluid. This is a consequence of the rapidly increasing costs of drug 
development and the high costs of curating very large bioinformatic datasets and novel 
computational methods; the economic costs of developing and operating these information 
infrastructures are simply too great to be borne by any single organization. Our case study of 
OT is an outstanding exemplar of a life sciences information infrastructure constituted by 
some of the world’s leading research, non-profit, and for-profit organizations. Despite their 
different objectives, they have developed a successful governance form to balance the 
tensions of sharing and collaboration inherent in a business context characterized by secrecy 
and vigilant patent protection. 
•  Genetic associations 
•  Somatic mutations 
•  Drugs (from CHEMBL about known drugs –
FDA) 
•  Pathways & systems biology 
•  RNA expression 
•  Text mining (associations from text-mining 
literature databases)  
•  Animal models 
Private to 
single OT firm 
Shared by  
OT members 
Public Data types Knowledge Domain 
•  About target-disease 
associations 
•  Drug discovery phase 
I and II  
Knowledge Domain 
•  About target-disease 
associations 
•  Drug discovery phase 
I and II  
Data types 
•  Data from high throughput experimental 
projects performed by OT partners together 
that generate target-centred data in human, 
physiologically relevant systems to 
strengthen  causal links between targets and 
diseases in selected therapeutic areas 
Data types Knowledge Domain 
•  About lead 
identification 
•  Drug discovery phase 
III and onwards 
•  Proprietary data for compound library 




















Given that OT exhibits both private and public good properties (Ostrom 1990), our analysis 
has identified the collective action challenges of aligning private and collective interests and 
an appropriate governance form for this information infrastructure. We theorize towards a 
governance approach that affords two processes, i.e., folding and unfolding, that allows 
dynamic navigation towards open, opaque and dark workspaces that protect the members’ 
economic interests. 
The governance form provides a continuum between openness and closure, which are 
enabled by two elements. The first element is the technical attributes of the information 
infrastructure, which is modular with private, consortium, and public layers. Modularity not 
only relates to access rights or visibility based on the organizational level but also employs 
temporal levers (i.e., delays) to affect this. In combination, these attributes enable the 
decomposition and redefinition of drug discovery domains that have historically been highly 
segregated (i.e., target identification, target validation, lead identification, lead optimization.) 
As a consequence, the clear boundary between what had previously been considered 
precompetitive and competitive is now more fluid, manifesting a structural change in the 
industry. The second element that enables the folding and unfolding process is the function 
of a broker. The broker acts as a trusted third party, enabling members to effectively 
transition through the various levels of disclosure and collaboration based upon need. The 
broker first negotiates the entry of new members into the OT shared layer (the consortium) to 
determine whether the candidate organization is committed to sharing its resources for a 
sustained period of time and whether its private interests are aligned with OT’s collective 
goals. Later, through bilateral agreements with each organization the broker facilitates the 
integration of the OT’s shared work layers into the companies’ private workspaces to 
facilitate competitive drug development. Additional tasks under the broker’s role include the 
pooling of disperse resources into the information infrastructure, mediation to agree on data 
standards and protocols, and support for the integration and compatibility of data across the 
infrastructure. 
4.7.1 Implications for theory  
Our theoretical developments integrate ideas from information infrastructure scholarship, 
collective action theory, and the conceptual foundations of the folding and unfolding 
constructs imported from Shaikh and Vaast (Shaikh and Vaast 2016). These constructs 
extend previous work on secluded workspaces and related concepts such as the ‘structural 
folds’ of Vaan et al. (2015) and Vedres and Stark (2010) and the ‘relational spaces’ of 
Kellogg (2009). Our research differs in that our folds do not theorize about individual 
behavior. Rather, we take the organization as the focal entity and theorize about the process 




aspect of the previous work of (Shaikh and Vaast 2016) also differs in terms of context: the 
research and development processes in drug discovery are longer than those in open-source 
development, and as a result, the temporality of the opaque spaces is longer. 
Applying this theoretical perspective to the empirical case, we sought to understand the 
dynamic governance of an information infrastructure that overcomes the challenge of 
simultaneously aligning individual and collective interests. This research contributes to the 
current scholarship in the information infrastructure literature by theorizing the open attribute 
of infrastructure as a manageable and fluid attribute that allows moving from private to open 
workspaces with common goods that can be reused by any potential organization. Openness 
and closure are both enabling and constraining attributes of an information infrastructure 
depending on the context at hand. Our findings describe a governance approach that makes 
the two compatible, describing the ongoing navigation between open and private workspaces 
that allows organizations to optimize their private and collective interests. Our research 
suggests a formula to overcome the historical social dilemmas of collective action (i.e., free-
riding and overconsumption) in the sense that contributors have incentives to invest in the 
commons because the governance approach allows them to benefit via the use of specific 
levers (i.e., access time, integration with proprietary data, rights to patent fully developed 
drugs.) 
Finally, we extend the classic debate between top-down and bottom-up governance models: 
our case bridges the two with an alternative approach in which a broker, a trusted third party, 
is assigned coordination and arbitration tasks to orchestrate and mediate the flows of data and 
knowledge. According to our case data, folding and unfolding processes were allowed not 
only by the technical attributes of the modular infrastructure but also through an 
organizational component whereby an operational team with bilateral trust helped move the 
organizations from one layer to another. This governance form offers a more nuanced 
perspective to the classic portrayal of top-down or bottom-up governance approaches as 
discrete, static alternatives. 
4.7.2 Implications for Practice 
By many measures, OT represents an extreme case of an information infrastructure: the 
partners include several of the world’s most accomplished research and scientific institutions 
together with some of the most highly capitalized companies in the pharmaceutical sector. In 
this sense, it represents an exceptional case in which the ethos of scientific knowledge as a 
social good and profit-seeking business investment intertwine. While it is unreasonable to 
expect that all information infrastructures will operate with such acute opposition between 
public and private interests, most collaborative infrastructures and platforms with 
heterogeneous contributors will have divergent or competing objectives in some form 
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(Wareham et al. 2014). We suggest that the governance mechanisms that permit a dynamic 
transitions among varying layers of openness and closure, both technical (i.e., modularity) 
and organizational (i.e., brokerage), are in some sense generalizable to alternative forms of 
information infrastructures characterized by divergent motives and institutional objectives 
(European Commission 2019, Hey 2009). 
A leitmotif in our analysis is that the general increase in novel data-intensive computational 
methods in drug discovery and development is not unique to the pharmaceutical sector. 
Rather, it is a tendency we expect to observe across other scientifically intensive industries. 
As this evolution continues, we expect to see a number of industries transformed in response 
to increased reliance upon computationally intensive research and development methods. It 
can also be expected that the movement to combine resources and share costs towards what 
might be considered precompetitive or public-good outcomes will increase. While 
preliminary, our analysis of OT offers a model of how one might map similar structural shifts 





The pharmaceutical industry is notorious for its reliance on patent protection and secrecy. 
Open Targets has been celebrated as a model for other industry organizations and 
policymakers due to its form of governance that enables the participation of for-profit 
pharma companies in a shared information infrastructure alongside non-profit foundations 
and public research institutions; the benefits of shared investments and public-good outcomes 
can be realized while simultaneously protecting the private economic interests of the OT 
members. This is attributable to a governance form that allows fluid navigation from openly 
shared and private workspaces. Our case focuses on modularity and brokerage as general 
conditions that make members’ private and collective interests compatible. As 
computationally intensive research and development methods pervade other industries, we 
can expect a commensurate increase in required investment levels, rendering them 
prohibitive to individual organizations. As commons-based information infrastructures 
emerge in response, the governance described in this case offer a model of how to 
successfully navigate the trade-offs between private and collective interests. 
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Table 4. Construct definitions 
Construct definition Source 
Openness: access to information. Related to the act of sharing information, it is a key featured exhibited by 
information infrastructures  
e.g., (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010, 
Shaikh and Vaast 2016) 
Information infrastructure: “multi-layered entities comprised of technological components, people and 
institutional arrangements”  
(Constantanides 2012 p. 25)  
Commons: A set of resources that are collectively owned and shared among a community. Commons contain 
public and private property over which different agents have certain rights. 
(Ostrom 1990) 
Collective action: refers to joint action by a number of agents to achieve and distribute some gain through 
coordination or cooperation  
(Hardin 1982)  
Drug discovery: “the process of creating chemical or biological molecules that have the potential to be 
developed as therapeutic agents, typically because they generate a desired biological effect in an appropriate 
testing or assay system against a particular molecular (drug) target”. 
(Weigelt, 2009, p. 941) 
Governance: the rules that underlie the social activities, which are integral to order relationships, 
responsibilities, and expectations of contributors. 
e.g., (Mindel et al. 2018, Weill and 
Ross 2004) 
Modularity: An information infrastructure is modular in that it has the ability to add, modify and remove 
technological components with little effect on its features and the processes of other components.  The 
modular attribute of infrastructure leads to the subprinciples of decomposition, recombination and reusability 
of infrastructure components 
e.g., (Byrd and Turner 2001, Chung 
et al. 2003, Duncan 1995, 
Henfridsson et al. 2014) 
Brokerage: the process of connecting actors in systems of social, economic, or political relations to facilitate 
access to valued resources 
 e.g., (Burt 2000, Obstfeld et al. 
2014, Stovel and Shaw 2012) 
Folding: the process by which organizations create ‘private pockets of interactions’ inside their organizations 
(i.e., the movement of going private) and limit the openness of the information infrastructure 
(Shaikh and Vaast 2016) 
Unfolding: the process by which organizations release private information from private interactions into the 
shared or public layer of the infrastructure 




Example of Interview Guide 
About the organization, role and responsibilities 
• What does your organization do? 
• What is your role at the organization? 
• Which activities have you developed in OT? 
Initial engagement 
• How did organization become aware of and initially get involved in OT? 
• Why did you want to join OT? 
• Why did your organization agree not to patent targets? What has this decision meant for 
your organization? 
• How was the process of taking part in OT? 
• Which processes did you undertake within your organization to join OT? 
About OT infrastructure 
• What are the components, functions and applications of OT? 
• What is the difference between OT public and OT access for partners?  
• How are the data, technologies, and methods generated in the collaboration within OT 
integrated into the OT infrastructure? 
• How are the data, technologies, and methods generated in the collaboration within OT 
integrated into your organization? 
• Which processes did you follow to make such integration possible outside of OT 
collaboration and within your organization?  
About OT collaboration 
• What do you share in OT projects? 
• What do you not want to share in OT projects?  
• How do you control what your team does not share with OT in keeping with what the 
organization does not want to share? In other words, what processes do you follow so 
that the information shared is only relevant for targets and not for competitive phases in 
drug discovery? 
• How do you use the knowledge from OT collaboration in the subsequent drug discovery 
process? How do you reuse the data, technologies or methods? 
• What have been the positive and negative effects of collaborating with your 
competitors? 
The role of OT operational team in the collaboration 
• How is the OT operational team selected?  
• How does the OT team help select projects? 
• How does the OT team manage the process of publishing the data, methods, 
technologies and any output in the infrastructure? 
• How does the OT team help you to integrate such outputs with your internal processes 












Table 5. Data Analysis and Theoretical Constructs 
Illustrative examples of empirical observations and excerpts from the 
interviews 




“Partners (referring to company partners) take the public instance of OT and 
they replicate that in a private instance, and then they will inject their own 
private data (…) They want their internal teams to make decisions with their 
private data but also knowing what already existing data tell us and how our data 
integrate with that data” OT4 
“Sometimes, their private instances (referring to companies) are managed 
entirely internally by them, but other times they involve a third party, a vendor, to 
assist them in the maintenance and update. They try to align with our releases, we 
release five times a year, every two months or so, and they take the last data 
releases and refresh [them]with any additional features that we release, and they 
replicate that internally.” OT5 
“Our development team would sit with the company members or the intermediary 
vendor and work through how we run the pipelines and how we can get their 
proprietary data in. And then, we go through their different requirements, so we 
work and see how we can hand something over to them that can be simply 
configured for them when they take it inside” OT5 
Process of folding  
- Integrate consortium data or public data with 
company proprietary data 
- Collaboration with OT team to migrate the 
shared or open data to proprietary systems in a 
bilateral collaboration 
- Non-disclosure agreement with OT team to help 
integrate public or shared data with proprietary 
data. 
- Agreement on data standards and metadata 
compatible with the structure of private datasets 
to enable locking 
- Protocol agreement on data flows to guarantee 




“When data is ready, we integrate it into the platform; we need to wait until it is 
ready and publicize and then we enter it in the platform at that point and release 
it” OT4.  
“The platform team (in charge of releasing the data) get to see the type of data 
very early in the process. They have sample data, and they discuss the format. We 
also have a UX specialist, to understand what the deliverable is and how we 
manifest it in the platform so that people can use it to make a decision. This is the 
foundation for data specification, really. How are we going to receive it, what 
does it looks like, how will it be processed? The discussions are very early on, 
and we try to get mock ups very early on, to gather feedback from the consortium 
partners but also from other users, and then we kind of refine them that as we go 
along (…) It is a moving target, as some of the projects do not know what the data 
Process of unfolding 
- Public release of data in OT infrastructure 
originating from OT consortium projects announced 
through OT dissemination networks.  
- Data curation process by OT team before releasing 
the data 
- Formal approval by OT scientific lead committee 






will look like, so we have monthly meetings.” OT4  
 " We have other features that are private, that we do not share with others. Those 
hidden features allow me, for instance, to work with my compound library on the 
platform, which I do not share with other OT partners” (MT2).  
“We also can ask for new features in the platform. We can also implement the 
platform in-house, within the company, integrate it with our systems, and you 
receive support from the other members of the consortium” (OT1). 
“So, we have the platform that is public and open to everybody. Then, for the 
experimental projects, the partners share the data while they are creating it in 
google buckets10” 
“We have an intranet for the consortium partners. It is information exchange 
between partners (…) The intranet has a link with the platform, and it is used for 
general governance of the projects. As we go through the project call processes, 
there are page proposals to share the details. It is like a one-stop shop for the 
whole portfolio of projects” OT4.  
Access rights 
- Public: anyone can access the data 
- Shared: only consortium partners can access the 
data 










“Everybody that joins OT understands the premise for being here. There is 
limited access without a doubt. Everybody understands that until there is a formal 
publication after the project there is no disclosure.” 
Time latency  
- Two years on average from the generation of the 
datum until it is released in the OT public layer.  
“Companies usually have a flag for the data that is private and what is public in 
their private instances because for them it is very important to differentiate that” 
OT4 
Domain or boundary demarcation  
- Delimitation of data and knowledge boundaries that 
correspond to public, shared and private layers.  
“We never get the whole, the full set of data. And sometimes we only get dummy 
data, which is fine because we only need to see the structure of the data. And 
likewise with the consortium members (referring to when they emulate Open 
Target in private instances) they do need our help and say, ok I have my private 
instance, now how do I inject my private data, but they do not want to share their 
data with us, so we talk about it in the context; we talk about the structure of their 
data, so to some extent it is blinded” OT4. 
Interoperability and data standards 
Agreement among OT partners on the structure and 
labeling of the data to make them integrable with 
public and private layers.  
                                               





“Any access to data on an experimental project is provisioned through a person 
on the operations team at OT. We do have a gatekeeper for that. Any person from 
our team asking for data needs to go through them” OT5 
“There is a need to coordinate the integration of data into OT, both from the 
projects that generate data but also with the data providers such as Chembl and 
Uniprot and all the data that goes into the platform to keep it up to date. We also 
work with the developer team that creates some of the features that users will use 
to visualize the data coming through.” OT4 
Trusted third party  
-Selection of an executive and operational team that 
behaves as a separate entity financially reporting to 
the governance board representing all organizations.  
- Coordination and mediation role when conflicts of 










“To become a member, you need to share the vision of the consortium 
[open disclosure] and agree on investing around at least two-digit million 
euros, and all partners have to accept your membership." OT1  
"We have to be careful; this is why we have only one company join every year. It 
takes time to integrate a company into the consortium." MT2 
“EMBL EBI, Wellcome Trust [the academic partners] are part of this philosophy 
to make raw data available. They are academic institutions, and this is easy for 
them. However, the question of openness is a question for companies. Not all 
companies agree to be open and share their knowledge and information about a 
discovery. This is a major issue. Some companies agree to open up their 
knowledge about a discovery, but other companies do not join because they do 
not believe in this strategy. They do not want to share" (MT2)  
Bilateral negotiations 
- Bilateral negotiations before entering OT 
consortium to agree on the conditions of the 
collaboration (i.e., resources to be invested and 
policies about data releases and open collaboration 
among partners) 
 “We implement brokerage and matchmaking exercises to create the 
working teams and projects" (OT1) 
Pooling common resources 
- Identification of the disperse resources that are 
being invested in the different company teams subject 
to become a joint collaborative project. Coordination 
of the process through calls for proposals and open 
collaboration days to identify such common ground. 
 “We have regular meetings with the consortium members. They come to us with 
challenges on data integration, and suggestions, and then we feed it back to the 
developers, and try to have something improved for them (…) We get also 
suggestions on the features or data that we should get from partners.”OT4 
“The requirements from the different companies are framed differently. We have 
meetings on a quarterly basis. We prioritize the requirements. There is a 
roadmap” OT4 
Bilateral support for integration:  
- Bilateral NDA agreements with the OT operational 
team to support integration of shared and public data 









 Serendipity in Big Science Infrastructures 
The article that constitutes this chapter aims at understanding the second vector: technology 
transfer, responding to the second sub-goal (1.2.) of our PhD investigation. The study seeks 
to understand the nature of the serendipitous process behind transferring big science 








This paper explores how policy can promote the application of scientific research beyond its 
original purview. We analyze ATTRACT11, a novel policy instrument in the European 
Commission’s Horizon 2020 program, aiming to harness the detection and imaging 
technologies of the leading European research infrastructures towards entrepreneurship. In 
this initiative, 170 projects were funded with €100,000 for each to develop a proof-of-
concept commercial application within one year. Leveraging the unique dataset from the 
projects funded under ATTRACT, our study finds different serendipity modes compared to 
the previously proposed typologies, as follows: (1) building on previous research, (2) 
combining different technologies, (3) applying a technology into a different field, and (4) 
using artificial intelligence or machine learning. This study contributes to the emerging 
literature on serendipity by showing the potential of policy interventions to enable 
individuals and organizations to find unexpected commercial applications of big science 
research. 
 
Keywords: big science, serendipity, high-imaging technology 
5.2 Introduction 
Some of the most pervasive technologies in society today, such as the internet, medical 
diagnostics and treatments, and information and communication technologies, result from 
leveraging the research generated by big science infrastructures to areas beyond their direct 
scientific purview. While the potential of big science to create social, cultural, and economic 
impacts is acknowledged, uncertainty remains on how these big science infrastructures can 
deliberately find novel applications outside of their immediate scopes of research. Moreover, 
there are also questions regarding the extent to which policymakers can play an active role in 
enabling these research centers to find novel uses for their research that were previously 
unanticipated. Exploring these questions, this paper examines a novel policy response by the 
European Union to promote the commercialization of technologies from some of Europe’s 
most impactful research infrastructures. 
                                               
11 The members of ATTRACT are as follows: the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), 
European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), European Southern Observatory (ESO), European 
Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF), European X-Ray Free Electron Laser Facility (European XFEL), and 
the Institut Laue-Langevin (ILL), Aalto University, ESADE Business School, and the European Industrial 
Research 
Management Association (EIRMA). 
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The term serendipity has been evoked to describe various unintended discoveries, typically 
with some beneficial outcomes. For example, Fleming’s discovery of penicillin is often cited 
as a serendipitous discovery with tremendous social value. The definition of serendipity, 
however, can be ambiguous. The Merriam Webster dictionary defines serendipity as “the 
faculty or phenomenon of finding valuable or agreeable things not sought for” (Merriam-
Webster, 2020), while the Oxford dictionary defines it as “the occurrence and development 
of events by chance in a happy or beneficial way” (Oxford University Press, 2019). In the 
management and innovation literature, creating conditions that foster serendipity is 
considered desirable for managers and policy-makers (Yaqub, 2018). 
On the surface, the argument that serendipity can play a positive role in scientific processes 
and policy has its immediate value as ex-post, anecdotal narratives with limited normative 
value. However, this misconception comes from interpreting serendipity as mere 
happenstance instead of resulting from deliberate effort (de Rond, 2014). A systematic 
analysis of serendipity is useful because it offers a more nuanced understanding of its 
antecedents and mechanisms (e.g., Yaqub, 2018; Garud 2018). By identifying the formative 
conditions of serendipity, the design of mechanisms to realize the peripheral benefits of 
scientific research infrastructures can be improved; in effect, one could attempt to 
systematize serendipity. However, to date, most of the research has been speculative or based 
on small-sample, anecdotal evidence from previous scientific discoveries.  
This study examines the ATTRACT project, a €20M-funded initiative within the Horizon 
2020 Framework Program that aims to systematize the discovery of breakthrough 
applications of imaging and detection technologies from the leading European science 
research infrastructures. Recognizing that the full potential of these detection and imaging 
technologies is unknown, ATTRACT was formulated with the understanding that capturing 
the value of big science will require both stimulating exploration and the simultaneous 
fostering of commercial development through risk absorption and support. Accordingly, 
ATTRACT supported 170 projects with seed-funding grants of €100,000 each to leverage 
their various technologies towards sustainable businesses and greater economic returns for 
the European economy.  
Analyzing how the large research infrastructures can find new impactful uses for their 
science is highly relevant. Given their extreme sophistication and required investment levels, 
research infrastructures are normally funded by taxpayers via national ministries or funding 
agencies – often in pan-national consortia. As such, it bears upon policymakers to seek 
mechanisms to optimize the potential socioeconomic value of these public investments. 
ATTRACT brings six of the largest European scientific research infrastructures, which are 




Nuclear Research (CERN), European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), European 
Southern Observatory (ESO), European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF), European 
X-ray Free Electron Laser Facility (European XFEL), and the Institut Laue-Langevin (ILL). 
These organizations work in diverse domains, such as nuclear, particle, and condensed matter 
physics; life sciences; molecular biology; astronomy; materials science; structural biology; 
and chemistry.  
The 170 projects funded under ATTRACT provide a unique dataset to examine the processes 
towards serendipity. In this analysis, we find the following modes: (1) building on previous 
research, (2) combining different technologies, (3) applying technology into a different field 
and (4) using artificial intelligence or machine learning. We validate the previous typologies 
of serendipity and extend these notions by describing new categories. Unlike the previous 
studies that examined serendipity ex-ante, this study explores purposeful actions carried out 
in the pursuit of serendipity. Moreover, we explore how the intentional nature of the policy 
intervention by ATTRACT can help in finding new, previously unexplored applications of 
research technologies. 
The article proceeds by reviewing the history of big science, the polemics of its underlying 
social value, and the mechanisms and measures that policymakers use to stimulate the 
application of science towards social and economic impacts. We describe the literature on 
serendipity, summarizing the extant literature and the main research questions. We present 
the ATTRACT project and explore how it attempts to systematize serendipity. Contributing 
to the serendipity literature, we summarize the 170 projects funded under the call and 
examine the various modes used to discover previously unanticipated applications. We 
conclude with observations concerning serendipity and describe trajectories for future 
initiatives concerning big science and socioeconomic value. 
5.3 Background: big science and social impact 
In the following, we explore the history of big science and the issues related to its impact on 
society. 
5.3.1 Definition and History 
Big science infrastructures are defined by Florio and Sirtori (2016) as institutions with a) 
high capital intensity, b) long-lasting facilities or networks, c) operating in monopoly or 
oligopoly conditions affected by externalities, d) who produce social benefits via the 
generation of new knowledge (either pure or applied). As argued by Giudice (2012), the 
evolution of big science began early in the twentieth century with examples such as the 
factory-like conditions where Heike Kamerlingh Onnes made seminal discoveries on 
 
 117 
superfluidity and superconductivity in the early 1900s, or the Wilson Observatory, completed 
in 1917 and made famous by Edwin Hubble. What began to characterize research as big 
science was how it differed from the ideal of the lone genius in the laboratory with simple 
table-top experiments.  
This new model of scientific exploration was fully institutionalized by Ernest Orlando 
Lawrence at the University of California, Berkeley with the development of the cyclotron, 
which is a device for accelerating nuclear particles to very high velocities to bombard, 
disintegrate and form completely new elements and radioactive isotopes. While the first 
cyclotron was merely a simple 4-inch device that could be held in the human hand, over time, 
larger versions that could achieve greater energy levels were created. With each subsequent 
generation of the cyclotron, a larger number of physicists, engineers, and chemists were 
needed for construction, operation, and maintenance. More importantly, he advanced a form 
of team-based, collaborative science that contrasted with the isolated model of ‘smaller 
science’12 (Hiltzik, 2016) and later matured into large research teams with hundreds of 
scientists and engineers. This new type of industrialized science eventually propagated to 
other American and European universities and was facetiously called the ‘Cyclotron 
Republic’ by Lawrence's numerous admirers and rivals (Hiltzik, 2016).   
The cyclotron also provides an early example of how big science research can have 
alternative applications for socioeconomic impact. A serendipitous by-product of Lawrence’s 
lab was the production of radioactive isotopes useful for cancer treatment (Hiltzik, 2016). 
With the help of his brother John Lawrence, a medical doctor who became the director of the 
university’s Medical Physics Laboratory, Ernest was able to recraft the cyclotron’s narrative 
to court funders intrigued by the potential of important isotopes. In a Faustian spirit, the 
laboratory metaphorically produced oncology-focused isotopes by day, while discretely 
conducting basic research by night, and while many on the team bemoaned the fact that 
commitments to medical research hindered advancement in fundamental physics, this shrewd 
strategy enabled Lawrence to fund his constantly moving targets of higher energy levels that 
required more sophisticated hardware, complex operating organizations, and generated 
unprecedented costs. This tactic further institutionalized the future relationship between big 
science and big funders, be they philanthropies, national ministries of defense or energy, or 
increasingly, supranational-coalitions (Crease et al., 2016).  
                                               
12 Quoting Luis Alvarez in Hiltzik (2015): There were no doors inside the Rad Lab. ‘Its central focus was the 
cyclotron, on which everyone worked and which belonged to everyone equally (though perhaps more to 
Ernest). Everyone was free to borrow or use everyone else’s equipment or, more commonly, to plan a joint 





The rise of big science, however, is often associated with the Manhattan Project and the 
numerous technological innovations that were enhanced during WWII, such as radar and 
wireless communication. Motivated primarily by military and global political concerns, 
technological superiority was considered a central element of geopolitical competition 
(Galison and Hevly, 1992). This superiority was not limited to military research, although the 
defense industry was certainly a central protagonist. Espoused in the famous report of 
Vannevar Bush (1945), Science: The Endless Frontier, basic research was not only good for 
fundamental science but generated applied engineering and technologies that translated into 
products, spin-offs, jobs, and overall economic prosperity that benefited all social classes. 
The ‘Bush legacy’ (Wilson, 1991) was further catalyzed by the successful leap-start of the 
Soviet space program, an event that galvanized the American public to approve the 
astronomical funding levels of the American space program while having little concern for 
its scientific merit. With the perceived technological gap between the USA and the USSR, 
the Soviet space program was considered a severe existential threat that, similar to the 
Manhattan Project, could only be remedied by massive investments in basic, applied, and 
ever-bigger science (Giudice, 2012). 
Currently, with the cold war decades in the past, the role of big science in society has 
transformed. The perception of grand existential geopolitical threats has turned into a more 
disperse narrative. As a result, investments in big science motivated by national security or 
geopolitical stability have decreased. This decrease has weakened the sacrosanct link 
between nuclear physics, weapons research, and geopolitical security and, as a consequence, 
has reduced the primacy of fundamental physics (Galison and Hevly, 1992; Hiltzik, 2016). 
Moreover, the tenacious success of the Standard Model has left aspiring physicists 
scrambling for new avenues to conduct physics, leading them to astrophysics and cosmology, 
as well as more distant fields, such as biology and life sciences (Galison, 2016).  
In addition, the nature of big science infrastructures has become more heterogeneous. Today, 
traditional particle accelerators and nuclear reactors work alongside synchrotron radiation, 
neutron scattering, and free electron laser facilities, where the empirical scope has widened to 
materials science, chemistry, energy, condensed matter physics, nanoscience, biology, 
biotechnology and pharmacology (Doing, 2018; Heinze and Hallonsten, 2017). Finally, big 
science infrastructures are no longer constrained by national security mandates. These 
infrastructures must now compete in a global scientific market with increased mobility, 
transparency, and competition. As such, they are often in positions where they need to justify 
their utility and efficiency across diverse scientific communities and policymakers 
(Hallonsten, 2014; Heidler and Hallonsten, 2015). 
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5.3.2 Impact Assessment of Big Science 
The previously described changes have transformed the political context in which big science 
operates. An important early figure looking into the new challenges faced by big science was 
Alvin Weinberg, director for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, where uranium was 
enriched for the atomic bomb in its early years. In his important articles in Science (1961) 
and Minerva (1964 and 1963), he voiced his concerns that big science had become a bloated 
self-serving institution of bureaucracy and complacency, disconnected from more basic 
human and social needs (Crease et al., 2016). At the same time, the softening of geopolitical 
ethos did not free big science from excessive political influence (Hellström and Jacob, 2012; 
Weinberg, 1964, 1963, 1961). In contrast, since public budgets require substantial political 
support, there were concerns that champions may be tempted to sell and defend their visions 
with a certain level of sensationalism (Scudellari, 2017). Moreover, there were worries that 
the business of blockbuster science could undermine the more serious and less sensational 
work of normal science (Hellström and Jacob, 2012). Weinberg then wanted to establish 
some criteria for which investments in big science could be evaluated against alternative 
social priorities (Hellström and Jacob 2012). 
An obvious point of departure is to evaluate the scientific productivity levels of big science 
infrastructures, which are typically evidenced through citation and patent counts. While 
quantitative evaluation of these measures is easy, they are also considered very imperfect 
proxies of scientific value, as well as poor indicators of the many peripheral benefits of big 
science infrastructures (OECD, 2003; Schopper, 2016). As an example, Bianco et al. (2017) 
argue that the International Space Station, which has cost over $100 billion to build and $2 
billion a year to operate, has, as of 2017, only produced 34 refereed articles and 4 patents. 
Given their long cycle times, publication and patent counts favor more mature infrastructures 
and are often used as post hoc justifications of sunk-cost investments.  
Broadening the scope beyond scientific impact, the normal focus for researchers attempting 
to evaluate the value of big scientific research infrastructures is on the impacts of direct 
spending on high-tech procurement with subsequent multiplier effects (Autio et al., 2003; 
Castelnovo et al., 2018). For instance, aggregating numerous studies of CERN, Schopper 
(2016) estimates that for every euro spent on high-tech products, an additional 4.2 euros are 
generated in supporting industries. Beyond the impacts on immediate suppliers, another 
narrative used to justify investments in scientific research infrastructures are technology 
spinoffs, with their corresponding or assumed economic growth, job creation, and tax 
revenue (Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009). Here, NASA may be the most prolific example, 
boasting over 2,000 spinoffs since 19764 (NASA Spinoff)13. Like the early cyclotrons at 





Berkeley, the value of spinoffs is that they often commercialize technologies in applications 
outside of a laboratory’s principal scientific purview, demonstrating how major research 
infrastructures can generate impacts beneficial to society without detriment to its main 
mission (OECD, 2014).  
An important characteristic of technology spinoffs as a metric of social value is that the 
benefits are assumed to accrue to society well beyond the immediate scientific community, 
and this assumption is important in justifying the investments to taxpayers. However, 
estimating the indirect, or even direct, economic impacts becomes even more problematic 
when the technological derivatives are not protected by patents, trademarks, or citations 
(Schopper, 2016), as is often the case. Given that the political mandate of many research 
infrastructures is to generate scientific knowledge towards greater social value (Hammett, 
1941), the decision not to protect technologies with property rights is frequent and explicit. 
These practices are consistent with the ethos of open science and open innovation 
movements (Chesbrough, 2003; European Commission, 2016a), as well as specific mandates 
from funding agencies to make publicly funded research data accessible, with research 
results published in open access platforms and FAIR data principles (European Commission, 
2012). The most famous and recent case was the World Wide Web (specifically, HTTP, 
URL, HTML), i.e., when Tim Berners-Lee convinced CERN’s managers in 1993 to place it 
in the public domain and make the IP freely available to everyone. By accepting this case, 
CERN effectively agreed not to draw revenues or economic value from it. In the words of a 
CERN senior scientific officer: ‘In the case of a conflict between revenue generation and 
dissemination, dissemination takes precedence’ (World Intellectual Property Organization, 
2010). For a technology with this level of impact, any quantification of its socio-economic 
value almost approaches the surreal.  
Researchers have attempted to derive more holistic models by conceptually defining the 
alternative social benefits of research infrastructures (Autio et al., 1996). For example, Florio 
et al. (2016) derive a model that is based on the following six main dimensions: 1) impact on 
firms due to technological spillovers produced by access to new knowledge and learning by 
doing; 2) benefits to employees and students through increases in human capital; 3) the social 
value of scientific publications for scientists; 4) cultural benefits through outreach activities; 
5) additional services provided to consumers; and 6) the value of the scientific discovery. 
An earlier, complementary perspective was offered by Autio et al. (2004) who derived a 
number of propositions related to the positive value that a big science infrastructure can have 
on its ecosystem of suppliers. These include pushing the frontiers of technology and 
engineering standards, reducing uncertainty surrounding standards and technology 
investments, sharing their capacity to manage highly complex projects, aggregating highly 
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diverse and specialized knowledge domains towards radical learning and novel 
combinations, access to international networks, prestige and reputation, network formation, 
an exceptional scale and a scope that supports extreme prototyping and testing. 
Overall, the indicators are not perfect in terms of assessing the impacts of research 
infrastructures since they can be insufficient proxies of what they are measuring (e.g., 
citations), suffer from time-lag effects (Schopper, 2016), and can be myopic in capturing the 
value provided (spillover effects, human capital formation, or cultural value). As argued in 
Boisot et al. (2011), the more that a research infrastructure deals with fundamental research, 
the greater the uncertainty surrounding the future value of the outputs. The lack of reliable 
data, or well-understood causality, means that more holistic conceptualizations are 
excessively difficult to quantify and can lead to politically oriented narratives. 
In summary, the previous discussion leads to the following conclusions: For research at the 
forefront of science, a variety of big science organizations have been created with facilities, 
infrastructures, and instrumentation with unprecedented technical sophistication. With 
questions on how limited public resources are allocated, concerns have arisen on the social 
and economic value of big science and how to effectively measure these impacts. Despite 
these worries, big science infrastructures have a consistent track record in terms of finding 
alternative applications for their technologies that have tangible impacts on society. While it 
is common for big science to find serendipitous value in areas previously unanticipated, there 
is a limited amount of rigorous empirical research on the nature of serendipity and how it can 
be proactively cultivated. We, therefore, review the literature on serendipity and its 
mechanisms in the following section.  
5.4 Serendipity 
Serendipity refers to a broad, multifaceted phenomenon related to the unanticipated 
discovery of something beneficial. As it has been used in various contexts, we trace its 
various conceptualizations over time. Moreover, we describe the current understanding of 
how serendipity can be fostered. 
5.4.1 Definitions and Typologies of Serendipity 
The term serendipity was coined by writer Horace Walpole in 1754, who was inspired by the 
Persian fairy tale, Three Princes of Serendip (Cunha et al., 2010; Rosenman, 2001). He refers 
to serendipity as an unexpected discovery found from the combination of accident and 
sagacity (Rosenman, 2001). Sagacity refers to having perception and sound judgment, or in 
other words, a prepared mind. As such, instead of being merely interchangeable with the 




the focus of attention (de Rond, 2014). An equivalent formulation can be seen in the context 
of entrepreneurial opportunity, where serendipity has been seen as the combination of 
directed search, favorable accidents and prior knowledge (Dew, 2009). By stripping away the 
random and sometimes mystical aspects of serendipity, it becomes a concept that can be 
subject to rigorous evaluation, allowing an examination of its triggers, antecedents and 
mechanisms. 
A methodical attempt to understand serendipity was initiated by Robert Merton in the 1950s, 
which eventually resulted in a book dedicated to serendipity in 2004 (Merton and Barber, 
2004). Yaqub (2018) conducted a systematic review of Merton’s archives to identify four 
specific archetypes of serendipity. Mainly focusing on scientific discoveries, he organizes 
these according to a) whether there is a targeted line of inquiry; and b) the type of solution 
discovered. Yaqub (2018) defines Walpolian serendipity as a targeted line of inquiry that 
leads to discoveries that researchers were not in search of (solution to a different problem). 
Mertonian serendipity happens where the desired solution is achieved via an unexpected 
route (targeted problem – different path). Bushian serendipity is where untargeted 
exploratory research leads to a solution for a well-known problem. Finally, Stephanian 
serendipity is where untargeted research finds an unsought solution that may find a future 
application. 
However, even earlier than Yaqub (2018), de Rond (2014) describes a different framework 
for the structure of serendipity. While he also organizes serendipity in a 2x2 matrix, he 
divides it differently according to a) whether the solution was the intended target and b) 
whether the original research design was causal to the solution. In his work, de Rond evokes 
the term pseudo-serendipity to describe when the solutions are intended in the first place, 
compared to (only) serendipity, where the solutions are completely unanticipated.  
One key difference between the two is that de Rond (2014) already assumes that there is an 
intended target for serendipity to occur, while Yaqub (2018) also permits untargeted search 
in his framework. Nonetheless, we can see some equivalence between their categories. For 
instance, while not exactly the same, pseudo-serendipity corresponds to the Mertonian 
formulation of serendipity, while de Rond’s serendipity is equivalent to the Walpolian 
formulation. Another difference is that whether the discovered solution is a consequence of 
random variation or deliberate design is not adequately captured by Yaqub’s recent typology. 
The role of design in serendipity is further emphasized in the work of Garud et al (2018). 
Taking insights from the evolutionary biology literature, they introduce the term ‘exaptation’ 
to the innovation literature to refer to the “emergence of functionalities for scientific 
discoveries that were unanticipated ex-ante.” They identify two forms of exaptation, as 
follows: franklins and miltons. Franklins refer to the supplementary usage of existing 
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structures in areas in which they were not originally intended for use (e.g., using coins as 
screwdrivers). Miltons refer to discoveries without a currently known function. A widely 
known image to illustrate miltons is that of spandrels, i.e., the triangular space 
unintentionally created by the shape of arches, which were later used as a blank canvas for 
painting (Bahar, 2018). 
In contrast to the previous formulations of serendipity, Fink et al. (2017) propose another 
perspective altogether, with is based on the crossovers of interdependent components. In an 
experimental study, they show that components early on do not have much benefit, as their 
utility depends on the existence of other components. However, as the innovation process 
continues and other components appear, the potential of this original set of components can 
suddenly manifest. This moment, which seems to come out of nowhere, is what is perceived 
as serendipity. Accordingly, they explain that serendipity is not only a matter of 
happenstance but is a result of the components’ delayed fruition, which occurs from the 
existence of other important components.  
Finally, it is also important to note another field where the term serendipity has also gained 
ground, as it gives insights into what differentiates serendipity from other similar concepts. 
In the field of information systems, serendipity has become an important metric in 
recommender systems (Kotkov et al., 2016). Recommender systems seek to predict what 
rating a user would give to a certain product so that new products can be recommended. 
These systems have been the backbones powering widely used services such as Netflix, 
Spotify, and YouTube. In such systems, serendipity means that users do not only receive 
results that are relevant but results that are significantly different from the user’s previously 
rated items. This component of surprise is what seems to define serendipity in this context. 
5.4.2 Realizing Serendipity 
Aside from attempting to find better definitions of serendipity and understanding its nature, 
there has also been much progress made on the various factors or mechanisms that can lead 
to serendipity. McCay-Peet and Toms (2015) propose a process model for how individuals 
discover and perceive serendipitous events. Their model consists of the following 
components: Trigger, Connection, Follow-up, Valuable Outcome and an Unexpected Thread. 
The trigger refers to environmental cues sparking the interest of the individual. This trigger is 
then connected by the individual to their previous knowledge and experiences. Individuals 
then follow-up on these triggers to obtain a valuable outcome. The surprise occurs from 
noticing the unexpected thread present from the previous processes. 
The conditions that promote serendipity have also been explored. For instance, the strategies 




routines, being observant, making mental space, relaxing their boundaries, drawing on 
previous experiences, looking for patterns and seizing opportunities” (Makri et al., 2014). 
Yaqub (2018) also describes four mechanisms that we summarize as (1) examining 
deviations from theory, (2) activating previously acquired knowledge and experiences from 
individuals, (3) tolerating errors and following up on such occurrences, and (4) leveraging 
networks. In the organizational context, Cunha et al. (2010) identify some conditions related 
to serendipity, including boundary spanning, mindfulness, social networks, teamwork, free 
space for creativity and opportunities for playing with ideas. 
Artificial intelligence has also been used to find novel solutions to various challenges. 
Computational methods can aid in the search for interesting information, enabling the 
discovery of new knowledge domains that have been previously unexplored (Arvo, 1999; 
Beale, 2007). In drug discovery, for instance, it has been used to repurpose drugs to new 
therapeutic areas (Mak and Pichika, 2019). As progress in the field increases, artificial 
systems that “catalyze, evaluate and leverage serendipitous occurrences themselves” are also 
increasingly explored (Corneli et al., 2014). 
While serendipity at the personal and organizational level has been emerging, the literature 
on how serendipity can be actively pursued at a macro-level is still limited. Garud et al. 
(2018) describe arrangements to induce exaptation of science, as follows: exaptive pools, 
exaptive events, and exaptive forums. Exaptive pools refer to the maintenance of scientific 
discoveries such as through patent and publication databases. These ideas, however, remain 
decoupled until they are activated by exaptive events, such as technology fairs and 
workshops. These possibilities can be further developed and contextualized through exaptive 
forums, where actors become increasingly entangled.  
In summary, the extant literature on serendipity has mostly been speculative or based upon 
small-sample, anecdotal examples of scientific discoveries. Moreover, the previous studies 
mainly focus on the individual scientists, lacking understanding of how serendipity can be 
induced at a more macro-level. As such, questions remain on how serendipity can be 
cultivated towards finding market applications for science and how it can be cultivated, for 
instance, with the help of policy. To move the serendipity literature forward, there is a need 
for studies based on empirical evidence, preferably using quasi-experimental conditions. By 
examining the novel policy response ATTRACT, this study puts forward a rigorous 
empirical examination of serendipity. 
5.5 ATTRACT 
The ATTRACT project is a €20M-funded initiative within the Horizon 2020 Framework 
Program that aims to systematize the discovery of breakthrough applications of research from 
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the leading European big science infrastructures. In the following section, we describe its 
underlying philosophy, aims and results to date. 
5.5.1 Philosophy 
The assertion that the products of scientific research centers can have value outside of their 
intended scientific purview is not new.14 It was demonstrated clearly by Lawrence’s early 
cyclotrons in oncology, and the idea was perhaps best institutionalized as an important policy 
driver by Bush, who advocated large investments in untargeted scientific research as a source 
of serendipitous discoveries or solutions (Bush, 1945; Yaqub, 2018). In a more liberal 
interpretation, the Bush legacy favors large investments in research for its unknowable 
scientific value, as well as numerous unknown benefits that accrue as socio-economic 
derivatives (education, spin-offs, job creation, etc.)  
During the last three decades, policy-makers have increasingly emphasized policies to 
accelerate innovation and economic growth (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). Three main types 
of approaches have been developed. The mission-oriented approach aims to support solutions 
to challenges that are part of an explicit political agenda. Here, policy-makers tend to anchor 
innovation policies in grand societal challenges, such as national defense, climate change, or 
other sustainable development goals (Galison, 2016; Galison and Hevly, 1992; Mazzucato, 
2016; Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017; Mowery, 2012). Invention-oriented approaches aim 
to stimulate the supply of inventions as derivatives of scientific discovery while leaving any 
commercial exploitation to the market (Bush, 1945; Wilson, 1991). This was the most widely 
adopted approach championed post-war by Bush, as policy-makers sought to advance science 
and technology as broad drivers of geopolitical policy (Galison, 2016; Galison and Hevly, 
1992). Finally, recent decades have seen system-oriented approaches that seek to foster 
interactions among the different actors taking part in the innovation ecosystem (Borrás and 
Laatsit, 2019; Lundvall, 2010; Lundvall and Borrás, 2009). 
Within these main orientations, a wide range of policy instruments have been deployed in 
Europe to stimulate innovation (European Commission 2016), and different typologies have 
been suggested to understand them (e.g., Borrás and Edquist, 2013; Edler and Georghiou, 
2007). The most widely accepted view considers instruments such as those focusing either on 
technology push or market pull. Technology push (supply-side) policies stimulate framework 
conditions and opportunities for innovation to thrive, including measures to support R&D 
collaboration, network formation, and incentives to attract highly skilled labor to focal 
regions and sectors. For example, in Europe, the Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) 
program has allocated €2.7 billion to pursue breakthrough ideas through unexplored 
                                               




collaborations of multidisciplinary scientific and cutting-edge engineering teams, which is 
indicative of the invention-oriented approach mentioned earlier.  
Market pull (demand-side) interventions have been emphasized with greater frequency in the 
most recent literature (Edler and Georghiou, 2007; European Commission, 2016b; Rolfstam, 
2009). This perception recognizes that the derivatives of basic scientific research have 
limited value if specific market-pull mechanisms are not in place to facilitate their entry to 
the market (Scherer, 1982; Schmookler, 1962). Demand-side policy instruments include 
measures to foster investments by private capital (brokering, tech-transfer, IP, subsidies, etc.) 
or, alternatively, pre-commercial procurement to nurture financial liquidity, investment, and 
operational scale in start-ups and SMEs (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017; Rolfstam, 2009). 
However, instruments that simultaneously stimulate both the supply-side and demand-side 
dynamics, especially for early-stage, high-risk technologies, are less common (Cunningham 
et al., 2013; European Commission, 2016b).  
The challenge of bridging the supply and demand sides of the innovation cycle is not an 
exclusive concern of innovation policies. It is also a well-known challenge in 
entrepreneurship research, where it is frequently metaphorized as the valley of death (VoD) 
(Beard et al., 2009; Hudson and Khazragui, 2013). This metaphor describes the difficult 
phase in product development and commercialization where many viable products or start-
ups do not survive for a variety of reasons. Typically, these include excessive and unforeseen 
costs for research, prototyping, testing and manufacturing, limited product development 
budgets, ineffective coordination and expertise, sub-critical market exposure, and the 
inability to obtain sufficient internal or external funding to bring the product or start-up to a 
revenue-generating state (Frank et al., 1996).  
A substantial amount of research has focused on the various mechanisms that can be 
marshaled towards mitigating the VoD phenomenon, which include the following: 
innovation intermediaries (Islam, 2017); scientific parks; technology clusters and living labs 
(Almirall and Wareham, 2011); industry associations (Markham et al., 2010); business 
incubators and accelerators; technology brokers and tech-transfer functions (Beard et al., 
2009); regional, national, and pan-national funding instruments, such as Horizon 2020, EIT 
and ERC of Europe, and NIH, NSF of the US (Hudson and Khazragui, 2013). Finally, 
particularly in the medical and life sciences fields, there has been a growth in initiatives in 
translational research (Butler, 2008). No single VoD scenario is applicable to all 
technologies. For technologies with high technology readiness levels (TRL) (Banke, 2010), 
the VoD is potentially less fatal, particularly for incremental innovations with probable 
market uptake. This condition is typically addressed by risk mitigation functions performed 
by private investment and venture capital. However, technologies with low TRLs require 
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more extensive interventions, typically with both risk absorption (seed funding and early 
industry involvement) and risk mitigation (public/private investment mechanisms). It is 
important to note that TRLs are highly context dependent; i.e., the technology may be very 
mature and tested in its original application at the scientific research installation (high TRL), 
but immature in a larger system of commercialization when used in a different sector or 
market (low TRL) (Héder, 2017). 
5.5.2 Purpose, design and results to date 
The main aim of ATTRACT is to harness and direct exploration towards breakthrough 
innovation opportunities in detection and imaging technologies, while also offering space for 
serendipity to stumble onto unforeseen applications. As such, there are no ‘intended’ 
technological applications or desired outcomes. Rather, the ATTRACT governance is 
designed to generate as many options and variety in the applications as possible. That 
acknowledged, there are some obvious areas where detection and imaging technologies can 
be employed towards substantial, if not paradigmatic, advances in other domains. Frost and 
Sullivan argue that imaging and detection technologies will have core functions in almost all 
technically sophisticated commercial products and will constitute an annual market of over 
$100 billion in their own right (Frost & Sullivan, 2015). These domains include medical 
device and imaging technology, biotechnology, energy, advanced manufacturing, 
automation, microelectronics, materials and coatings, environment and sustainability, and 
information and communication technology.  
On many dimensions, ATTRACT has been designed to directly address the ineffectual 
transition – or disconnection – between the technology-push instruments (applied in the early 
phases) and the market-pull instruments (the later entry of private capital) (Auerswald and 
Branscomb, 2003; Wolfe et al., 2014). In this respect, ATTRACT is distinctive from recent 
instruments, such as FET, given that the focal actors include both research infrastructures and 
industrial players, and equal protagonism is given to both the supply and demand sides. This 
is enabled by the pre-existing relationships between research infrastructures and their 
industrial suppliers; that is, the highly specialized SMEs that have contributed to the 
engineering, construction, and operation of some of the world’s most sophisticated 
technologies. Thus, the industrial relevance and operational feasibility of the projects are 
verified from the start. Specifically, for projects involving European research facilities and 
industrial organizations, the most immediate use of their technologies is guaranteed. In this 
sense, a first ‘internal market’ is assured. This ‘internal market’ paves the way for industry to 
target other applications and new commercial opportunities (i.e., the feasibility of the pilot 
technologies has been prototyped and tested in the real and demanding working conditions of 




The completion of ATTRACT phase I is expected to lead to insights and findings that inform 
modifications and extensions to the design of ATTRACT phase II and related innovation 
policy initiatives. ATTRACT phase II will aim to take a select group of 10-20 validated 
projects from ATTRACT phase I and scale them towards technology readiness levels 5-8. 
ATTRACT phase II is specifically designed to address the intermediate or secondary phases 
of the valley of death phenomenon, which requires greater scalability, maturity, and support. 
Funding for ATTRACT phase II is currently being negotiated with the relevant funding 
bodies and is subject to receiving grants. However, the current estimates suggest a total 
funding of €35 million. In addition, emphasis will be placed on the transition to public 
sources of equity-based capital (e.g., the European Investment Fund and the European 
Investment Bank), as well as private capital sources, such as early and late-stage venture 
capital and private equity. 
Table 1 highlights the main attributes of ATTRACT and how they are positioned relative to 











Table 1. Comparison between ATTRACT and other funding instruments  
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Scaling up Late-stage VC funding instruments, private equity, IPOs, etc. 
1We are referring to EU funding programs such as Horizon 2020. We do not consider 
national public funding programs.  
2Exceptions exist, such as the SME instrument 
https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/smeinstrument. 
Nevertheless, they differ from ATTRACT because a project needs to apply for seed 
funding, and subsequently, for scale funding. In ATTRACT, the transition between seed 







As of the writing of this paper, ATTRACT has implemented the following steps:  
1. An open call was launched to solicit project proposals (1,211 submitted) for 
leveraging detection and imaging technologies towards potentially commercially 
sustainable products or services. While not exclusive, the emphasis was on concepts 
at technology readiness levels 2-4. The call solicited proposals leveraging the 
following four main technology groups: a) sensors; b) data acquisition systems and 
computing; c) software and integration; and d) front- and back-end electronics.  
2. All submissions were assessed on technical merit and innovation-potential. 
Specifically, the evaluation dimensions included the project definition, scope, and 
technological feasibility, state-of-the-art, scientific/engineering merit, industrial 
potential, commercial feasibility, and social value.  
3. 170 projects were awarded €100,000 for the development of a proof-of-concept or 
prototype with an application outside of the original purview of the technology, over 
a period of one year.  
5.5.3 The 170 Funded ATTRACT Projects 
The call was open from 1 August to 31 October 2018. In that period, 1,211 proposals were 
received. The top 10 countries submitting applications were as follows: Italy (261); Spain 
(230); Switzerland (108); France (96); the United Kingdom (81); Germany (67); Finland 
(65); the Netherlands (59); Portugal (33); and Austria (26). From these submissions, 170 
projects were selected for funding.  
To analyze these different projects, we carried out the following: We collected the text 
proposal of the 170 funded projects for analysis. Each proposal submitted contained a 
maximum of 3,000 words, including the following parts: a) summary; b) project description; 
c) technology description and external benchmarks; d) envisioned innovation potential 
(scientific and/or industrial), as well as envisioned social value; e) project implementation, 
budget, deliverables, and dissemination plan. The proposals of these 170 funded projects 
were read by the authors and three master’s students for evaluation. 
Three master’s students with backgrounds in biomedical engineering, mechanical 
engineering/physics and entrepreneurship evaluated each project independently. They coded 
for the following project characteristics: technology readiness level (scale of 1 to 9), scope of 
market application (specific, specific but easily expandable, or general), location in the value 
chain (upstream or downstream), technology novelty (scale of 1 to 5), technology relevance 
to the market (scale of 1 to 5) and credibility of budget and milestones (scale of 1 to 5). The 
variables were used based on extant definitions in the literature (i.e. TRL and MRL). In the 
event that there were no extant definitions, new categories were induced from the 
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phenomenon (serendipity). After analyzing each project separately by the three independent 
coders, their findings were integrated. In cases where the codes were not consistent, 
discussions were held to reach agreement. The coding was then validated in an additional 
round of coding by the authors and then tabulated. As such, each project was evaluated and 
coded by a minimum of three independent evaluators. Three physicists (two co-author of the 
study) and a venture capital expert oversaw the coding process and validate results.  The 
results are presented in the following paragraphs. 
The ATTRACT project call required the participation of a minimum of two collaborating 
organizations. While the majority of projects were the result of two organizations 
collaborating, as many as five organizations can be seen collaborating in a single project 
(Figure 1A). 
Figure 1. Summary of Organizations Involved in ATTRACT projects.  
                 
       
A shows the number of organizations collaborating across projects. B shows the number of 
countries collaborating per project. C shows the types of organizations involved across all 
ATTRACT projects. D demonstrates the various combinations of organizations collaborating 










Exploring the countries represented in each project funded in ATTRACT, Figure 1B shows 
that the majority of projects involve collaborations between organizations located in the same 
country. Such arrangements allow the partners to closely interact and meet frequently as they 
work on their projects. Interestingly, almost half of the projects (45%) involve international 
collaboration. Especially when projects require highly specialized, scarcely available 
expertise among partners, it is necessary for collaborations to occur across borders. 
As seen in Figure 1C, the majority of projects involve research organizations (ROs) or 
universities. Aligning with the goals of ATTRACT, many projects also involve input from 
industrial partners, including startups, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or 
multinational corporations (MNCs). The most represented configuration involves 
collaborations between universities and research organizations (Figure 1D). These research 
organizations typically have expertise in spinning out technologies. Aside from this 
configuration, industry-academia collaborations are extremely common, most notably 
between universities and SMEs and ROs and SMEs. 
We visualize the 170 projects in Figure 2 through automated processing of the textual data 
from the proposals. As the showcased projects reveal, ATTRACT covers wide ground in the 
domains of technologies sourced and targeted application areas. There is a huge cluster of 
projects applying big science research to impact the field of healthcare, such as through 
better diagnostics and treatments (blue cluster). Aside from this cluster, there are many more 
projects applying the imaging and detection technologies of big science to various 
commercial applications, such as consumer electronics, environmental monitoring, and 
security (green cluster). Finally, we see efforts to further improve the technologies 















Figure 2. Visualization of the 170 Funded Projects under ATTRACT.  
 
Each project is labeled by its acronym. The projects are plotted by processing their textual 
data (removal of stop words, lemmatization, inclusion of n-grams), performing TF-IDF 
vectorization and decomposing by PCA into two components. The colors were generated by 
K-Means clustering. The blue cluster refers to projects in healthcare. The green cluster refers 
to applications of detectors to various areas. The orange cluster refers to upstream advances 
in sensor technologies. The code will be available online. 
The automated classification was, however, not adequate to fully understand the projects 
included within ATTRACT. We, thus, conduct further analyses by manually evaluating the 
textual data of the projects. Figure 3A shows the different technological domains as 
submitted the participants, which are as follows: sensors (70%), data-acquisition systems and 
computing (32%), software and integration (30%) and front and back-end electronics (16%). 
Note that the projects can belong to more than one domain so they do not add up to exactly 




percentage is not unexpected, as big science infrastructures are generally known for the 
sophistication of their imaging and detection technologies. The high expertise of these groups 
in sensor technology, together with the versatility of sensors towards various uses, make 
them good candidates for exploring alternative commercial applications. 
Figure 3. Summary of the Various Coded Dimensions of the ATTRACT Projects.  
 
               
  
                
A shows the domains of the projects, as stated in their proposals. B shows the application 
areas, as coded from analyzing the text. C describes the scope of the market application for 
each project. D shows whether the application area is upstream or downstream. E describes 
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evaluation of the technology readiness level of each project. 2G describes our evaluation of 
the novelty of the technology. 2H shows the evaluation of the credibility of the proposed 
budget and milestones of each project.  
Further analysis was carried out to describe the different features of the funded projects under 
ATTRACT (Figure 3). Figure 3B shows that ATTRACT caters to a diverse range of 
application areas, including healthcare (36%), electronics (20%), environment (12%), energy 
(6%), security (6%) and manufacturing (6%). These projects commit to these areas in 
varying degrees. Figure 3C shows that the projects are almost equally split in terms of the 
degree of specificity in the application area. While 35% of the projects are specific to their 
mentioned application area, there are also a large number of projects offering a general 
solution to different application areas (28%). An interesting category is the 38% that are 
specific but expandable projects that have already identified their pilot market but then can 
easily extend their reach to other areas. Furthermore, Figure 3D shows that there are slightly 
more projects located upstream in the value chain. These upstream projects (55%) aim to 
supply companies with knowledge and technologies that can be further processed and 
integrated towards their offerings. In contrast, downstream projects (45%) cater directly 
towards solving the problems of its intended market. 
Figure 3E shows that the most common technology readiness level was 2, meaning that the 
projects are only in the stage where the technology and/or application area has been 
conceptualized. The average TRL across all projects was 1.8. These low TRL values are in 
line with what was expected from the projects during the proposal call. The low TRLs show 
that these technologies are still in their early stages, requiring further development towards 
becoming viable solutions. Their low TRLs have the benefit, however, of giving them the 
flexibility to find the serendipitous area where their application will have the most impact.  
Originating from the leading big science infrastructures, the projects feature some of the most 
advanced, cutting-edge technologies. Figure 3F shows that the projects are highly novel, with 
an average rating of 3.4 out of 5. The problem typically with technologies that are too novel 
is finding areas that would be relevant for their application. However, as seen in Figure 3G, 
the projects have generally high relevance to the markets they are hoping to serve. Across all 
projects, the average rating was 3.5 out of 5. This rating implies that a project such as 
ATTRACT can help activate researchers to find relevant applications for the technologies 
they are working on. Otherwise, for projects lower in rating, the support provided by 
ATTRACT enables these projects to refine their technologies to find a better fit with their 




To systematically explore the space in the development of their technologies, it is important 
for the project’s team to have a credible plan and list of milestones. Figure 3H shows that the 
projects were rated highly on this aspect, with an average rating of 3.5 out of 5. 
5.5.4 Modes towards Serendipity 
In the project text, the researchers typically narrate the mode by which they were able to 
develop new applications for their scientific research. We identified the recurrent themes by 
which serendipitous discoveries were actively pursued by project members in our first read 
through the 170 projects. In the second and third readings, we categorized the projects 
according to the following criteria: 
• Combination of different technologies – technologies or knowledge from different 
research domains is combined, integrated or assembled together to produce a new 
application. 
• Building on previous research – technologies from previous research work are 
extended or improved to be more effective or efficient but are still within the same 
domain or application area. 
• Applying technology to another field – technology or knowledge from one domain is 
used in a new research domain or application area.  
• Using machine learning or artificial intelligence – when the computational advances 
in machine learning or artificial intelligence are used to augment or find new uses for 
existing technologies. 
Note that the projects typically combine these modes to different degrees and so, we coded 
them according to what is explicitly mentioned in the text. The number of projects in each 





Figure 4. Modes towards Serendipity in the ATTRACT projects. 
                                      
5.5.4.1 Combination of different technologies 
The most represented mode was the combination of different technologies (41%). Under this 
category, technologies could come from adjacent or distant domains. Moreover, these 
technologies could be combined with varying degrees of integration. On one extreme, we 
identify a subset of projects (16%) where existing, readily available technologies are 
assembled to develop a new application. For instance, a project called PHIL, which aims to 
use a photonic system for liquid biopsy, mentions the following: 
 “we will design and build the system using mainly commercial solutions for the different 
system aspects”.  
Otherwise, many projects combine the latest advances from distant research areas to create 
novel solutions. A notable example is the SCENT project, which aims to create new gas 
sensors. The project mentions that it is: 
“based on merging two up-to-now disjointed macro-disciplines: high-pressure technology 
and gas-sensing; whose scientific communities are still far one another: the former focusing 
mainly on synthesis of materials, the latter unaware of HP-potentialities.” 
5.5.4.2 Building on previous research 
The second mode we identified is extending and building on previous research (31%). 
Typically, this mode proceeds from re-examining previous research so that new features that 
have not been previously identified or explored can surface. Pursuing this re-examination 




new perspectives in the existing data. A notable example is the project Random Power, 
which is a random bit generator for cryptography. According to their proposal: 
“The genesis of the project is an example of ingenuity and serendipity and can be tracked to 
the effort of understanding random events affecting the response of state-of-the-art detectors 
of light with single-photon sensitivity.” 
Another way that previous research is reinterpreted is by exaggerating features or taking 
things to the extreme. For instance, there are many projects that examine what possibilities 
would be opened if current detectors could be applied at extremely cold temperatures or in 
environments with very high radiation. Similarly, there are projects that develop new 
application areas through imagining what opportunities can be created if a technology 
becomes a magnitude more efficient or powerful.  
The previous research can also be extended by projecting from the current state of their 
research a laudable target. By setting a difficult goal, the researchers then leave it to their 
abilities and to successful development of the project so that they can bridge the gap between 
this goal and their current state.  
5.5.4.3 Applying technology to another field 
Another set of projects (27%) applied a technology from one field to another field. This 
category coincides best with the previous notions of serendipity – finding new uses from 
existing things. By exposing a technology to a field that it has not been previously used for, 
new use cases for the technology potentially emerge. Especially for the big science institutes 
in ATTRACT, their technologies might be narrowly used within their scientific domain. 
These new technologies are also able to provide a fresh perspective to the field, proposing 
new ways to deal with the problems that the existing technologies currently employed within 
the field may not adequately address. 
A notable example of a project is SIMS, which involves designing a seismic imaging and 
monitoring system. They mention that they will develop a: 
 “next-generation MEMS sensor that utilizes patented technology inspired by the search for 
gravitational waves.” 
5.5.4.4 Using artificial intelligence or machine learning 
The final mode we identified involved the application of machine learning for a specific 
application, accounting for 14% of the projects. This category can be considered a subset of 
the previous category since machine learning is a breakthrough originating from the 
computational sciences that is finding new uses in different domains. By being able to find 
patterns that humans cannot easily identify, it can be said that applying AI or machine 
 
 139 
learning increases the efficacy of various sensors in what can be obtained from the data it is 
able to collect. 
Many of the projects in this category are in the field of healthcare. The usage of machine 
learning allows data collected from the various imaging technologies to be brought together 
and processed to reveal new insights on certain diseases. For instance, the project MAGres 
plans to integrate various magnetic resonance techniques to obtain a better understanding of 
the brain tumor glioblastoma. They mention the following: 
“ML [machine learning] methods are the key to unlock the predictive power from the 
complex and high-dimensional data to be acquired” 
 
5.6 Discussion 
We identify four categories of how big science research can be used in previously unexplored 
ways towards commercial applications. These four modes towards serendipity are (1) a 
combination of different technologies, (2) building on previous research, (3) applying 
technology to another field and (4) using AI or machine learning. Compared to the previous 
studies of serendipity, the categories we describe do not completely coincide with any one 
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The category of applying technology from one field to another coincides highly with the 
previous notions of Walpolian serendipity (Yaqub, 2018) and the idea of exaptation (Garud 
et al., 2018). These two formulations, on a fundamental level, refer to the unanticipated usage 
of a certain item. A nuanced difference, however, between these previous notions on 
serendipity is that our categorization stems from a different view of serendipity, i.e., 
exploring the modes towards its realization. Instead of characterizing it ex-ante, our category 
describes the actions that researchers are actually taking in the hopes of finding serendipitous 
applications for their scientific research. 
On the surface, extending the previous research does not seem to be related to serendipity. 
The implied incremental nature of the progress that comes from building on previous 
research makes it seem that it is not a viable way to cultivate serendipity. However, as we 
find in the different projects, extending the previous research can be productive, especially if 
it allows the accumulated wealth of knowledge and experience of various actors to be 
activated and re-examined. This productivity coincides with how Cunha et al., (2010) sees 
serendipity, i.e., as the process of metaphorical association – seeing things in a new way. 
Such activation facilitates researchers to pursue a laudable target that they have not 
considered doing before. 
Compared to the previous typologies of serendipity, we find two new categories. The first 
one is the combination of different technologies. This conceptualization of the phenomenon 
is consistent with that of Fink et al. (2017), which relates serendipity to the surprise from the 
crossover of interdependent components. On a fundamental level, the innovation research has 
greatly emphasized the role of combining knowledge from diverse domains to generate 
breakthrough innovation (e.g., Guan and Yan, 2016; Schoenmakers and Duysters, 2010). 
Nonetheless, it has not been explicitly linked to serendipity due to the lack of empirical 
studies on its realization.  
Finally, in the ATTRACT projects on AI and machine learning were used to process and 
make sense of the huge quantities of data generated by the various sensors. These 
technologies are valuable, as they are able to see subtle patterns that are invisible to the 
human eye. AI and machine learning improve the performance of certain technologies by 
being able to process large amounts of data and integrate different sources of information to 
obtain new insights. However, it is important to make a distinction that AI and machine 
learning were mainly used to integrate the data resulting from the detectors instead of for 
discovering new applications. Machine learning was not used on a meta-level to discover 
new serendipitous applications of the technologies, for instance, from mining text from 
publications and patents. However, with the ongoing progress in these technologies (as in 




directly be used to generate leads for serendipitous connections between various topics (e.g., 
Arvo, 1999; Giles and Walkowicz, 2019). 
5.6.1 Implications for theory 
The research on serendipity has evolved beyond the simple conceptualization as an accident 
or happenstance. Recent developments have allowed serendipity to be scientifically 
examined by having reformulated it as a capacity, requiring the focus of attention (de Rond, 
2014). This paper validates the previously proposed typologies on serendipity through the 
unique dataset of ATTRACT. While the previous research on serendipity mainly relied on 
anecdotal stories in the history of science, ours is grounded on the data from the 170 funded 
projects under ATTRACT. With these projects spanning different domains and varying in 
their technological features, this gives us access to a large dataset that we can probe to study 
how serendipity is actively pursued.  
Unlike the previous studies of serendipity, which view the phenomenon after it has already 
occurred, we provide another perspective by looking at the modes towards its realization. 
This process-oriented data-driven approach allowed us to find two previously unidentified 
modes wherein serendipity can be cultivated, as follows: combining technologies and using 
machine learning. More systematic analyses with other novel datasets are needed to 
corroborate our findings and identify other means that serendipity can be realized.  
5.6.2 Implications for policy and practice 
Our paper shows how policy can enable researchers to find alternate serendipitous uses for 
their technologies. The ATTRACT project is consistent with calls by Mazzucato (2013, 
2016, 2017), who argues that the government can go beyond its role as a regulator or fixer of 
markets towards an entrepreneurial role, absorbing the risks in strategic sectors until 
technologies have reached a sufficiently mature state to be attractive to private and venture 
capital. This assumes that market mechanisms and private capital alone may not be the most 
efficient routes to realizing innovation via basic to applied research (Martin, 2016). Specific 
industrial policies and stimulus instruments are needed to absorb the risks in basic research 
settings when working with low TRL technologies. This is particularly relevant to 
ATTRACT in light of the empirical research suggesting that the more the research 
infrastructure is involved in basic research as part of its mission, the less likely that the 
organization will be involved in technology transfer activities (Boisot et al., 2011; Rahm et 
al., 1988); this is certainly the case for several ATTRACT partners. 
ATTRACT also resonates with the ‘cooperative technology’ model of technology transfer 
described by Bozeman (2000), which assumes that government laboratories and research 
infrastructures can play an important role in technology innovation and economic growth. 
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With some variation, authors such as Mazzucato and Bozeman echo the original doctrine of 
Vannevar Bush, i.e., that basic research has a substantial and positive impact on socio-
economic innovation via direct and indirect mechanisms. Interestingly, however, the recent 
literature has argued that while it is commonly believed that Bush maintained an 
unquestioning faith in an integrated and linear model of innovation, his notion was more 
sophisticated and involved symbiotic cross-fertilization (Leyden and Menter, 2018). In this 
view, the authors argue that while Bush saw that basic research and applied research benefit 
each other, they also succeed by working as separate systems, or stacks. Consequently, 
scientific and economic policy mechanisms should seek to coordinate the two systems, 
allowing each to operate through its own logic and success criteria, yet simultaneously 
cultivating specific points where they can nurture each other (Cunningham et al., 2013; 
European Commission, 2016b; Leyden and Menter, 2018). ATTRACT does not presume to 
be the definitive word on how to accomplish this coordination task. Indeed, faithful to its 
genesis in scientific institutions, ATTRACT should be seen as an experiment in innovation 
policy (Bakhshi et al., 2011). With its focus on the revelation of information and cross-
fertilization of technology and entrepreneurial options, it is experimental at an operational 
level. With its novel constellation of actors, resources, design, and governance, ATTRACT is 
very much an experiment in innovation policy.  
5.7 Conclusions 
We have described the ATTRACT project, which is a novel innovation policy instrument to 
find new applications for the breakthrough imaging, detection, and computational 
technologies of Europe´s leading scientific research infrastructures.  
We have described the philosophy behind the project, discussing the history of big science 
and the issues with regard to assessing its socioeconomic impact. Where ATTRACT is still 
in-process, the large data set from the proposals allows us to view serendipity in a unique, 
unprecedented manner. Specifically, the 170 projects allow us to probe serendipity in a 
quasi-experimental setting with some controls. We identify several novel modalities of 
serendipity that emerge from the data. 
There are many interesting avenues for future research. First, it is a widely accepted wisdom 
that increasing the collisions between different actors promotes the chances of serendipity. 
As such, it is valuable to understand how the various partners working in the projects were 
able to find each other and create new applications for their previous technologies. 
Incorporating insights from the alliance and network literature would create new insights in 




Faithful to its genesis in scientific institutions, ATTRACT is best viewed as a policy 
experiment. Where a complete evaluation of it will require more time, the initial evidence 
suggests that policymakers can play a purposeful and effective role in fostering derivative 
benefits from public investments in big scientific research infrastructures.   
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 From Bits to Atoms: White Rabbit at CERN 
The article that constitutes this chapter consists in a micro-study of a single case that gives us 
insight into the different mechanisms that help reconcile the main tensions between the two 
exogenous influence presented (i.e open science and technology transfer).The study 
empirically investigates White Rabbit, an open-source hardware initiated at CERN and 






The success of Open Source Software (OSS) has inspired others to adopt the 'open source 
way’ of development to the field of electronic hardware design: Open Source Hardware 
(OSH). While there are many expectations that an open-source ethos will influence 
commercial hardware development to the same degree that it has influenced software 
development, yet little is known about how the transposition of open-source development to 
a form of technology ‘object’ that has material components (hybrid objects) might be 
unsuccessful if the conditions salient in OSS development are not equally applicable in OSH. 
We study the development of White Rabbit (WR), an OSH initiated at CERN and deployed 
as a powerful precision and synchronization technology in many industrial settings where 
time accuracy is critical. Through the investigation of WR, our study contributes to recent 
conceptualizations of digital objects by uncovering the differences from hybrids to purely 
non-material digital objects and elucidates what happens when we transpose the OS model of 
development to a hybrid object. As a lens to understand how different attributes of objects 
require different development models, we adopt relevant constructs from Transaction Costs 
Economics (TCE) and examine its utility as a predictive theory of OSH development. 
Keywords: Open source hardware, hybrid objects, development, transaction costs 
economics.  
6.2 Introduction 
“Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!” Alice follows the time-obsessed hare down the rabbit 
hole into Wonderland. The White Rabbit is the first Wonderland character that Alice 
encounters in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, a fantasy novel by English mathematician 
Charles Lutwidge Dodgson published in 1865. White Rabbit (WR) is also the name of an 
open source hardware (OSH) that consists of a fully deterministic Ethernet-based network for 
data transfer and synchronization. The technology was developed in 2008 by the European 
Organization for Nuclear Research (centre européen pour la recherche nucléaire; CERN) to 
provide a sequencing and synchronization solution for CERN’s geographically distributed 
accelerator network. WR was developed as an OSH through a sustained collaboration among 
traditional vendors, peripheral research organizations, and a heterogeneous community of 
voluntary contributors. WR was born as the evolution of CERN’s General Machine Timing 
(GMT) program and is currently the clock and event distribution system of their accelerators 
where time accuracy at the nanosecond15 level is required. After its implementation at 
                                               
15 A nanosecond (ns) is an SI unit of time equal to one billionth of a second, that is, 1/1,000,000,000 of a 
second, or 10−9 seconds. 
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CERN, WR was adopted by other scientific research infrastructures and subsequently 
implemented in a variety of industrial settings where time accuracy is critical, including high-
frequency trading (HFT) matching engines in financial services, telecommunications 
networks, automated vehicles, modern central navigation systems for air traffic control, and 
smart grids.  
The success of Open Source Software (OSS) has inspired others to adopt the 'open source 
way'16 of development in the field of electronic hardware design: OSH. OSH is a term for 
hardware or tangible artifacts – machines, devices, or other physical things – for which the 
design is made publicly available in a way that anyone can study, modify, distribute, make, 
and sell either the design or hardware based on this design (OSH Association). OSH typically 
comprises both material and non-material layers; that is, it can be viewed as a stack of 
technologies with a physical form combined with embedded operating, middleware, or 
application-level software. Although OSH is most common in scientific research 
infrastructures (Balka 2011; Boisseau et al. 2018; Mellis and Buechley 2012; Pearce 2012), it 
has now attracted the attention of a wide range of industrial organizations that need to 
develop never-seen-before technologies not easily acquired through commercial vendors. 
The domain of OSH includes a diverse range of projects and products such as computer 
systems and components, scientific machines and tools, robotics, home automation, and 
medical and biotech instruments (Pearce 2012). Some compelling examples of OSH17 
include Arduino18, RepRap19, and the Open Compute Project20. Projects range from small-
scale, do-it-yourself hardware projects for electronics hobbyists to complex projects that 
require highly sophisticated expertise, long development cycles, and industrial manufacturing 
capabilities, which render them cost-prohibitive to hobbyists or small research laboratories 
(Balka et al. 2009; Boisseau et al. 2018; Oberloier and Pearce 2017). For example, RISC-V21 
is gaining momentum as an OSH instruction set architecture (ISA) in both research and 
commercial organizations that seek to avoid the non-recurring engineering costs of 
specialized integrated circuits.  
With this recent evolution in OSH, some scholars have predicted that an open-source ethos 
will influence commercial hardware development to the same degree that it has influenced 
software development (Balka et al. 2010; Powell, 2016). However, the transposition of open-
source development to a form of technology ‘object’ that has material components might be 
unsuccessful if the conditions salient in OSS development are not equally applicable in OSH.  
                                               
16 We borrow this expression from Howison and Crowston (2014). 
17 See a comprehensive list of examples OSH at ohwr.org. 







Following Faulkner and Runde (2019), we define objects as entities that endure (i.e., 
“something that exists through time and is fully present at each and every point in time over 
the period of its existence” p. 5) and entities that are structured, that is, entities composed of a 
number of distinct parts (henceforth components). We employ the term ‘object’ in the same 
spirit as Faulkner and Runde (2009, 2013, 2019) and Kallinikos et al. (2013) to designate 
purposefully engineered objects rather than any object that occurs naturally. The universe has 
all types of objects; we refer here only to a subset of them that we term digital objects. 
Digital objects have not only a function that “members of some community impose on that 
object in pursuit of their practical interests” (Faulkner and Runde 2013 p. 807) but also a 
form, which means that they possess the characteristics and capabilities so that the object's 
function can be performed. Both function and form give the object its technical identity. For 
instance, using Faulkner and Runde's (2013) example, an application for network monitoring 
derives its technical identity by facilitating the monitoring of devices connected to the local 
network. Digital objects have components or constituent parts that do not have a technical 
identity themselves to the degree that they do not fulfill a function given by a community, but 
they possess different attributes; that is, digital objects have defining properties according to 
how the components work, how they are arranged, and how they interact with one another.  
A principal attribute to distinguish is the difference between material and non-material 
components, which is their embodiment. The notion of embodiment (Yoo 2010) owes its 
legacy to the philosophy of phenomenology (Boland 1986; Heidegger 1962) and refers to 
“the property of being manifest in and of the everyday world” (Dourish 2001 p.18). Material 
components have spatial attributes (i.e., shape, volume, mass, and location). That is, material 
components have a “physical mode of being” (Faulkner and Runde 2013 p. 806), which 
makes them “rigid, stable and tangible” (Yoo 2010  p. 222) as opposed to non-material 
components, which exist “in a logic state, which makes them malleable and fungible” (von 
Briel et al. 2018 p. 281). Digital objects with material and non-material components fall into 
the group of hybrid objects, or hybrids (Faulkner and Runde 2019). Hybrid objects include 
any hardware with middleware or software (Yoo 2010) and encompass many of the objects 
being developed in OSH projects.  
To our knowledge, little scholarly work has systematically investigated how the premises of 
open-source development differ when applied to hybrids. As other scholars have emphasized, 
the open-source model may not easily be transposed to hybrid development (Balka 2011; 
Balka et al. 2010; Boisseau et al. 2018; Oberloier and Pearce 2017; West and Kuk 2016) or 
any object different than software (Lerner and Tirole 2003). Therefore, further research is 
warranted given the expected impact of OSH. Moreover, an analysis of the open-source 
development of hybrids offers the variance needed to theorize, beyond OSS, the relationship 
between the attributes of object components (i.e., what is being developed) and the 
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organizational conditions of their development model (i.e., how it is being developed). 
Accordingly, the research question that this study asks is  
How do the attributes of a hybrid object and its components affect the open-
source model of development?  
To answer our research question, we first engage in a review of recent conceptualizations of 
digital objects to delineate the attributes of the digital objects that contain both material and 
non-material components (hybrids) to understand ‘what’ agents act on when they develop 
them (Faulkner and Runde 2019; Kallinikos et al. 2013; Yoo et al. 2010). We adopt the 
definition of development as the “social process of designing, developing, and implementing 
the technical artifact, usually in a specific organizational context and over time” 
(Akhlaghpour et al. 2013 p.152).  In a second step, we review what we know about hybrid 
development to understand how hardware that contains middleware and software has 
traditionally been developed. Third, we review the IS literature on the ‘open source way’ of 
developing software. Our goal is to extract from this literature the common characteristics of 
how work is organized in OS development and the conditions that underlie it (i.e., the 
prerequisites for the occurrence of OS development) (Benkler 2002; Dahlander and 
Magnusson 2008; Feller and Fitzgerald 2002; Fitzgerald 2006; Fitzgerald and Feller 2002; 
Howison and Crowston 2014; O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007). 
As a lens to understand how hybrid component attributes and their interaction require 
different development models, we briefly review transaction costs economics (TCE) 
(Williamson 1975, 1985, 1996) as a high-level theoretical frame. We find the logic of TCE to 
be useful because it works through the strategic alignment hypothesis, namely, that 
transactions with different attributes will align with governance structures that vary in their 
relative ability to economize on particular attributes of transaction costs (Williamson 1996). 
We believe that this underlying mechanism is similar to and useful for understanding the 
relationship between the attributes of a hybrid object’s components and how they align with 
an appropriate model of development. We appropriate relevant concepts from TCE and 
explore both their adequacy and limitations in explaining hybrid object development.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After discussing the theoretical 
underpinnings of our research study and analysis, we then describe our research context 
around WR and its development, the research design and analytic methods. We also present 
the findings and discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the study, its limitations, 




6.3 Theoretical underpinnings 
6.3.1 The attributes of hybrids 
Beginning with Orlikowski and Iacono’s (2001) empirical study about the treatment of 
digital technology in IS research, scholars have portrayed the specific features of digital 
technology in diverse ways (e.g., Ekbia 2009, Kallinikos et al., 2011, 2013, Faulkner and 
Runde 2009, 2019; Yoo et al., 2010), with the greatest emphasis on the non-material aspects 
of digital objects. Attributes such as non-rivalry, infinite expansibility, reproducibility 
(Faulkner and Runde 2009, 2013) and largely unstable, unbounded (Ekbia 2009), interactive, 
fluid, editable or distributed attributes (Kallinikos et al. 2010, 2013 p.360; Manovich 2001) 
are supported by examples such as blogs, wikis, personal profiles in social media, booking 
systems, digital libraries, files, images, films or videos, and open-source software. This 
literature stream is less attentive to the physical nature of components, for instance, their 
capability to be reproduced, distributed, or their stability over time. Thus, there is an 
opportunity to better understand the attributes of hybrid digital objects where material 
characteristics are present.  
From our review of the literature, five salient attributes are relevant for our analysis (e.g., 
Ekbia 2009; Faulkner and Runde 2009, 2013, 2019; Kallinikos et al. 2010, 2013; Yoo 2010; 
Nambisan et al. 2017). These five attributes are 1) embodiment, 2) modularity, 3) 
granularity, 4) editability, and 5) reproducibility.  Our study applies these five attributes to 
assess how these traits vary when a digital object contains material components. We provide 
the construct definitions and our conceptual departure from the related notions in Appendix 
A. 
Embodiment refers to the component’s material or non-material state as described previously 
(Faulkner and Runde 2009, 2011; Yoo et al. 2010). Modularity describes components as 
either 1) loosely coupled – where functionalities are dependent yet distinct from one another 
or 2) tightly coupled – where components are more closely integrated and responsive to, but 
less distinct, from one another (von Briel et al. 2018; Kallinikos et al. 2010, 2013; Manovich 
2001; Yoo 2010). Granularity is also determinative, as it affects the degree to which a 
development task can be decomposed into smaller units to be completed by smaller teams or 
individuals (Kallinikos et al. 2010, 2013; Kallinikos and Mariátegui 2011). Taken together, 
modularity and granularity describe a great deal about the composition of the object and 
components, that is, their relative sizes, how they are arranged and relate to one another, and 
their degree of interdependence (von Briel et al. 2018; Kallinikos et al. 2010). We are also 
concerned with the degree to which object components are modifiable, specifically, 
editability, as it affects the degree to which multiple implementations, customizations, or 
forking are possible at specific points in the technology stack (von Briel et al. 2018; Ekbia 
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2009; Faulkner and Runde 2019; Kallinikos et al. 2010). Reproducibility is associated with 
embodiment, as it describes the pragmatic or economic cost of producing and distributing 
multiple units of the object or component (Kallinikos et al. 2010). In this sense, although 
digital objects with non-material components (e.g., a web browser) can be downloaded 
unlimited times once the code is written, each copy of a hybrid object or component requires 
physical production and distribution (von Briel et al. 2018; Faulkner and Runde 2009, 2013, 
2019; Kallinikos et al. 2013).  
6.3.2 The development of hybrids 
The development of hybrids has traditionally been characterized as requiring a number of 
discrete and sequential steps that are not as easily decomposed, distributed or completed in 
parallel processes (DeMicheli and Sami 2013). Although there is no single approach to 
hybrid development, our purpose is to identify the common features across the literature.  
The first step in the development of hybrids is the logical design, which is represented in the 
schematic diagram. The schematic diagram provides no information on the physical 
arrangement or interconnection of the parts; it is only a logical depiction of the object. Where 
one could argue that hybrids and pure software design are similar up to this point (logical 
design), they diverge from here. Hybrid objects require a translational action to go from the 
digital representation of the object (the logical design) to the object itself. Translational 
action refers to “practices associated with movement from one layer of the bearer to another” 
(Faulkner and Runde 2019 p.10). For hybrid objects, the material attributes of the 
components (e.g., size, heat, etc.) and the interconnection of the parts must be considered.   
Moving from the schematic to the actual physical layout is somewhat of an art form, as the 
physical nature of the components must be considered (Ackermann 2009). Electronic design 
automation (EDA) can aid the developer to generate a netlist that describes each set of 
electrical connections by grouping them into a ‘Net’, a group of components that are 
electrically tied together. This netlist also describes the electrical value and physical 
attributes of the components from component libraries. However, despite the benefits of 
EDA software, substantial human expertise is required to evaluate the challenges of size 
constraints, heat, radio interference, external connections, component cost and other 
operational and environmental factors; two equally qualified designers could easily produce 
two different circuit boards of varying quality based on the same schematic (Ackermann 
2009). 
Sophisticated hybrid objects with multiple components can have subassemblies. When the 
object is more complex, it is more difficult to complete the detailed development of any one 
part until the entire subassembly is developed, which reinforces the sequential nature of the 




design, unexpected side effects arise when each prototype is assembled and tested for the 
first time; these are side effects that will not appear when the components are tested in 
isolation (Pan et al. 2018). For this reason, where commercial software testing is often 
conducted by independent software specialists who test individual components and their 
integration according to testing scripts (Wareham and Sonne 2008), for such hybrid objects, 
this testing is often performed by the engineers who design the object given their more 
tightly coupled and integrated nature (Drechsler and Breiter 2007). Moreover, the integration 
of different subassemblies requires ensuring the compatibility of the different components 
with market standards (DeMicheli and Sami 2013; Gajski and Vahid 1995).  
Several observations about the traditional development of hybrids are worth noting. When 
the phases of development are independent, (i.e., logical design, schematic capture, physical 
design, prototyping, and testing), they are highly interdependent and sequential. Changes in 
the fundamental design are more difficult and expensive to modify later in the development 
cycle, as a change of one component “is likely to require extensive compensating changes in 
the designs of many interrelated components” (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996 p.65 ). This 
generates a certain inflexibility to engineering modifications later in the process, which 
imposes some stability on the core structure and principal components (DeMicheli and Sami 
2013). In addition, the use of non-standard components requires more time between 
development iterations for “procuring materials, creating tooling, trial runs, product 
assembly, [and] quality control” (von Briel et al. 2018 p.283; Marion et al. 2012). Non-
standard designs also have an acute effect on testing costs, which limit the frequency of 
design iterations and further constrain the possibility of modifications by different developers 
(Gajski and Vahid 1995; Mellis and Buechley 2012).   
Various software tools can only partially alleviate these challenges. Although EDA offers 
substantial automation benefits, as mentioned, human expertise plays a substantial role in the 
actual physical design of the object (Ackermann 2009). Other software tools exist for 
tracking and integrating concurrent modifications introduced by different developers (Mellis 
and Buechley 2012). However, the limited maturity of these tools requires far more 
centralized direction-giving; this effect is exacerbated by the addition of multiple software 
layers on top of the hardware (Pan et al. 2018; Drechsler and Breiter 2007). Even if 
employing virtual prototypes (Bogers and Horst 2014) or advanced manufacturing techniques 
(e.g., 3D printing) (Bogers et al. 2016), the development of hybrids “involves more activities 
such as transferring premature prototypes into designs that can actually be manufactured” 
(von Briel et al. 2018 p.283; Yu et al. 2018), which incur time, especially when compared to 
the modifications to software based on writing lines of code (Mellis and Buechley 2012).  
 
 159 
Finally, the high interdependence of physical components can aggravate the business and 
financial aspects of the development process to control costs, which encourages linear 
process planning to define who contributes at various points of the process (von Briel et al. 
2018; Yu et al. 2018). Overall, such centralized direction-giving in the development process 
has typically been exercised in organizational hierarchies, that is, following formal rules 
within an organization to preserve “agency over component supply and functions” (von Briel 
et al. 2018 p.283) or contractual mechanisms that specify development processes and 
outcomes that preserve input control over the development.  
6.3.3 Conditions for OS development 
The basic characteristics of the open-source model have been articulated in a large number of 
publications by its advocates (e.g. Raymond, 1999; Cook, 2001; Linux Documentation 
Project, 2001; Masum, 2001) through diverse case studies of OS development projects 
(Mockus et al., 2002; Scacchi, 2001). Essentially, the open-source model has been described 
as an alternative organizational model for development, which is neither market nor 
hierarchy (Shah 2006). Diverse and partially overlapping approaches have described it as 
commons-based peer production (Benkler 2006), a community-based model (Shah 2005, 
2006), open sourcing (Ågerfalk and Fitzgerald 2008), collective invention (Allen 1983), 
private-collective innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003) or distributed innovation 
(Lakhani and von Hippel 2004).  
Early OS research primarily concentrated on delineating the unique characteristics of the 
‘open source way’ of software development (Crowston and Howison 2006; Feller and 
Fitzgerald 2002, 2002; Mockus et al. 2002; Raymond 1999), how open source communities 
coordinate work (Ben-Menahem et al. 2015; Crowston and Howison 2006; Howison and 
Crowston 2014; Koch and Schneider 2002; Krogh and Hippel 2006) and how they are 
governed (O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007; Sharma et al. 2002; Tullio and Staples 2013). As the 
success of OS initiatives progressed and commercial companies increasingly engaged in OS 
communities, scholars studied the transformation of OS into a more mainstream and 
commercial form of developing software, which is labeled as OSS 2.0 (Fitzgerald 2006). 
With a strong commercial orientation, OS went from a phenomenon of “ideologically driven 
developer communities” (Rolandsson et al. 2011 p.577) to a commercial model of 
developing software where many companies engage with communities in collaborative 
developments (Niederman et al. 2006).  
Although OS is not a homogeneous approach to software development, the specific attributes 
(i.e., common characteristics of how work is organized) and conditions (i.e., prerequisites for 
the occurrence of OS development) that underlie its model of development are common in 




work autonomously and self-select their tasks in (Crowston, 1997; Howison and Crowston, 
2014; Lindberg et al., 2016; Maha and Vaast, 2015; Shah 2005, 2006) (b) a loosely 
centralized collaboration (Cutosksy et al., 1996; Feller and Fitzgerald 2000, 2002) (c) where 
geographically distributed teams or individuals (Cook 2001; Feller et al. 2008; Feller and 
Fitzgerald 2002, 2002; Markus 2007) (d) work in parallel development in an asynchronous 
collaboration of tasks supported by (Cook 2001; Feller et al. 2008; Feller and Fitzgerald 
2001, 2002; Markus 2007) (e) infrastructural tools such as the internet and concurrent 
versioning of software (Baldwin and Clark 2006; Egyedi and Joode 2004; Feller et al. 2008; 
Feller and Fitzgerald 2002). Table 5 in the appendix provides a summary of the main 
attributes and related sources in the literature.  
Underlying such characterization of OS development are some requisite conditions. These 
are a) modularity (Benkler 2002; Fitzgerald 2006; Howison and Crowston 2014; Lindberg et 
al. 2014; MacCormack et al. 2006), b) granularity (Benkler 2002, 2006; Howison and 
Crowston 2014; Lindberg et al. 2014), and c) low integration costs (Benkler 2002; Feller and 
Fitzgerald 2002; Howison and Crowston 2014; Langlois and Garzarelli 2008). As Howison 
and Crowston (2015) argue, to enable asynchronous collaboration, the “open superposition” 
of tasks is necessary. This requires that each module creates an “(adequately) finished 
artifact” (Howison and Crowston 2015 p. 44) that can be completed by an individual 
programmer in a geographically distributed environment. This further assumes not only that 
tasks can be broken down into smaller independent problems (modularity) but also that such 
tasks are sufficiently granular for independent and geographically distributed individuals to 
understand and complete them (granularity). In other words, “to pool a relatively large pool 
of contributors, the modules should be predominantly fine-grained, or small in size. This 
allows the project to capture contributions from large numbers of contributors whose 
motivation level will not sustain anything more than quite small efforts towards the project” 
(Benkler 2006, p. 10). Moreover, with requisite modularity and granularity, OS contributors 
can practice what Howison and Crowston (2014) call productive deferral, where difficult 
tasks can be deferred to allow developers to work on easier tasks (which is therefore 
asynchronous and non-linear development).  
Finally, these independent modules must be re-integrated to form a useful system. This 
requires low instantiation costs, that is, the costs of rebuilding and adding additional layers to 
existing work and quality controls over the modules and the costs of integrating completed 
modules and making them interoperable (Howison and Crowston, 2014; Benkler 2006). 
When these appropriate integration characteristics (e.g., efforts and costs) are sufficiently 
low, non-linear, asynchronous development is increasingly feasible: complex, functionally 
interdependent work can be broken down and completed without prohibitive decomposition 
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and reintegration efforts. Table 5 in Appendix A provides a summary of the main conditions 
for OS development and the related sources in the literature.  
6.3.4 A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective on Hybrid Development 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) has had an established tradition in management studies 
since the seminal publications of Williamson (1975, 1985). TCE has been applied in 
information systems research, particularly in an attempt to understand how ICT reduces 
external and internal coordination costs, thereby affecting firm size and managerial controls 
(Gurbaxani and Whang 1991; Malone et al. 1987). The literature on TCE is vast, and 
excellent reviews of it exist (e.g., Macher and Richman 2008). It is important to emphasize 
that although the core concepts of TCE are described in the works of Williamson (1975, 
1985, 1996), TCE discourse has been applied to so many domains in management, law and 
social science that a comprehensive interpretation of the theory is well beyond the scope of 
this paper. What is relevant for our analysis is that TCE works through the discriminating 
alignment hypothesis: that transactions with different attributes will align with governance 
structures that differ in their relative ability to economize on particular attributes of 
transaction costs (Williamson 1996). Given transaction attributes, the resulting transaction 
will be governed by mechanisms conceptualized as falling at some point on a market-
hierarchy continuum. Where the costs of using market-based mechanisms are excessively 
high, transactions will be internally integrated into a single organization or firm. With 
progressively lower external coordination costs and asset specificity, transactions can be 
completed in governance forms that can be considered to be decreasingly complex and less 
centrally governed. The most commonly cited TCE transaction attributes are defined in Table 
5 in Appendix A.  
TCE is a predictive theory. By exploring the conceptual similarity between transaction 
attributes and component attributes, the logic of TCE can be extended to predict the 
development models (as outcomes roughly equivalent to TCE governance structures) of 
hybrid objects according to their component attributes (Niederman et al. 2006). We therefore 
focus on several key constructs of TCE, primarily product and production attributes, that are 
most useful to our analysis and show how they relate to the five component attributes 
discussed earlier. Note that there is some overlap among the concepts, which make a one-to-
one mapping difficult. We have attempted to simplify at an appropriate level to understand 
the most important conceptual relationships and extrapolate predictive statements on how the 









Rationale TCE Prediction 
Embodiment 
    Material  
    Non-material 
Asset Specificity TCE says very little about the 
differences between tangible 
and intangible assets; specificity 
could vary widely in both cases.  
None 
Modularity 
    Tightly coupled 
































Tightly coupled components are 
more interdependent.  
Higher interdependence requires 
more centralized coordination.  
 
Loosely coupled components 
are less interdependent. Lower 
interdependence requires less-
centralized coordination.  
 
Complex components and 
production processes require 
higher monitoring costs.  
 
 
Simple components and 
production processes require 
lower monitoring costs.  
 
Tightly coupled and complex 
components are difficult to 
decompose and re-integrate, 
which increases integration 
costs.  
 
Loosely coupled and less-
complex components are easier 
to decompose and re-integrate, 
which decreases integration 
costs.  
The development of tightly 
coupled components is 
coordinated through more 
centralized governance. 
 
The development of loosely 
coupled components is 




Development processes with 
higher monitoring costs are 
coordinated through more 
centralized governance. 
 
Development processes with 
lower monitoring costs are 
coordinated through less 
centralized governance. 
 
Components with high 
integration costs are 
coordinated through more 
centralized governance. 
 
Components with low 
integration costs are 





    High granularity 




Highly granular components can 
be developed with a shorter 
duration, greater frequency, and 
lower monitoring cost. 
 
Low granularity components are 
developed with a longer 
duration, lower frequency, and 
higher monitoring cost.  
Components with higher 
granularity are coordinated 
through less centralized 
governance. 
 
Components with low 
granularity are coordinated 
through more centralized 
governance. 
Editability 
    High editability 
    Low editability 
Asset Specificity A component or IT object that is 
editable is more readily 
configurable to alternative uses. 
Asset specificity decreases with 
greater editability.  
 
A component or IT object that 
has low editability is less readily 
configurable to alternative uses. 
Asset specificity increases with 
lesser editability. 
Components that are less 
asset-specific are 




Components that are highly 
asset specific are 





(financial & legal)  
Components with low technical 
sophistication and low 




Components with high technical 
sophistication and high 
economic costs are difficult to 
reproduce.  
Easily reproducible 
components confer lower 
financial risk and can 
therefore be developed 
through less centralized 
governance. 
 
Difficult to reproduce 
components confer greater 
financial risk and are 




What is evident from this exercise is that although there are many useful similarities, some 
logical extensions are required to equate TCE transaction attributes to hybrid object 




For our analysis, we do not consider all the transaction governance outcomes identified in the 
extensive TCE literature (e.g., joint ventures, franchising, complex versus simple contracts, 
etc.). Rather, we collapse them into two generalized governance modes based on decreasing 
levels of centralized coordination and direction-giving, namely, 1) hierarchical control and 
2) contractual agreements, with the addition of 3) voluntary contributions from the OS 
literature discussed previously, given that the OS literature has argued that OS communities 
are a competing form of governance mode along hierarchies and markets (Benkler 2002; 
Demil and Lecocq 2006; Niederman et al. 2006; Watson et al. 2005). Hierarchical control 
refers to any activity that is completed, coordinated, or controlled by a single organization. 
Contractual agreements refer to the processes and outcomes described and committed to by 
transacting parties as stipulated in legally binding agreements. Voluntary contributions are 
the contributions of individuals or organizations that contribute to OS development processes 
without any pecuniary compensation or legal obligation. A key characteristic of voluntary 
contributions is that they are organized in a decentralized manner, with each contributor self-
selecting their tasks and foregoing any managerial process or price established in contractual 
agreements (Niederman et al. 2006; Watson et al. 2005).  
6.4 Research context and methods 
We engage in an inductive, longitudinal, in-depth case study about WR, an OSH developed 
at CERN in collaboration with more than 31 additional organizations. WR offers a powerful 
opportunity for theory generation by being “paradigmatic of some phenomena of interest” 
(Gerring 2007, p. 101), where “its extreme value on an independent or dependent variable of 
interest” helps us to theorize an emerging phenomenon. As a highly complex and 
sophisticated hybrid object, the approach allowed us to explore deeply contextualized 
patterns in the open-source development of a hybrid. We studied the ecosystem of the 
organizations that contributed to the development of WR, namely, firms’ network and 
research organizations and their interaction when developing a hybrid object such as WR.   
6.4.1 Research Context 
Since the 1970s, particle physicists have used the so-called Standard Model to describe the 
fundamental structure of matter. CERN has deployed the world’s most powerful particle 
accelerators and detectors to test the predictions and limits of the Standard Model, and most 
recently, they corroborated the existence of the Higgs boson. WR is the name of an OSH 
initiated in 2008 when engineers at CERN were confronted with limited bandwidth and the 
impossibility of dynamically evaluating the delay induced by the data links that constitute 
CERN's geographically distributed computing infrastructure. WR was developed with the 
following unprecedented specifications: a) the transfer of a time reference from a central 
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location to many destinations with an accuracy better than one nanosecond and a precision 
better than 50 picoseconds22; b) the ability to service more than 1,000 nodes; c) the ability to 
cover distances of the order of 10 km; d) and data transfer from a central controller to many 
nodes with a guaranteed upper bound in latency. 
Prior to WR, the extant synchronization standard for Ethernet networks was the Precise Time 
Protocol (PTP), which is standardized as IEEE 1588. WR extends PTP in a backwardly 
compatible way to achieve sub-nanosecond accuracy (Moreira et al. 2009). “The 
combination of deterministic latencies with a common notion of time to within one 
nanosecond allows WR to be a suitable technology to solve diverse problems in distributed 
real-time control and data acquisition” (Lipiński et al. 2011 p.2). 
WR started as an OSH in 2008 when CERN decided to collaboratively develop the 
technology with any voluntary contributor willing to join the endeavor. An open call was 
placed in CERN’s vendor ecosystem, supported by a repository, wiki, developers’ mailing 
list, workshops and other collaborative tools. Most importantly, an open source hardware 
license was created to govern the rules of sharing, distributing and selling the WR designs. 
Very early on, GSI Helmholtzzentrum für Schwerionenforschung, a large-scale accelerator 
facility in Germany, joined the development together with two companies that started 
contributing to the WR hardware, gateware, and software development. Motivated by the 
purposive engagement of CERN, a larger group of companies and research organizations 
joined (31 at present) to progressively shape a diverse and vibrant ecosystem of organizations 
that contributed to the development of WR components. Since its beginning, the number of 
contributors that joined the WR community has grown beyond any expectation and has 
surpassed CERN´s capability of keeping track of the different applications of WR, reuses or 
adaptations. Although the initial intentions of CERN were to evolve the General Machine 
Timing (GMT) protocol, by deciding to develop the technology as an OSH, it eventually 
grew into a “multilaboratory, multicompany and multinational collaboration developing a 
technology that is commercially available, used worldwide, and incorporated into the original 
PTP” (Lipinski et al. 2018 p.2)  
6.4.2 Data Collection and Sources 
Our study relies on a diverse set of primary and secondary data to provide richness and 
enhance the validity of our findings (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009; Klein and Myers 1999). 
We collected data across three years (2017–2019) and conducted more than 35 interviews. In 
addition to the interviews, direct observations were conducted from two study visits to CERN 
in 2017 and 2018, including the participation in a WR developer workshop. Interviews were 
                                               





chosen on the initial recommendation of the WR lead team at CERN, with subsequent 
recommendations from the interviewees. Our objective was to interview a representative 
cross-section of the WR community. The interview process was concluded when no 
significant additional insights were obtained from the data and theoretical saturation was 
achieved. The major themes in our interview protocol are summarized in Appendix B. In our 
results (section 4), we present interview excerpts from the study, with alphanumeric key 
identifiers (corresponding to Table 2) that represent quoted interviewees. 
Secondary sources included information retrieved from the WR repository and Wiki, which 
contains general information about the WR project (i.e., newsletters, a list of companies 
involved in the WR ecosystem, and presentations and reports from workshops), information 
about WR technology (i.e., synchronization, data delivery and standardization in IEEE1588-
2008) and the WR system (i.e., the switch, master and node), a list of users of WR 
technology, and information about the open hardware license. We also gathered data from 
the websites of WR users and suppliers, the research project websites that have integrated 
WR, social media and academic publications. Table 2 presents the details of each of these 
sources.  
6.4.3 Data Analysis 
We performed a three-stage inductive analysis by relying on established procedures for 
inductive research (Miles and Huberman 1994). We iterated between data and theory to shed 
light on emergent themes and constructs. The first stage was devoted to reading the abundant 
material available online about WR. We produced brief summaries that moved from 
technical descriptions to managerial inferences. Second, in-depth interviews were conducted 
to understand the primary agents involved in the WR community, their contributions to the 
technology development and how the development was organized since its inception until 
present. Three rounds of interviews were implemented in this process, as Table 2 describes.  
We iteratively analyzed the interview transcripts by coding relevant observations and 
contrasting them with our analysis of secondary sources. Data was coded by one of he co-
authors and it was progressively discussed with the other co-author, especially when the 
categorization was unclear to reach an agreement. We generated research memos that 
synthesized the emergent themes identified in the analysis and compared them with prior 
research. Finally, we confronted the empirical data with theory. Table 4 and Appendix C 
provide a detailed description of the progression of our empirical analysis towards the 
theoretical constructs. 
To validate our findings, we applied the respondents validation (Miles and Huberman 1994) 
by sharing our initial findings with the participants of the study and the WR community.  The 
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preliminary results were presented at a workshop on 6-7 October 201823 to an audience of 56 
participants of the WR community to gather feedback about the main results of the study. 
Additionally, a draft was shared with the interviewees to solicit their feedback and identify 
gaps in the technical details of WR technology and development history.  Finally, we 
triangulated the results with an independent study performed in parallel in October 2018 
based on a text-mining analysis of the WR Repository and WR community exchanges. This 
parallel study informed the sequential data collection phases by helping to identify new 
contributors to WR development and by disentangling the separate developer contributions to 
WR components.  
 
 
                                               




Table 2. Details on the data collection and use in the analysis 
Source of 
data Type of data Description Identifiers Use in the analysis 
Interviews First Round 
n=18 
Research scientists and engineers in research 
infrastructures 
 
RSE1 (2 interviews) 
RSE2 (2 interviews) 
RSE3 
To gather data and an overall 
understanding of the process, different 
phases, agents and actions in WR 
development.  









Companies developing software CS1  
Companies developing hardware CH1 (2 interviews) 
CH2 
CH3  




Customers of WR not involved in WR development CA1  
Second Round 
n=13 





To gather data on how work was 
organized and coordinated in the WR 
development process within the 
different phases identified.  





Companies developing software CS2 
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Companies developing hardware CH4 
















To verify the interpretations and 
provide increasing detail on WR-
specific components and each 
development model (i.e., hierarchical 
control, contractual agreements and 
voluntary contributions) per 
component used over time.   
Companies developing hardware CH1 
Observations First Visit April 2017: Visit CERN to see infrastructure, timing systems department, 
technology transfer office 
To gain additional understanding about 
WR contributors, users, the 
interactions among them and how they 
organize the work.  Second Visit October 2018: Workshop on WR with more than 56 participants.  Presentation of preliminary insights about the study to gather feedback from participants. 
Secondary 
data 
Repository 5,076 commits,  
36 developer members 
To gather data and obtain an overall 
understanding of all WR technology, 
its components, interdependences, 
cycles of development, different 
component versions, meetings among 
contributors, and main events in WR 
development. 
Wiki Documentation about 
- WR Technology: WR Switch; Master (Data, Timing); Node (WR PTP Core); 
WR good practice guide; Calibration (default parameters for WR switches/nodes, 
procedure); data-delivery; synchronization; Standardization in IEEE1588-2008; 
and a Frequently Asked Questions section. 
- WR Users: 30 users of WR and 16 evaluating the technology (documentation 
about the organizations, descriptions, and presentations) 
- WR Projects: 13 publicly funded projects using WR 






10 meeting minutes (2008- 2018) 
Workshop  10 Workshops (2008- 2018) 
1 Developer meeting (2010) 
2 Tutorial WR workshops (2017, 2018) 
Blogs/Websites 43 websites of users and projects 
Publications Presentations (n=64) 
Papers (n=53) 
Master thesis on WR (n=2) 
Posters (n=2) 
Demos (n=3 in 2010 and 2013) 
Training material (n=2 in 2013 and 2016) 
Test reports (n=18) 
Other data Parallel WR 
Study  
Text-mining analysis of an independent study implement by another researcher 
studying WR 
To triangulate facts and observations 
regarding WR development with the 






6.5.1 Isolating the Attributes of a Hybrid  
We decomposed WR into its different components to identify their specific attributes (see 
Figure 2 for a graphical representation of the components). Table 3 provides a description of 
each WR component with excerpts from the interviews and data to substantiate their 
attributes. For each component, we qualify a) embodiment – dichotomously as material or 
non-material – and the four additional attributes of b) modularity, c) granularity, d) 
editability and e) reproducibility as a matter of degree, that is, high, moderate or low. 







Table 3. Data analysis and theoretical constructs 
WR components 





Software Switch  Dedicated switch 
software 
“Switch is like a router with a very precise timing. Nodes is a 
distinct component but WR is everything, and how you implement 
both: it has a specific circuit that allows implementing both” CH1 
“It is much faster to develop the software than anything else. So, 
for instance, they could not test it until we managed to get a 
prototype of the hardware” RSE5 
“The development cycle was longer for the hardware than the 
software because if we lose something, we could compile it. It 
takes us a second, and then you test if it works. The test cycle is 
very fast.” RSE 1 
“I was working in the protocol and the PTP itself, whereas A was 
working on some hardware; then, I was also working on some 
gateware parts of the switch and then B was integrating all 
together. B was not coordinating; he was integrating and taking 
different inputs and trying to make them work. For example, the 
software that interacts with gateware and hardware needs to 
speak with one and the other. You still need to integrate them” 
RSE6.  
"It is a multilevel process. For the software, it required to be 
integrated with the hardware. Tests for each of the components, 
and as soon as they were integrated, we run other tests. The 
testing is done by the same developers; we do not have a separate 
team for testing” RSE6. 
- No major differences between the software 
for the switch and the node  
- Development of WR software was faster 
than for the other components 
- Easy to reproduce with other developers 
contributing 
- Loosely coupled, different developers, 
contributing in parallel to the general and 
dedicated software for both the switch and 
nodes 
- Highly granular enabling two companies, 
developers at the sponsor organization and 
other distributed voluntary developers to 
contribute in parallel  
- WR software was constantly edited and 

















software – used both 
in the switch and node 
Node General-purpose 
software – used both 
in the switch and node 
Dedicated software 
for the node 
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Gateware Switch General-purpose 
gateware – IP Cores 
used both in the 
switch and node 
“Gateware and software it is easier to split it among companies, 
but hardware does not make sense” RSE6 
"We had different actors working in parallel. I was coordinating 
the contributions that came from gateware Y that was integrating 
everything together. In the beginning, we had two companies 
helping with the software and gateware, the other two for the 
hardware. X was integrating everything" RSE6. 
“We are now developing gateware for new designs of the nodes, 
so we are supporting different applications of the nodes because 
it depends on each application” RSE6. 
- No major differences of the gateware for 
the switch and the node 
- Development of the gateware was split 
among different contributors 
- Easy to reproduce with other developers 
contributing 
- Components more tightly coupled 
compared to the software of the switch and 
node; different developers were 
contributing, but most work is performed by 
a core group  
- Gateware was edited but was more stable; 


















gateware – IP Cores 
used both in the 
switch and node 
Dedicated gateware 





“If we say a switch, we think about a hardware box” RSE1 
 “The switch has 18 ports, and it is a completely different 
functionality. It has to forward data between ports. The switch 
looks like 18 ports that are interconnected. It implements more 
standards and because it is a generic device and needs to allow 
different configurations. You implement many more protocols 
than in the nodes. Basically the switch is much more complex 
than the node because it is 18 times the node; plus, each of the 
ports needs to interact between themselves; plus, you need to 
implement more flexibility because it needs to allow different 
types of configurations; plus, you need to implement more 
- Highly stratified (many layers) but with 
high interdependencies among layers for 
efficacy and performance issues (more 
granularity is associated with less time 
accuracy) 
- Low granularity – entity block; more 
granularity translates into inefficiencies and 
lowers the switch performance. 
- Low modularity – components tightly 
coupled; splitting the switch translates into 










WR Switch Box: It is 
a white metal 19” 1U 
case with two cooling 
fans in the back 
Main PCB: It contains 









features let’s say” RSE6 
"It would not work to decentralize the WR hardware design. It 
needs to be one company that controls the design for one device. 
For software, you can have different people working on different 
parts. On gateware, it works decentralized like the software, but 
for hardware, this is not possible, especially for the switch. I do 
not see it working” RSE6.  
"The switch is quite a compact device; it needs to work like one 
unified device, and if you have different companies, you need to 
define different interfaces between the parts that they are 
designing, test each part, see that they work together, and you 
make it much more complex, too much work and much more 
expensive. For the precision, it is also better that you do not have 
so many connectors; here, it was no practical" RSE 1.  
“For example, when I was working on one IP core in the switch, I 
did test it alone, I gave it to X who was integrating everything and 
then we were debugging” RSE6 
“You could not make it more granular; it would make it many 
costs and extra work and less efficacy in terms of precision. It 
would be harder to make it work” CH1 
another, less accuracy as it is lost across 
modules, more effort to split and tightly 
coordinate work across teams, more costly 
- High stability of the switch version –  the 
actual version is very similar to the first 
version in 2012; very stable as the 
development cycles were too long and very 
costly in terms of prototyping and testing 
- Very difficult to reproduce; requires 
manufacturing companies with engineering 
expertise to reproduce each unit (the 
marginal cost is significantly higher than 0) 
and distribute them 
 
Backplane PCB: It 
contains electrical 
connections to 18 SFP 
cages, debug USB-
UART ports, LEDs, 
etc. 
Node WR PTP core “If we think of a node, we think about an IP core that you can 
instantiate in different hardware” RSE2 
“Node is an end device whether it receives or sends staff to one 
port. You throw or you digest the data. It is like one of the switch 
ports; plus, you need to implement, like in the switch, WR 
protocol” RSE 6 
“The development of the node it is easier than the switch” CH1 
“(Referring to WR hardware development) In hardware, it can 
- Less stratified than the switch; it is 1/18 
times the switch (fewer layers)  
- Heterogeneous instantiations of the nodes 
depending on the context of the WR 
implementation (e.g., sea, altitude, pressure, 
etc.) 
- Moderate editability as the number of 










take us weeks or months to do the same for software. This is the 
same for open or not open stuff. It costs you a lot to do a 
prototype in terms of money, time; you need to wait for it and test 
for it. It is much more difficult: more expensive, more time, more 
difficult. Once you do it, you do not change it very often" RSE1 
“The node is different because the first node was a spec board 
and designed here, and then one company developed a simplified 
version. Some people took this design and made different formats, 
and this was without ourselves doing it, we did not pay for the 
design, it was because people needed it” RSE 6 
the diverse WR implementations 
- Low reproducibility requires 
manufacturers to source prototypes and 
distribute them   
- Low modularity – splitting the node is 
ineffective; each version of the node had a 








Some general patterns should be noted. For the material components of WR, specifically, the 
hardware layers of the switch and node, we found a) low modularity and b) low granularity. 
Where the switch was more stratified compared to the node, both had high interdependencies 
among the layers required for timekeeping precision; additional layers reduced accuracy. 
Likewise, the components could not be split into more granular parts as this would generate 
interoperability problems across component interfaces and more standards to implement, 
which would further impede chronological precision. Additionally, for the switch and nodes, 
we found c) moderate editability; multiple developers can act on the design of the switch and 
the node and modify them but to a lesser degree than the software components. Although the 
switch was a more stable technology, the node offers greater editability, and as a result, there 
are five times more versions of the node compared to the switch. In addition, we found d) 
low reproducibility, with an average cost per node in the range of 1,500 dollars and the 
switch approximately 10,000 dollars. The development process involved physical 
prototyping that must be manufactured and acquired to test its performance, with 
reproducibility as an important attribute. As CH1 describes, “If someone wants to use WR, I 
need to manufacture it. However, in software, if I need to modify something, I do not incur 
NRE [referring to non-recurring engineering costs] because I modify [and] compile and 
users or any developer tries it, but in WR, I need to manufacture another prototype, and 
these costs are neutral for me; I need to incur costs in electronics. This process of 
manufacturing has additional costs, and of course, if I need to sell it, I need to certify it to 
ensure that it is safe, and this has important additional costs”.  
Across the software and gateware layers of WR, we found high levels of a) modularity b) 
granularity c) editability and d) reproducibility, as described in Table 3 through our data, 
which made the development of such layers faster and the distributed contributions easier to 
organize. As RSE1 explains, “The development cycle was longer for the hardware than the 
software because if we lose something (in the software), we could compile it. It takes us a 
second, and then, you test if it works. The test cycle is very fast”. As RSE6 further describes, 
“Gateware and software it is easier to split it among companies, but hardware does not make 
sense”.  
6.5.2 Three Phases of the Evolution of WR Development  
The hybrid model for developing WR underwent three main phases, where the hierarchical, 
contractual and voluntary contributions varied over time (see Table 4).  
The first phase (from 2008 to 2012) began with the project launch in 2008 and concluded 
when WR achieved the first version of the switch and the node in 2012. WR was launched as 
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an OSH project, a decision that is consistent with CERN’s traditional operational philosophy 
and raison d'être. As Bij et al. (2013) explained, “OSH also fits CERN’s role of transferring 
the technologies it has developed to industry and to stimulate industry with innovative 
products such as the WR”, p.7. As RSE 5 further describes, “To develop WR as open source 
would help us to get specialist knowledge, where we know that small companies play a large 
role; but on the other hand, we would need to support them and help them to achieve the 
quality we need. Companies benefit from that process because it helps them improve and 
produce better hardware”.  
However, given that WR would be a sophisticated technology conceived for a very specific 
purpose and due to the different interdependencies and highly integrated nature of the switch 
and the node, it quickly became evident that the design of the first versions of both the switch 
and the node needed to be controlled and directed by the sponsor, CERN. As stated by one 
hardware developer,“CERN was our grandfather — not only when we were developing WR 
together but also in the first moments when we were wondering what was next” (CH1).  
Contractual arrangements with two hardware suppliers and two software suppliers enabled 
the development of the first prototype, which required tight coordination among tasks and 
development teams. The development followed the four major sequential and consecutive 
steps of 1) requirement and specifications, 2) design, 3) implementation, and 4) testing, 
where the outcomes of each step were highly dependent on the results of the previous step. 
Although some parallel and asynchronous development was conducted by peripheral 
research organizations, overall, the development followed planned and sequential phases 
with low voluntary contributions. This phase is characterized by a predominance of 
hierarchical control by the sponsor. Beyond fulfilling the technical requirements of the 
switch and node design, the strong initial protagonism by CERN can be viewed as part of an 
initial community-building phase to build interest and confidence in the project. As stated by 
a CERN engineer, “After allocating some funding for the first companies to join, we needed 
to convince others to invest in developing WR [as voluntary contributors], which was not an 
easy task. I had to reach out proactively to the companies we knew could do it and convince 
them. We needed first, to select companies that had not only the expertise but also the 
capacity afterward to provide support to the WR product” (RSE 5).  The initial reliance on 
hierarchical control supplemented with several key contracts served as a signaling 
mechanism: “We knew CERN was serious this time by engaging firms, and this also sent a 
message to other organizations [as voluntary contributors] that could collaborate with us” 
(CH2). These initial signals were determinative in convincing voluntary contributors to later 
join in the development cycle: “Other organizations and potential users joined and agreed to 




that those companies will actually be able to provide the technology once the R&D process is 
finished” (CH2). CH1 further explained the implications of such engagement for companies: 
“the difficulty of WR, but this is the same for any other OSH, is that it needs to be 
manufactured along the process. That means that there are additional costs. For example, 
you have the additional costs of qualification to prove that it works and later on in the 
process, to certify that the design works, and this is an overhead that you do not have in the 
software layers of WR or any software (…) and if I need to introduce any modification, then I 
need to start all over again”. 
The second phase (from 2012 to 2015) began with the first WR prototype release. At this 
point, first users began implementing WR and reported bugs, whose fixes were incorporated 
into further designs. Novel instantiations of the node began to appear based on the unique 
requirements of the installations of other scientific research infrastructures. As such, this 
phase has high voluntary contributions and minor changes to the design of the switch but 
many new designs and configurations for the nodes. This phase is characterized by the low 
direction-giving by the sponsor (the switch was stable) with many new designs of the nodes 
emerging from a growing WR community.   
Some extraordinary examples of WR implementations that lead to new node designs and 
switch modifications include meteorology research institutes that need to transfer time from 
atomic clocks over distances up to 1,000 km, the neutrino telescope KM3Net located in the 
deepest seas of the Mediterranean, and a five-cubic kilometer Cherenkov submarine detector 
in Toulon (France), Sicily (Italy) and Peloponnese (Greece). At 4,410 meters above sea level, 
China built the Large High Altitude Air Shower Observatory (LHAASO), the world's largest 
and most sensitive cosmic-ray observatory for gamma-ray astronomy, which consists of more 
than 6,300 detectors and 12 telescopes. Four layers of WR switches (583 in total) covered 
7,344 nodes of a Square Kilometer Complex Array (KM2A) detector and a Water 
Cherenkov Detector Array (WCDA) (White Rabbit wiki). 
The third phase (from 2015 to 2020) began when WR started a standardization process to 
guarantee the stability of the technology, which raised awareness about the potential of WR 
across industries. In this phase, WR reuse and implementations emerged in 
telecommunications, financial services, smart grids, air traffic control, electronics and 
industry 4.0 applications. As a result, new versions of WR switches and nodes were 
developed as proprietary applications and not disclosed to the WR community. Voluntary 
contributions by the senior contributors to WR (both companies and peripheral research 
organizations) were balanced in this phase by proprietary contributions to the switch and 
node designs. Hierarchical control was exercised by the sponsor, not in development, but in 
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the standardization of the core technologies along with the coordination and aggregation of 
the WR community contributions.   
In this phase, we find a growing number of increasingly heterogenous adoptions by industry. 
Examples include Vodafone, which conducted a successful proof of concept in 2017 to 
distribute accurate timing through the live Vodafone network where time was measured with 
a surprisingly small error of less than one nanosecond over a cascade of four sites that 
spanned a total distance of 320 km. As reported in the WR wiki, “Needless to say that this 
result builds strongly on the outstanding work delivered by the WR community over the past 
years, and we are thankful to all of you who contributed. We are absolutely convinced that 
with WR, you have created a game changer that will enable marvelous new technologies in 
the future!”(JK, The Netherlands, 9/6/17). In financial services, the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange implemented WR because it needed a time synchronization technology superior to 
the current standards of NTP and PTP. As CH1 describes, “Financial transaction 
organizations are required by law to prove that the time reference used for stamping 
transactions is UTC [Coordinated Universal Time] traceable. Thus, the accuracy required is 
in the millisecond range, but WR allows the nanosecond range with high accuracy, allowing 
legal timestamping applications.” Similar implementations at other financial exchanges are 
appearing in the media, as “The financial industry has easily become the most obsessed with 
time” (Markoff 2018 p.1). Table 5 provides detailed information on the adopters of WR 





Table 4. A hybrid model of development over time 
 
Phase 1 – Design process (first prototypes) 
Phase 2 – Users/developers join for testing and 
design new versions 
Phase 3 – Applications outside the scientific 
industry, forking, and parallel proprietary 
developments 












Trigger: WR designs kick off with one supplier 
supporting WR specifications 
  
• Design of the first version of the switch and 
node controlled by CERN (1 manager, one 
integrator, two coordinators of components)  
• Contractual agreements with HW and SW 
suppliers to allow a first prototype to emerge 
that required strong coordination among tasks 
and teams 
• Low voluntary contributions that include few 
research infrastructures  
• High direction provided by the sponsor was 
given to the design  
Trigger: First commercial WR prototype  
 
• First users of WR contribute reporting bugs to 
the switch, which impact further switch designs  
• High voluntary contributors to design multiple 
versions of the node, conditional on the 
different applications of WR 
• Contractual agreements for WR for production 
• Low direction given by the sponsor as the 
switch was stable, while there was high 
generativity as the new designs of the nodes 
were shared in the repository as the WR 
community was growing 
Trigger: Standardization process of WR raises 
awareness across industries 
 
• First implementations in other industries (e.g., 
financial services, telecommunications, etc.) 
• New proprietary versions of WR switch and 
nodes conditional on the particular setting 
emerge; designs were developed inside the 
organizations and not disclosed to the 
community 
• Voluntary contributions are balanced by 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.5.3 WR Development: A Hybrid Model for a Hybrid Object 
When CERN decided to develop WR technology as OSH, it soon became evident that the 
very specific function, sophistication, and interdependent nature required that the core 
technological design be established before significant voluntary contributions could be 
incorporated. As a result, traditional hierarchical and contractual mechanisms were employed 
towards greater directionality and control in the initial development phases. After the core 
technologies were developed and stable, an increasing amount of voluntary contributions 
were incorporated at all levels of the WR technology stack. We label this as a hybrid model 
of development. The tightest hierarchical controls were enabled through employment in 
traditional engineering and development companies with CERN as sponsor and integrator. 
Moderate control was enabled by formal contracts that enabled the development of 
specialized components that were beyond the scope of capabilities for the core WR 
development organizations. Voluntary contributions originated in the WR community, with 
some centralized coordination and integration by CERN. This hybrid model is depicted in 
Figure 2. 





The most central function for CERN as the sponsor and principal user of WR was to provide 
sponsorship, legitimacy and centralized control to the project. This means the coordination of 




the internal management of the more complex and interdependent WR components (the 
hardware), and the aggregation and integration of the voluntary contributions. Given the 
heterogeneity of these diverse contributions, CERN put a team in place to orchestrate WR 
development. As RSE explains, “A was coordinating the contributions that came from 
gateware, B from the software and C of the hardware of WR switch and node. D was 
integrating everything together. In the beginning, we had two companies helping with the 
software and gateware, the other two for the hardware. Each of us was coordinating the 
contributions of the company and the ones coming from other organizations. D was 
integrating everything […] and E was in charge to coordinate everything as part of the 
department role more from a management perspective”. As CH1 claims, “WR worked 
essentially because of the leadership of CERN”.  
The need for a differentiated approach based on component attributes is evident in the 
following quote where RSE 6 explains how the hybrid model worked: “There was internal 
work at CERN, different work at companies and then other contributions by other 
organizations that voluntarily joined and contributed, and all this work was coordinated and 
integrated at CERN”. RSE 2 further justifies that “Whenever we want to have something 
done, we put a contract. Volunteer contributions are nice, contributions for free we accept 
them as developed packages, it shows that it works, and then we integrated them in the 
switch. However, when you need something specific, and if you do not know if it works or if it 
will not work, we need to control it. For software, you can be a one-man company, whereas 
for a company that develops hardware, you need licenses, expensive equipment, and before 
you get paid for what you do, you need to send it for production, which costs money, and for 
prototyping, which costs money again, and this does not translate into software”. 
Contractual agreements 
The contractual agreements employed were clustered around the following four main 
activities: 1) contracts awarded to companies to gather and manage WR specifications across 
the WR development community; 2) contracts to develop the repository and main hub for 
WR collaboration; 3) further contractual arrangements to contribute to the first switch and 
node prototypes across the software, gateware and hardware components; and 4) contracts 
for prototyping, where manufacturers were asked to produce a few units of WR switch and 
nodes and distribute them across the community for testing.  All of these contractual 
arrangements specify that all documentation that results from the development must be 
shared in the repository and are governed under an open-source license.  
An interesting facet of the contractual agreements was that many vendors included voluntary 
contributions as part of their deliverable.  In these instances, complete documentation also 
included contracting partners’ efforts in supporting other voluntary contributions to WR 
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development. That is, if their component included volunteer contributions from the WR 
community, they were equally responsible for this. As RSE4 explains, “You have to be ready 
to document and publish everything. Support may take more than you want”. 
 
Voluntary contributions 
As WR deployments increased beyond the original scope of scientific research 
infrastructures, a more heterogeneous community of WR users engaged in developing the 
software, gateware and hardware to customize it to the specific operational requirements of 
their diverse applications. A portfolio of tools common to OS initiatives was used in WR 
development that facilitated the customized applications in addition to the standard WR 
layers. These tools included documentation wikis, issue tracking, dedicated mailing lists, 
peer review over email, regular face-to-face meetings, dedicated workshops, and proprietary 
tools to allow distributed hardware development such as electronic design automation and 
field-programmable gate array (FPGA) development tools.   
The voluntary contributions were diverse. Some were focused on the core technologies, 
whereas others emphasized the more peripheral aspects of the nodes and software. Some 
volunteers contributed to testing, where other volunteers participated in WR OSH 
communities with the explicit purpose of cultivating skills that could be monetized as they 
worked with their own clients. As RSE 6 shares about one organization that voluntarily 
contributed, “X´s contribution to WR was a measurement of one of the key things that WR 
used to reach the nanosecond. They invented this.” Another example of a voluntary 
contribution is "Y was contributing from the very beginning although it is hard to point to 
one thing. They were contributing to some modules in the switch to some extent” (RSE 3). In 
some cases, the voluntary contributions were related to testing the first WR prototype in 
2012: “When organizations started using WR, they started to find bugs and were doing bug 
reports but not a development of some kind. All of these bug reports resulted in new releases 
of the switches, and people [and] other research infrastructures helped developing new 
releases”.  Other companies contributed to WR communities to learn: “Other organizations 
contributed to discussions. Minimum effort contributors but their business idea was to 
contribute to the discussions so that they could be the first to use WR in case they had the 
first client to make sure that they could use it” (RSE 5). 
In addition, a set of regulatory devices, such as the creation of a new open-source hardware 
license, were also put in place to agree on codified norms across organizations and ensure the 
stability of the core technology. This element is particularly important given that whether via 
contracts or via voluntary engagement, all contributors in WR development are 




depends on the type of hardware. If it is simple hardware, then you will find individuals with 
tools that allow simple designs, but for designs that are complex such as WR, only companies 
and organizations [participate] because the tools cost many money."  Previous research in 
technology ecosystems and platforms has emphasized the importance of standards and 
disciplined versioning of core technologies as insurance of a fair economic return on 
investments by implementors, re-sellers, and complementors (Wareham et al. 2014). 
6.6 Discussion 
6.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
First, our study contributes to recent conceptualizations of digital objects by uncovering the 
differences from hybrids to purely non-material digital objects. The study of WR identifies 
that the physical nature of the components of hybrid objects deviates from the attributes 
commonly associated with digital objects in both essence and degree. WR, and by extension, 
many sophisticated hybrid objects that contain material components, exhibit less editability 
and less reproducibility and are less modular and less granular. As a consequence, the efforts 
for their decomposition and reintegration are higher compared to pure non-material digital 
objects.  As such, the nominal and relative attributes of the hybrid object components of a) 
embodiment, b) modularity, c) granularity, d) editability, and e) reproducibility have strong 
implications for how their development is organized (Akhlaghpour, Wu, Lapointe, 
Pinsonneault, 2013). As our analysis shows, at certain levels, these attributes can inhibit the 
possibility for development to be completed in conditions normally ascribed to OS. In the 
case study of WR, this resulted in the coexistence of voluntary contributions combined with 
traditional hierarchical and contractual models of development.  
This rationale can be specified as follows. The development of tightly coupled components 
requires highly sequential processes with intensive coordination and control over the 
activities. A change of one component may require extensive compensating modifications in 
the designs of many other interrelated components. Consequently, the development cycles of 
hybrids are longer, and modifications and one point may require more time and resources 
given the component interdependencies. Relatedly, the granularity of the components is 
important if the nature of the object does not permit a reduction into numerous independent 
elements. It follows that the editability, or the ability to modify it continuously and 
systematically, can be lower in hybrids due to tighter integration with the hardware. Where 
this is not always the case (personal computing devices are an obvious example), many OSH 
projects are designed to address specific needs that have yet to be fulfilled by mature 
commercial HW/SW solutions and consequently, will likely have a higher level of coupling 
between these layers. The material aspect of hybrids can reduce their reproducibility, which 
 
 189 
implies non-negligible production and distribution costs and dissuades voluntary 
contributions, as volunteers normally need to incur significant expenses related to 
prototyping and testing. As evidenced in this case, this is very much correlated with the 
sophistication and economic costs of the technology.  
We have re-visited some fundamental ideas of TCE to explain the modalities of developing 
hybrid objects. TCE certainly does not explain all aspects of our OSH phenomenon, and we 
clearly do not want to oversubscribe it as a theoretical lens (Fischer 1977). Through the 
discriminating alignment hypothesis, TCE predicts governance structures according to the 
transaction attributes (Williamson, 1996). In exploring the conceptual equivalence between 
transaction attributes and component attributes, we demonstrate that some TCE logic and 
constructs are particularly well-suited to make predictive statements about when OSH 
development will be 1) hierarchically or 2) contractually governed or 3) built on voluntary 
contributions in a more traditional OS manner. We simplified our use of TCE by collapsing 
the development models to two major outcomes (hierarchical control and contracts, 
supplemented by voluntary contributions), but given the novelty of OSH, we believe that this 
predictive capacity should not be underestimated. CERN chose to develop WR by leveraging 
the expertise of a significant number of heterogeneous voluntary organizations willing to 
develop WR as an OSH; however, following a similar logic of the strategic alignment 
hypothesis, WR component attributes determined the need for a mixed model of 
development to emerge that combined voluntary contributions with commercial contracts and 
hierarchical control.  
Most likely, the most potent TCE construct in our analysis is interdependence, as it 
envelopes modularity as a predictor of development governance. Object components with 
low modularity are more tightly coupled. This applies to both their physical and logical 
attributes of all technology layers and, therefore, also to their development process that 
requires greater linear coordination and centralized control. This logic applies equally to the 
TCE constructs of product complexity and monitoring costs, which although they are also 
strong predictors, they can be more ambiguous as observable attributes of objects or 
components. In addition, the TCE constructs of duration and frequency are also useful in that 
they indirectly relate to the granularity of the component. TCE posits that transactions with a 
shorter duration and frequency are governed by less centralized, simpler market-based 
governance forms. Similarly, more granular components can be developed in a less-
centralized or voluntary mode. The TCE construct of asset specificity is somewhat 
synonymous with editability to the degree that the component can be re-configured for 
alternative uses (low asset specificity = high editability). As TCE predicts that low asset-
specific transactions are governed through less centralized governance, it follows that we 




contractual or voluntary processes. Transaction risk is more of an omnibus TCE construct 
that refers to the potential economic loss, IP infringement, enforcement costs, or any general 
legal or financial loss. It follows from TCE that higher transaction risks will be governed 
through more complex and centralized governance forms. Where these elements were present 
in our analysis of WR, they did not emerge as a focal concern from our respondents to the 
same degree. This may be a consequence of the unique culture and social norms that are 
common in scientific research organizations. Interestingly, TCE has very little to say about 
the material versus non-material embodiment of object components. This may be because 
where there is some correlation between the material attributes of the component and its 
modularity, granularity and integration characteristics, this correlation can vary considerably 
based on the design and complexity of the object. 
6.6.2 Practical Implications 
Big-science research infrastructures develop some of the most sophisticated technologies in 
existence. Researchers are currently experimenting with OSH to develop new complex 
hybrid objects that will find multiple unintended applications in different industries 
(Wareham and Pujol 2019). In parallel, commercial interest in OSH is growing, particularly 
for organizations that want to minimize the non-recurring engineering costs of nonexistent 
technologies or solutions. Although open source is a powerful model that can serve as a low-
cost source of frontier technologies, it might need to be supplemented with more traditional 
commercial development processes at specific points based on the component attributes. A 
need for hierarchical control and contractual agreements is likely greater for OSH projects 
that are highly sophisticated, which require unique expertise and greater financial 
investments. The WR case illustrates how the transposition of the open-source model to WR 
was possible with the combination of these traditional managerial mechanisms that allow 
direction-giving and control at specific, necessary phases of its development. Combined with 
the generative nature of the OS community, they made it possible for WR to be deployed as a 
powerful precision and synchronization technology in many industrial settings. It will be 
compelling to follow the emergence of OSH movements in other realms of high-end 
commercial computing such as the RISC-V movement in integrated circuits. 
6.6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Our findings are subject to limitations that warrant further investigation. First, we study an 
extreme case of OSH developed with the sponsorship of CERN. In this regard, WR is non-
representative, but it is studied with the goal of understanding something that is likely to 
become more predominant in the future. Furthermore, for theory generation, it is beneficial to 
study cases with high values on variables of critical interest. Obviously, we should be 
prudent in extrapolating our findings to contexts that do not have the same level of technical 
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sophistication, economic resources, and political stature as CERN, as these factors are clearly 
influential in the case of WR.  
As a technology, there are two aspects of WR that are also exceptional. First, as time 
measurement in the extreme is very sensitive to both the physical and logical architecture of 
the technology, WR is very tightly coupled at certain points, and this high interdependence 
between layers clearly influenced its development model. Other OSH projects may not have 
the same technical sensitivities and may therefore be amenable to a wider range of 
development modes. Second, WR is not a general use technology such as an operating 
system or scripting software; it was commissioned with a very specific purpose and is 
therefore intolerant to significant variance in its performance. Clearly, OSH projects that are 
more general purpose and not constrained by such rigid outcome requirements might be 
tolerant of greater scope drift or more organic development processes. It follows, then, that 
additional research is needed in OSH to investigate different types of hybrids in a wider 
variety of contexts to further substantiate the relationships between the attributes of hybrid 
components and multiple forms of development.  
There are some parallels between the WR OS community and the literature on platform 
complementors (Constantinides et al. 2018; Tiwana et al. 2010; Wareham et al. 2014). 
Specifically, the WR switch is similar to a stable platform core. The OS community behaves 
like platform complementors that develop more customized implementations at the node, 
gateware and software layers for specific contexts and thus attract a large number of 
heterogeneous contributors that pursue their own innovation strategies and commercial goals. 
As research on technology ecosystems and platforms is currently more extensive than OSH, 
any identifiable similarities or differences could offer valuable insights. 
6.7 Conclusion 
A nanosecond is roughly the time that it takes light to travel one foot and has long been 
considered a critical metric in computing (Markoff 2018), even in the era of single-
box/single-location computers. Currently, the industrial internet is pushing the adoption of 
massive sensor data and real-time communications; software, hardware, and data are now 
scattered over heterogeneous grid, mesh and cloud computing installations. For these 
geographically dispersed applications, the accurate measurement of time is commensurately 
difficult – yet critical – in industries that are time-sensitive or even “obsessed with time” 
(Markoff 2018 p.1).  
  WR was developed as an OSH to address the distortions created by time latency in CERN’s 
geographically distributed network. Born as a natively open-source endeavor, WR 




that is, hierarchical, contractual, or voluntary contributions, respectively. The attributes of the 
object components were clearly determinative in the choice of the development model. Our 
analysis identified and described these causal relationships and showed how different 
developmental modalities can co-exist and complement one another towards the development 
of hybrid objects with diverse component attributes. We further demonstrated how, after the 
initial sponsorship by CERN, the subsequent WR implementation and adaptation by other 
scientific infrastructures and industry was possible due to a vibrant open source community 
capable of customizing and thereby further evolving the more modifiable layers of the WR 
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Key construct definition 
Table 5 Key construct definition 
 Construct definition Source Related notions in the literature Key departure 
About the 
Object 
Hybrid object: Digital objects with material and 
non-material components. Hybrid objects include 
any hardware with middleware or software and 
encompass many of the objects being developed 
in OSH projects.  
(Faulkner and Runde 2019) Type of digital objects or digital 
artifacts or IT artifacts.  
We extract from the literature on 
digital objects the traits ascribed to 
such objects and any reference to 
digital objects with some degree of 
physicality.  
Embodiment: Material (or perpetual) and non-
material (or ephemeral) embodiment. 
(Faulkner and Runde 2009, 
2011; Yoo et al. 2010) 
Numerical representation (Manovich 
2001) 
Largely unstable, unbounded and 
resisting reification (Ekbia 2009) 
We differentiate between material 
and non-material components.  
 
Modularity: “Modularity represents the technical 
realization of the simple yet powerful idea that 
integral, en bloc objects or systems are hard to act 
upon, control, and manipulate” (Kallinikos et al. 
2013, p. 360). It is an attribute of object 
components that refers to their faculty of being 
responsive to and distinct from one another. 
When they are responsive to and distinct from one 
another, they are loosely coupled; when the 
components are responsive but not distinct from 
one another they are tightly coupled. 
(Kallinikos et al. 2010, 2013; 
Kallinikos and Mariategui 2011; 
Manovich 2001; 
Yoo et al. 2010) 
Communicability, sensibility, and 
associability (Yoo 2010; Yoo et al. 
2010) 
Modularity is the first condition for 
OS development. OS can be applied 
to costly and highly complex 
software development if it allows for 
modularity, that is, breaking down 
complex problems into "smaller, 
independent or weakly connected 
problems" that can be then dealt with 
by diverse agents. Modularity 
decreases the need for contributors to 
coordinate their task 
interdependencies actively. 
Modularity increases flexibility 
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(Benkler, 2002; Fitzgerald 2006; 
Lindberg, 2013; MacCormack, 
Rusnak, & Baldwin, 2006; Howison 
and Crowston, 2014). 
Granularity: Granularity refers to the ability of 
an object to be decomposed into numerous, small-
grained components.  Modularity refers to the 
relationship between components, whereas 
granularity refers to the number of units to which 
one can decompose the object. Both modularity 
(tightly versus loosely coupled) and granularity 
(high or low) should be considered to be 
continuums, that is, matters of degree, not discrete 
alternatives. 
(Benkler 2006; 
Kallinikos et al. 2010, 2013; 
Kallinikos and Mariategui 2011; 
Manovich 2001) 
Infinite expansibility (Faulkner and 
Runde 2009, 2011, 2019) 
 
Granularity is the second condition 
for OS development. An object can 
be OS developed if the components 
of the object are sufficiently granular 
or small-grained. The granularity of 
the components is crucial and 
determines the possibility of 
distributed agents to simultaneously 
cooperate in concurrent tasks in part 
of the same development process. ‘To 
pool a relatively large pool of 
contributors, the modules should be 
predominantly fine-grained, or small 
in size. This allows the project to 
capture contributions from large 
numbers of contributors whose 
motivation level will not sustain 
anything more than quite small 
efforts towards the project’ (Benkler 
2006, p. 10). 
Benkler, 2002, 2006; Lindberg, 2013 
Editability: Digital objects are pliable and are 
susceptible to be modified continuously and 
systematically. Editability can be achieved by 
rearranging, adding, modifying or eliminating 
(Kallinikos et al. 2013; 
Kallinikos et al. 2010; 
Kallinikos and Mariategui 2011; 
Manovich 2001) 
Accessibility (Benkler, 2006, Lessig 
2006) 
Adaptability (Zittrain, 2008; Benkler, 
2006; Lessig 2006) 
Editability is the third condition of IS 
and involves the integration 
characteristics of the object. An 




elements.  Addressability (Yoo, 2010; Yoo et al. 
2010) 
Interactivity (Kallinikos et al. 2013) 
Openness (Kallinikos et al. 2013, 
Kallinikos et al. 2010, Kallinikos and 
Mariategui, 2011) 
Recombinability (Faulkner and 
Runde 2009, 2011) 
Reprogrammability (Yoo 2010; Yoo 
et al. 2010; Kallinikos et al. 2013; 
Kallinikos and Mariategui 2011; 
Manovich 2001; Zittrain 2008 
Variability (Manovich, 2001) 
Traceability (Yoo 2010; Yoo et al. 
2010) 
Transcoding (Manovich 2001) 
cost of integrating independent 
modules and making them 
interoperable or the cost of 
connecting people to tasks is 
sufficiently low due to efficient and 
cheap network communications 
(Benkler, 2002; Langlois and 
Garzarelli, 2008; Howison and 
Crowston, 2014). 
Reproducibility: Minimal marginal cost. (Faulkner and Runde 2009, 
2011) 
Transferability (Zittrain, 2008), 
Benkler, 2006), Lessig, 2006) 
Distributedness, which refers to 
seldom being contained within a 
single source or institution 
(Kallinikos et al. 2013) 
Non-rivalry, which concerns the 
possibility of an object being used 
simultaneously by a large number of 
parties (Faulkner and Runde 2013 
p.815, 2009, 2011, 2019) 
Reproducibility is associated with 
embodiment, as it describes the 
pragmatic or economic cost of 
producing and distributing multiple 
units of the object or component 
(Kallinikos et al. 2010). 
About the 
developme
Development: The “social process of designing, 
developing, and implementing the technical 




Based on TCE, we identify two 
generalized development models (in 
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nt  artifact, usually in a specific organizational 
context and over time”.  
TCE terms, governance structures) 
based on decreasing levels of 
centralized coordination and 
direction-giving: 1) hierarchical 
control and 2) contractual 
agreements, with the addition of 3) 
volunteer contributions from the OS 
literature. 
Organizational attributes of a development 
process: major characteristics that describe the 
organization of a particular (or type of) 
development process (cf. ‘how’ a development 
process is organized). 
Based on (Crowston and 
Howison 2006; Feller and 
Fitzgerald 2002; Fitzgerald and 
Feller 2002; Raymond 1999) 
- - 
About OS development 
 
Autonomy and the self-selection of tasks: OS is 
characterized by a collaborative effort where 
agents combine effort voluntarily and self-select 
their tasks, which does not mean that they do not 
receive pecuniary compensation (though that may 
often be true) but rather that the collaborators 
choose their tasks in a similar way that arises in 
the assignment of sellers to products in a classic 
market (Lindberg, 2013). “Work is not assigned 
to developers; instead, they choose what to work 
on” (Sharma et al. 2002 p.10). 
(Crowston, 1997; Howison and 
Crowston, 2014; Lindberg, 
Berente, Gaskin and Lyytinen, 
2016; Maha and Vaast, 2015; 
Shah 2005, 2006; Di Tullio and 
Stapies, 2014) 
- - 
Loosely centralized: OS is characterized by 
distributed teams that have access to the source 
code, submit code patches to solve problems and 
(Cutosksy et al., 1996; Moon & 
Sproull, 2000, Feller and 





add functionalities to the software. al. 2002) 
Virtual boundaries: OS is characterized by a 
geographically distributed community defined by 
virtual rather than physical boundaries. OS 
communities do not have well-defined boundaries 
and remain open to new contributors, which can 
join at any time and are fluid in allowing any 
member to leave the community. Users can not 
only contribute to the source code but also test the 
software, report bugs, or suggest new features. 
(Cook 2001; Feller et al. 2008; 
Feller and Fitzgerald 2002, 
2002; Markus 2007) 
 
- - 
Asynchronous collaboration and open 
superposition of tasks: OS is characterized by 
massive parallel development, debugging, and 
asynchronous collaboration supported by the 
internet as a communication, collaboration and 
distribution platform and by concurrent 
versioning software. Complex OS collective work 
can be completed in a sequence of layers or 
modules with distinct functionality and payoffs 
that do not depend on future work for its utility. 
(Cook 2001; Feller et al. 2008; 
Feller and Fitzgerald 2001, 
2002; Markus 2007) 
 
- - 
Infrastructural tools that facilitate parallel 
development: The internet and concurrent 
versioning systems allow the submission and 
responsive testing of code patches and the 
frequent releases that characterize OS. 
(Baldwin and Clark 2006; 
Egyedi and Joode 2004; Feller 







Asset specificity: The degree to which an asset 
can be redeployed to alternative uses and by 
alternative users without any sacrifice of 
productive value. 
(Dyer 1997; Macher and 
Richman 2008; Williamson 
1975, 1985, 1989, 1996) 
 
 
See Table 1, which address the relation among the TCE concepts with 
 
 207 
used Duration: The time during which the transaction 
will transpire. 
attributes of hybrid object components. 
Frequency: How often specific transactions 
occur. 
Search costs: Costs associated with searching 
markets for supplier/product availability and the 
determination of price and quality. 
Uncertainty: The uncertainty surrounding the 
transaction that includes market, geopolitical or 
institutional uncertainties. 
Monitoring and enforcement costs: Includes the 
costs associated with ensuring that each party 
fulfills a predetermined set of obligations and 
with any legal costs required for enforcement. 
Interdependence: The degree to which a product 
or process can be decomposed into discrete tasks 
and completed by individual vendors. 
 
(Related to)  
Product and process complexity: Relating to the 
number of components and the extent of the 
interactions to manage between these 
components. 
Transaction risk: The potential economic or 






Example of interview guide  
About the organization, roles, and responsibilities 
• What does your organization do? 
• What is your role at the organization? 
• When did you got involved in WR? 
• What was your task? 
• Has your task changed over time? 
Initial engagement 
• How did the organization know about and initially get involved in WR? 
• How did your organization fund the investment for collaborating in WR? Did it change 
over time? 
• (in case it was via a contract): What was the reason for the contract? Duration? What 
happened after the contract? 
Motivational aspects for collaborating 
• What were the motivational aspects behind the collaboration?  
• How did these motivations change over time? 
About WR technology and the process of development 
• What are the components, functions, and applications of WR? 
• Please describe the development cycle of WR (including versions). 
• How did the development of WR hardware differ from WR gateware and software? 
• How did the different development tasks relate to one another for hardware, gateware, 
software? 
• What were, in your opinion, the major events in the development of WR? Why? 
Coordination 
• How did you develop your task? 
• Did you collaborate with someone? 
• Did you report to anyone inside and outside your organization? 
• Which tools did you use to develop and communicate the outcomes of your task? 
• Did you have meetings? For what purpose? 
• How did you use the repository, wiki, mailing list? Others? 
The role of the license 
• What is the OSH license?  
• Did you participate in the debate on the OSH license? 




Table 6. Data analysis and theoretical constructs related to the development models 
Nº Events Time Developme
nt phase 
Theoretical observation Theoretical construct 
(1)  Diligent requirements collection through CERN- supplier 
contract- to gather joint (cross-organizational) specifications-  
2008 Specificatio
ns 
Cosylab was called in to gather requirements by using input 
from CERN, GSI’s Facility for Antiproton and Ion Research 
(FAIR) project, L’Institut de Physique Nucléaire de Lyon 
(IPNL), and ITER, the international nuclear fusion project. 
Requirements were collected through the phone, video 
conferences and in person. The requirements were organized 
into layers, starting at the lowest (physical) layer and moving 
up until the event distribution processor. Then, commonalities 
were listed, and the potential incompatibilities were identified. 
Contractual agreement for 
specifications 
(2)  Publication of all specifications by CERN: All specifications files 




Open publication of all specifications so that developers could 
join the collective endeavor 
Voluntary contributions 
(3)  Contract to create a web-based Open Hardware Repository portal 
CERN- supplier contract.  







CERN decided to outsource the development of a repository for 
the following reasons, according to testimonials: 
• Time saved by having fast research results 
• Increased quality of the requirements by adding a wide 
field of expertise 
• Time saved by flexible addition of complementary 
development services 
• Tailored solution that fit an open-source community 
Contractual agreement to 
develop an infrastructural tool 
to allow further open source 
development 
(4)  Provision of an open repository to allow community collaboration 2009- 
presen
t 
All Open repository contents are considered to be the knowledge 
hub of all the WR community. 
Voluntary contributions 




users   presen
t 
outside communications and requests to enter the community, 
implementation requirements, etc. 
(6)  Contract with supplier for WR switch hardware design (e.g., 
cards) 
2008 Design CERN outsourced to an expert engineering company the design 
of the WR switch (only hardware) to accelerate the design 
process.  
Contractual agreement for 
hardware design 
 
(7)  Contract with supplier for WR switch software and gateware 2008 Design CERN outsourced to an expert software company the 
development of core-specific software and gateware for the 
switch to accelerate the design process.  
Contractual agreement for 
software design 
 
(8)  Quality and design review of software and hardware by CERN 
design unit and Beams department 
2008 Design and 
Prototyping 
In-house: quality review of the design of both 
software/hardware core WR 
Hierarchical control 
(9)  Contract with supplier for assemblage (production of prototypes) 2012 - 
2013 
Prototyping CERN supplier for the hardware design, outsourced the 
assemblage of WR switch prototypes. Although it was 
outsourced by the supplier, CERN had direct control on the 
quality (1-year iterations due to gaps from production files to 
actual production). 
Contractual agreement for 
prototypes 
(10)  Contract with second supplier for WR production (GSI- Creotech) 2017 Prototyping GSI contracted a second supplier to produce WR prototypes to 
look for redundancy in the system.  
Contractual agreements for 
prototypes 
(11)  Contract with second supplier for WR production (CERN- 
Creotech) to compare quality 
2017 Prototyping CERN purchased from second provider WR switch to test the 
quality and compare it with the first provider. 
Contractual agreements for 
prototypes 
(12)  Plugfest to check interoperability with other companies’ hardware 
designs and to showcase WR to attract developers  
2010 Design  Voluntary contributions 
(13)  Contract CERN- Supplier to develop a WR Starting Kit- to attract 
users and developers (peer review). 
2012 Testing (and 
Design) 
Starting Kit consisted of a couple of Spartan-6-based boards 
called SPEC, one of which can be configured to be a master 
and the other as a slave to encourage users to perform early-
evaluation experiments. WR starting kit developed 
Voluntary contributions 
(14)  Coordination meetings with CERN personnel 2008- 
2019 
All Section meetings were led by the director of the section to 
manage and coordinate actions across WR development. 
Hierarchical control 








All Workshops with all the WR community to coordinate and 
direct tasks. Conclusion – agreement after the first workshop – 
Timing Workshop Summary 
Summary of the Timing Workshop held 15 February 2008: 
CERN will be the manager for all the tasks related to WR 
development.  
Hierarchical control (Project 
management – task assignments 
across community) 
(17)  Documentation control by CERN (including schematics and PCB 
documentation by CERN) 
2008- 
2019 
Design Upload all documentation of the schematics and PCB. Identify 
incompleteness with respect to prototyping (flaws), improve 
the quality of documentation and guarantee the accessibility of 
such information.  
Hierarchical control 
(18)  Release of an open source hardware license v.1.1 to attract 
voluntary developers (not via contracts) and govern the 






A new open source hardware license will attract contributors 
from outside the organization. 
The research group released Version 1.1 of its open hardware 
license (OHL) three months after the initial license was 
published. The license borrows concepts from open source 
software licensing models but governs the use of hardware 
designs instead of source code. 
Voluntary contributions  
(19)  Release second version of open source hardware license  2011 All Release second version of open source hardware license to 
attract voluntary developers (not via contracts) and govern the 
distribution of the open hardware designs. 
Voluntary contributions 
(20)  Release of an open source hardware license v.1.1  2013 All Release of an open source hardware license v.1.1 to attract 
voluntary developers (not via contracts) and govern the 
distribution of the open hardware designs. 
Voluntary contributions 
(21)  Development of an open source tool that allows open hardware 
design (KiKat) 
2019 Design Development of alternative tools to the proprietary ones that 












 Discussion and conclusion 
 This final chapter integrates the findings of the articles that compose chapters 3,4,5 
and 6, as well as discussing the theoretical contributions, managerial and policy implications, 







7.1 Theoretical contributions 
The main goal of this Ph.D. dissertation is to understand the tension between two competing 
vectors that are influencing big science infrastructures: 1) calls for more openness in 
scientific processes and outcomes, and 2) a need for more effective technology transfer. 
On one hand, studies #1 and #3 have offered a contextual overview of the dynamics within 
each of these exogenous forces in isolation and have provided contributions to a) the 
literature of open science, and b) technology transfer, respectively. A better understanding of 
each vectorial force has enabled an exploration of the dynamics at the intersection of the two 
forces. Considering study #2 and study #4 as a joint product, we extract several broader 
contributions to the study of information systems development at the intersect of the two 
vectors (figure 1). We conclude with table 1 that summarizes the theoretical contributions 
and normative implications. 
































































































7.1.1 Contribution to open science literature 
Open science literature suggests that scientific data sharing confers increased costs to 
scientists and their institutions without commensurate professional benefits (Borgman 2015; 
Edwards 2019; Edwards et al. 2011; Tenopir et al. 2015; Wallis et al. 2013). Yet we lack a 
recent overview of whether, and how, data is shared across scientists. 
The inequality of policy attention towards scientific data sharing compared to other trends 
within open science (i.e. open access) has resulted in a lack of evidence about if scientists 
share their data, how they share data, and the reasons behind their data sharing behavior. 
While data about open access publications are readily available, indicators about scientific 
data sharing have been lacking. 
In consequence, generating a comparable global survey data set informs future policy 
discussions and is one of the primary contributions to this literature stream. Additionally, the 
analysis of the study #1 data also advances that there is no homogenous explanation of why 
the number of researchers who have shared their data remains stable from 2016 to 2018. The 
study confirms the difficulties of scientific data sharing (e.g. Borgman 2015; Edwards et al. 
2011; Piwowar et al. 2007), but further contributes by uncovering the delicate system of 
mechanisms that need to be implemented to align individual and collective incentives in a 
manner consistent with the specific epistemic cultures of each scientific community and their 
professional practices. Specifically, in comparing two scientific communities (HEP and MB), 
the study provides a theoretical explanation of why the slow adoption of data sharing is due 
to an intertwined web of varied cultures and rational pursuits. Where HEP and MB have 
significantly different epistemic cultures, research infrastructures, and scientific practices, 
both communities have established information infrastructures with mechanisms designed to 
mitigate the domain-specific costs and facilitate data sharing and re-use. In short, the study 
suggests that modularity and time dilation can be employed as governance mechanisms that 
reconcile the collective benefits of the scientific community with individual academic career 
incentives. Both mechanisms can be employed across various epistemic cultures to 
accommodate divergent practices across scientific communities. Appropriate and transparent 
governance enacted in the information infrastructures can mitigate the perceived risks 
preventing scientific data sharing.   
7.1.2 Contribution to the literature on technology transfer in big science 
The present dissertation also contributes to the literature on big science by opening the 'black 
box' of how big science brings new technologies to society in applications previously 





While previous literature extensively reflects on the technology contributions of big science 
infrastructures (Autio 2014; Autio et al. 2003, 2004; Castelnovo et al. 2018; Hallonsten 2014; 
Heidler and Hallonsten 2015) and has mostly based on anecdotal examples of scientific 
discoveries and individual scientists' experiences, yet we lacked knowledge on how such 
infrastructures may purposefully realize such serendipity process in a more systemic level 
(Autio, 2014).  
The third study sits in this literature and explores the dynamics behind the aim of transferring 
big science solutions to unanticipated market applications through the analysis of the 170 
projects funded under the ATTRACT initiative. The analysis uncovers four modes wherein 
serendipity can be cultivated: Recombination of technologies; repurposing; building and 
extending technology from previous research; and AI and ML to augment existing 
technologies.  
The study contributes to evolving research on serendipity beyond its simple 
conceptualization as a natural accident and suggests that big science infrastructure can 
proactively shape the transfer of their technological solutions to other industrial settings.  
7.1.3 Contribution to IS development 
Finally, and probably the major theoretical contribution of the dissertation relies upon the 
intersection of these two vectors (i.e. open science and technology transfer) and sits at the 
core of IS development. By assessing two different open science dimensions in Open Targets 
(OT) and White Rabbit (WR) (i.e. data commons and open-source hardware), the cases help 
elucidate the specific mechanisms that organizations use to reconcile the tensions caused 
when for-profit entities contribute to opensource or commons-based resource pools.  
In particular, in the case of White Rabbit, we describe the friction of transposing an open-
source model of development to digital objects with physical components (hybrids). We 
isolate how hybrid objects deviate in nature and form, that is, their attributes, in comparison 
to pure non-material digital objects (Faulkner and Runde 2009, 2013, 2019). Thereafter, the 
attributes of hybrid objects are analyzed under the conditions of open source development 
(i.e. high modularity, high granularity, and low integration costs), to understand the 
applicability of the 'open source way' in OSH development (Benkler 2002; Feller et al. 2002, 
2008; Fitzgerald 2006; Howison and Crowston 2014). In the WR case, we found that open-
source development was complemented with more traditional commercial development 
processes at specific points. The case uncovers the need for hierarchical control and 
contractual agreements that allow direction-giving and coordination in the development of a 
highly sophisticated OSH such as WR. This was a result of the highly complex and 
interdependent nature of the technology, which requires centralized control, technical 
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expertise, and more considerable financial investments. Combined with the generative nature 
of the OS community, WR was successfully developed and deployed as a powerful precision 
and synchronization technology at many scientific research infrastructures, and sequentially, 
in numerous industrial settings. This wider diffusion of WR outside of its immediate 
scientific purview is a result of the open-source community supporting it. 
The case of Open Targets moves to a different open science dimension (i.e. data commons). 
It sheds light on the dynamic governance of an information infrastructure that overcomes the 
challenge of simultaneously aligning individual and collective interests (Constantanides 
2012, Constantinides and Barrett 2015; Hanseth and Monteiro 1997). By integrating ideas 
from information infrastructure scholarship and collective action theory (Hardin 1968, 1982; 
Ostrom 1990), we theorize that the openness-attribute of information infrastructure is a 
manageable with appropriate mechanisms that enable movement from private to open 
workspaces. This allows contributions to common goods by for-profit companies that need 
opacity and closure following competitive and market logic. In other words, to overcome the 
historical, social dilemmas of collective action (i.e., free-riding and overconsumption) and 
provide the effective incentives for contributors to invest in the commons, two mechanisms 
are employed that afford the fluid movement between open and closed spaces of work: the 
principle of modularity, which refers to the technical architecture of the infrastructure, and 
the role of a broker or a trusted third party, that serves as an arbiter amongst the organizations 
to orchestrate the exchanges. 
Taken together both studies, what we can appreciate is the parallelism between the fluid 
navigation through open and opaque spaces in Open Targets and the hybrid development 
process in WR. In OT, such hybridity between open and dark places made 'openness' 
compatible with the traditional, restricted, and controlled spaces of work where protected 
R&D processes take place to pursue the competitive race towards a new drug. In WR, the 
‘hybrid development process’ made ‘openness’ and the generativity of open-source 
compatible with hierarchical control and contractual agreements to coordinate and afford 
direction-giving in the development of a complex OSH such as WR. What the combination 
of the two studies teaches us is that ‘openness’ needs some degree of opacity to find the 
proper equilibrium between the two vectorial forces. The studies go one step further and 
advance how organizations can navigate across the shadows; that is, graduated levels of 
transparency and accessibility.  
In both cases, the very prominent role of the digital artifact is evident. In OT, the technical 
attributes of a multi-layered infrastructure designed around the principle of modularity 
afforded navigation between scientific openness and closed market logic, making individual 




understand where and how different agents act, we can decipher the mechanisms that 
emerged to make for-profit and community-based collaboration in both White Rabbit and 
Open Targets development. In both studies, by identifying the technical attributes of the 
artifacts we manage to relate them to the governance approach that stakeholders follow to 
find the optimum equilibrium between openness and technology commercialization.  
Equally important and related to the technical characteristics, both studies feature the role of 
the organizational attributes that accompany the development of a data commons 
infrastructure or open-source hardware development. The arbitrage role of an operational 
team at Open Targets that behaves as a trusted-third party governing the exchanges between 
the organizations, or the orchestrating role of CERN who grandfathered and directed the 
development of White Rabbit.  
In sum, when contrasting the dynamics of each of the vectorial forces (i.e. open science and 
technology transfer) with the friction across the vectors, we elucidate the intricate 
complexities that interact when scientific institutions attempt to simultaneously foster 
openness in research processes while boosting the commercialization of their technologies. 
Our case studies show how the technical attributes of a digital ‘object’ or information 
infrastructure combine with effective arbitration towards effective policy interventions. Table 
1 provides an overview of the contributions and normative implications of the different 










Table 1. Overview of the contributions of the different studies and normative implications 
Study # 1:  The stickiness of scientific data  2: Opaque spaces of the commons: Governing 
information infrastructures in Life Sciences 
3: Systematising serendipity 
for big science 
infrastructures 




Do researchers share their data? How do 
they share their data? Which mechanisms 
emerge to enable researchers to share 
their data? 
How do organizations develop commons-based 
information infrastructures that govern access to 
collective resources while simultaneously protecting 
the members’ private interests? 
Which are the formative 
conditions of serendipity 
transforming big science research 
towards commercial applications? 
How do the attributes of a hybrid object and its 





Collective action theory 
Information Infrastructures 
Collective Action theory 
Serendipity Digital objects and IT artifacts 
Open-source 
Transaction Costs Economics 
Contribution  
 
Epistemic cultures (communitarian versus 
individualistic) coexist with rational cost-
benefit estimations   
The principles of modularity and time 
dilation are mechanisms that allow 
fostering data sharing practices by 
making compatible individual and 
collective interests. Both mechanisms 
allow mitigating differences in more 
communitarian and individualistic 
scientific epistemic cultures 
Two dynamic processes: Folding and unfolding to 
transition from open to opaque spaces of work 
The two processes are afforded by the principles of 
modularity (technical architecture of the infrastructure) 
and brokerage (organizational attributes of the 
infrastructure) 
Four serendipity models: 
1. Recombination 
2. Repurposing: applying 
technology to another field 
3. Incremental: build and extend 
technology from previous 
research 
4. AI and ML to augment existing 
technologies 
Hybrid development model 
The physical nature of the components of 
hybrid objects inhibits the conditions of open 
source development and leads to the emergence 
of a hybrid model that combines hierarchical 




Sharing scientific data is not a 
dichotomous decision, but it needs to 
establish a degree towards what data do 
you share (modularity), and when do you 
share it (time dilation - embargos).  
Mechanisms shaping incentives and 
rewards need to be designed locally to 
account for differences in epistemic 
cultures and suggesting that one-size-
does-not-fit-all.  
The development of data infrastructures based upon 
commons needs to allow the dynamic transition 
between open and opaque spaces of work to preserve 
the private incentives of for-profit to invest in the 
infrastructure development and to overcome the 
historical, social dilemmas of collective action (i.e., 
free-riding and overconsumption).  
A modular architecture combined with the role of a 
broker or a trusted third party, who is assigned 
coordination and arbitration tasks to orchestrate and 
mediate the flows of data are required to overcome the 
apparent incompatibility of openness versus 
commercialization of R&D outputs.   
Big science infrastructure can 
actively shape the transfer of their 
technological solutions to 
alternative industrial settings by 
proactively cultivating four 
serendipity models. 
 
The material aspect of hybrids objects can 
reduce object editability, granularity, 
reproducibility, and integration characteristics. 
While open source is a powerful model that can 
serve as to leverage crowd knowledge towards 
developing frontier technologies, it might need 
to be supplemented with more traditional 
commercial development processes at specific 
points based on the component attributes (i.e. 





7.2 Managerial and policy implications 
The managerial implications of the Ph.D. thesis are multiple. With the COVID-19 
crisis, the policy attention on open science has grown. The response of the scientific 
community to COVID-19 outbreak has been to embrace the principles of open science 
unprecedented levels, including: sharing preprints to speed up access to research 
outputs; global scientific data sharing related to COVID-19 to accelerate discovery 
(Pells 2020); and the development of open-source hardware prototypes of ventilators 
(Buytaert et al. 2020). The examples have only been the tip of the iceberg of what some 
open science ideologists have been trying to pursue for the last decade. We can predict 
that the open science policy mandate is not only here to stay but will push much further.  
Yet, although we know how openness help to leverage the spread of skills and expertise 
and accelerate discovery, we see also in the exemplar space of COVID-19 that this goal 
can be at odds with the companies engaged in the commercialization of ventilators 
(Buytaert et al. 2020); additionally, it also induces fear into pharma concerning the 
safeguard of data and knowledge flows in the race towards a COVID vaccine or other 
treatments (Darzi 2020).  
The present dissertation places itself at the center of this tension and tries to overcome 
the 'dualistic' ideological debates where stakeholders position themselves at the 
extremes of the open-closed continuum in policy discussions. As such, we try to offer a 
nuanced perspective on how to pursue a 'smart' openness and inform policy 
interventions by suggesting governance mechanisms that manage not only to safeguard 
economic interests of for-profits in their R&D and innovation pursuits, but also to align 
their individual interests with the open science demands. 
While the full industrial impact of scientific data infrastructures based upon commons 
and open-source hardware is yet to come, both the Open Targets and White Rabbit 
studies offer inspiring formulas of how they frame the tension as a manageable trade-off 
with appropriate governance mechanisms.  In an exercise to describe the policy 
relevance of the results, we provide a summary of the policy implications of the studies 
in table 2. 
We conclude by elaborating two examples of the major policy implications and 
resulting recommendations from the dissertation results: First, we consider the present 
context where the European Commission is currently investing in the development of a 
major scientific data infrastructure, the European Open Science Cloud (EOSC) 
(European Commission, 2019), which is foreseen to accelerate scientific data sharing 
across European countries and beyond. Our results suggest that modularity should be a 
major characteristic of the EOSC architecture to successfully attract the engagement of 
a broad range of the extended community, including for-profit entities. Developing an 
infrastructure with different layers and access rights while simultaneously allowing 
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embargo periods over the data (time dilation) can allow organizations and scientists to 
navigate across their required levels of opacity to align their specific interests with the 
common good. Allowing some degrees of ‘darkness’ in EOSC design will also 
contribute to achieving larger engagement of the wide community and, hence, to its 
sustainability. Paradoxically, if the rational pursuits of commercial organizations or 
scientists’ professional incentives are ignored in the technical development and 
governance of the EOSC, it may jeopardize the uptake of such infrastructures and lead 
to wasteful public expenditures.  
A second example can be taken from open source hardware, where public research 
infrastructures are experimenting with this new formula in the procurement of their 
scientific experimental tools (Pearce, 2012). Open-source hardware offers these 
organizations the possibility to avoid vendor lock-in, to merge disperse expertise from 
their network of suppliers and contributors, and at the same time, align their public 
mission by fully disseminating the design of their technologies. However, if funding 
agencies do not permit some degrees of darkness through permissive open-source 
hardware licenses that allow proprietary (and non-disclosed) developments to emerge 
around the core technology, this well-intentioned policy could fail to engage core 
contributions by those seeking subsequent commercial exploitation on the periphery.  
In sum, openness in science needs some degree of opacity to find the proper equilibrium 
between the two the social benefits of science and the commercial interests of some of 
its most important contributors. In essence, our analysis suggests that policies calling 
for carte-blanche openness that ignore the incentives of many profit-seeking 
organizations that make valuable contributions to the larger ecosystems supporting 
scientific programs may have undesirable consequences. It is important to move away 
from naïve ideological debates between the pro-Open with pro-IP advocates and employ 
hybrid governance approaches that allow resolving the divergent interests of its various 
stakeholders. This dissertation suggests that policy attention needs to be focused on 




Table 2. Overview of the general policy implications of the different studies  
Study # 1:  The stickiness of scientific data  2: Opaque spaces of the commons 3: Systematising serendipity  4: White Rabbit at CERN 
Findings  
 
66% of researchers declare making their data 
available. The % remains stable, with no 
growth shown over the past two years.  Data 
sharing significantly varies across disciplines. 
Both communitarian and individualistic 
scientific communities (different epistemic 
cultures), employ three mechanisms (with some 
variation) to enable data sharing in both 
scientific communities: Modularity; Time 
dilation; and Boundary organization to establish 
transparent data governance and mediate the 
identification of the 'bona fide' researcher.  
Folding and unfolding are two governance 
processes that allow organizations to transition 
from open to opaque spaces of work. These two 
governance processes are afforded by the 
principles of modularity and brokerage that are 
articulated through the technical and 
organizational attributes of the infrastructure. 
These two processes allow overcoming the 
historical social dilemma of collective action 
(i.e. free riding and overconsumption) 
Four serendipity models: 
1. Recombination 
2. Repurposing: applying technology to another 
field 
3. Incremental: build and extend technology 
from previous research 
4. AI and ML to augment existing technologies 
The physical nature of the components of 
hybrid objects inhibits the conditions of open 
source development and leads to the emergence 
of a hybrid model that combines hierarchical 





Mechanisms shaping incentives and rewards 
towards scientists to foster scientific data 
sharing need to be designed locally to account 
for differences in epistemic cultures and 
suggesting that one-size-does-not-fit-all.  
The development of public data infrastructures 
(or the federation of existing ones) needs to 
allow the navigation between open but also 
restricted spaces of work combined with 
embargo periods over the data (or time dilation 
between the creation and disclosure of the data) 
to preserve private and individual incentives.  
These infrastructures need to be governed by a 
trusted third-party of the community (with 
bilateral Non-disclosure agreements) that 
behaves as an arbiter and orchestrates the data 
flow.   
The policy mandate of the increasing impact of 
big science infrastructures can be materialized 
in a systemic way by the infrastructures through 
purposively facilitating inside their activities 
four serendipity paths (corresponding to the 
four serendipity models).  
New public funding instruments can 
experiment with the four models to accelerate 
the technology transfer of big science 
technological solutions to alternative industrial 
settings  
Public procurement policies of research 
infrastructures at large can foster the model of 
open-source hardware – as they have done for 
open-source software. By advocating for this 
model of development in their procurements 
they will allow large peer review of their 
technologies, will avoid vendor lock-in 
situations, and obtain system efficiency gains 
by avoiding redundant technology 
developments across infrastructures.  Yet, the 
voluntary contributions of open source need to 
be complemented by more traditional 
commercial development processes at specific 
points based on the technology attributes (i.e. 
editability, granularity, integration, and 
reproducibility). 
Open-source hardware licenses applied to these 
public procurements need to consider allowing 
contributors to engage and not disclose 
proprietary developments around the core open 
and standardized hardware technology to 
protect for-profit interests and enable an 
ecosystem to emerge around the technology.  
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7.3 Limitations and future research  
Notwithstanding its theoretical contributions, this Ph.D. dissertation also has several 
limitations. While the individual limitations of each study are explained separately in 
each chapter, this section aims at providing a holistic perspective. 
Regarding the study of data sharing attitudes and practices, where the sample sizes were 
large, the period between the two surveys was only two years. Given the phenomenon 
studied, this sampling is likely insufficient to detect long-term patterns. Additional 
surveys with the same instrument can enrich our current data. Additionally, research 
that purposefully examines the heterogeneity in data sharing practices across disciplines 
can benefit from in-depth comparisons of high-intensive and low-intensive data sharing 
scientific communities to explore whether the mechanisms uncovered in our study to 
mitigate the domain-specific barriers and facilitate data sharing and re-use are 
applicable in other scientific contexts. 
Open Targets is constituted by some of the world's most formidable research 
organizations together with highly capitalized pharmaceutical companies. As such, the 
generalizability of the findings to other information infrastructures in different contexts 
might also be limited. It should be noted in the case of OT is also exceptional because 
of the extremely competitive nature of the life sciences industry. Other information 
infrastructures may not have the historical precedence of secrecy, legal protection, and 
long investment lifecycles. 
The challenge of the case method is to generalize the findings. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that there is a trade-off between internal and external validity.  White Rabbit 
is also a very sophisticated and expensive technology. It is plausible that OSH with less 
cost and complexity could be developed in entirely different modalities. Hence, while 
we acknowledge the difficulties of generalizing the results of OT or WR to the larger 
populations, it is equally valid that the internal validity of our findings in both studies is 
the main focus. Our results are deeply grounded in the contexts under study, and by 
employing established procedures in inductive research (Miles and Huberman 1994), 
the two cases sought to maximize the internal validity of our results.  
Regarding the study of ATTRACT, we exploit a unique dataset of 170 projects funded 
with €100,000 to develop a proof-of-concept commercial application within one year. 
This is also a unique policy intervention historically unprecedented in the European 
Commissions. As such, we encourage more systematic analysis with other novel 
datasets to understand other approaches by which a serendipity process can be 
identified, brokered, and cultivated. In the future, the role of generative computing and 




Finally, by studying an extreme case of OSH developed with the sponsorship of CERN, 
we acknowledge that WR is non-representative, yet it is studied to understand 
something likely to become more predominant in the future. Extreme cases are 
particularly useful for theory generation, as they exhibit high values on variables of 
critical interest (Gerring 2007). Nevertheless, the level of technical complexity, 
financial resources, and political stature of CERN are likely unique yet essential 
influences in the case.  Hence, we should be prudent in extrapolating our results to a 
different context that does not display the same local characteristics. We encourage 
additional research in OSH to investigate the heterogeneity of hybrids in different 
contexts to substantiate further the relationships between the attributes of hybrid 
components and multiple forms of development. Recent announcements of OSH 
ventilators being developed in response to the COVID 19 virus are an obvious 
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